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Introduction 
 
 
Aim of the research 
 
For over four decades, between the end World War II and 1989, Italy’s security policy was first and 
foremost characterized by passiveness. Arguably, one might have wondered if such a thing existed 
altogether.  In the context of the Cold War, Italian armed forces were trained to defend the country 
from an attack from east that never actually materialized and crossed the border very rarely to 
participate in peacekeeping operations. However, in the last thirty years, Italy dramatically 
transformed the way in which it projects its military force, turning from a “security consumer” to a 
“security provider” (Walston 2007). Notably, Italian armed forces actively participated in a multitude 
of Military Operations Abroad (MOA), often promoted by multilateral institutions such as the United 
Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the European Union (EU). In 
particular, Italy provided a significant contribution in all the major areas of crisis in the last years. 
Italian armed forces conducted air strikes in Kosovo and Libya, fought the Talibans in Afghanistan, 
guaranteed security and delivered assistance to Iraqi people after the end of the Saddam Hussein’s 
regime, contributed to the respect of a ceasefire at the border between Lebanon and Israel. The 
numbers of this commitment to MOAs are glaring. For example, in 2006, Italy has become the largest 
contributor to UN peacekeeping missions in Europe in terms of personnel deployed, providing a 
higher share than wealthier states such as United Kingdom, France and Germany (Carati and Locatelli 
2017). 
 
Considering how Italian strategic culture was permeated by pacifism, such development is 
particularly puzzling. From different perspectives, various scholars attempted to explain why 
successive Italian governments decided to send troops abroad as part of multilateral interventions 
(Brighi 2013; Carati and Locatelli 2017; Cladi and Locatelli 2018; Davidson 2014). These studies 
enumerated a list of drivers including the protection of national interest, compliance with the 
humanitarian principles of the operations, and the attempt to raise the country’s profile. Most of these 
works emphasized this latter factor as the key explanatory variable. Davidson (2014) found that the 
importance attached by Italy’s policymakers to the alliance with the United States is fundamental to 
understand contributions to operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. He also stressed that the decision 
not to participate in the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 but only providing troops in a successive 
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phase was not driven by a questioning of the transatlantic ties but rather grounded on electoral 
concerns deriving from substantial public contestation of the war. Furthermore, Carati and Locatelli 
(2017) confirmed that “fellowship”, i.e. the tendency to follow allies and partners in order to be 
considered as a key actor within the international community, is the most crucial element to explain 
Italian participation in the intervention in Kosovo and Libya. Cladi and Locatelli (2018) underlined 
that, among other factors, a strong emphasis on multilateralism pushed the Italian government to 
deploy an outstanding number of soldiers for the reinforcement of UN peacekeeping operation in 
Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 2006.  
 
However, such change in Italian security and defence policy was also surely fostered by an emerging 
consensus among Italian political parties. Through a qualitative analysis of parliamentary debates and 
votes, a few studies highlighted the presence of a widespread party support for MOAs, bringing on 
the same side the main centre-left and centre-right parties (Calossi and Coticchia 2009; Coticchia 
2011; Ignazi et al. 2012). Such bipartisan support was based on a shared discourse emphasizing the 
humanitarian aims and multilateral legitimation of the missions and, simultaneously, removing any 
sort of military dimension. As Ignazi et al. (2012) argued, the implicit agreement among Italy’s main 
parties was: “just don’t call it war”. Such message sometimes conflicted with the operational reality 
on the ground in which Italian troops were involved in complex and perilous tasks such as 
counterinsurgency. Other than genuinely originating in the beliefs of Italy’s political elites, this 
narrative was also designed to avoid potential audience costs from a traditionally pacifist public 
opinion. A few studies demonstrated that when policymakers adopted a different rhetorical 
framework or the consensus on the humanitarian and multilateral nature of the mission was contested, 
public support significantly decreased (Coticchia 2014; 2015; Coticchia and De Simone 2016; 
Olmastroni 2014a). Such consensus did not extend to some extreme left and right parties who were, 
in most cases, pivotal coalition partners. However, Coticchia and Davidson (2018) emphasized how 
these extreme parties never seriously threatened to defect on such issue as they did not consider it as 
sufficiently salient and feared of being blamed by their own voters for making the cabinet collapse.  
 
The aim of my dissertation is further exploring how Italian parties positioned and interacted on MOAs 
during the so-called “Second Republic”, i.e. between 1994 and 2013. Therefore, this doctoral thesis 
will address the following questions: “why did Italian parties support MOAs?”, “Why did they vote 
in favour of MOAs?”, and, finally, “Why did not extreme coalition partners leave the cabinet in spite 
of the decision to participate in a MOAs?”. As suggested, a few studies have already addressed these 
issues (Calossi and Coticchia 2009; Coticchia 2011; Coticchia and Davidson 2018; Ignazi et al. 2012). 
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However, a systematic and comprehensive investigation of how Italian parties behaved with regards 
to MOAs is currently missing. In some cases, this depends on the fact that existing works tackled this 
issue within the broader examination of Italy’s post-Cold War increasing activism in peace and 
security operations (Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012). Furthermore, due to the timing of publication, 
some works did not manage to take into account relevant MOAs such as the one in Libya (2011) 
(Calossi and Coticchia 2009; Ignazi et al. 2012). Notably, none of these works has employed 
quantitative methods and statistical analyses. To sum up, there is substantial margin for updating and 
improving this research agenda. Therefore, the main goal of my dissertation is providing an 
innovative and original contribution to the understanding of the role of political parties in Italy’s troop 
deployments for multilateral interventions after the end of the Cold War.  
 
By doing so, this dissertation will contribute to three scholarly debates. The first concerns the 
dynamics of party competition in Italy during the Second Republic. Some studies highlighted how, 
due to the presence of an alternation in government between two rival coalitions, Italian political 
system has gained more majoritarian and competitive traits, for example in the legislative arena (Cotta 
and Verzichelli 2016; Pedrazzani 2017). Secondly, this dissertations feeds into the debate over Italian 
post-Cold War foreign and security policy and dimensions of change. While some scholars claimed 
that centre-left and centre-right governments had more or less diverging ideas about how Italy should 
behave externally (Andreatta 2008; Carbone 2007), other ones found overall continuity in Italian 
foreign policy (Croci 2008: Walston 2007). In addition to these “domestic” debates, this doctoral 
thesis also speaks to the emerging international research agenda on the party politics of foreign policy, 
and, military interventions especially. The following section provides a brief overview on such debate 
and how my work can contribute on it.  
 
The state of the art and contribution to the literature  
 
For various decades, scholars in the field of International Relations (IR) and the sub-field of Foreign 
Policy Analysis (FPA) have consistently underestimated the role of political parties in shaping states’ 
foreign policy and international politics (Alden and Aran 2017). The lack of attention for parties 
within IR literature is quite understandable after all. During the Cold War, this field of research was 
characterized by the ascendance of (neo) realist theories attributing little, if any, relevance to 
domestic-level variables in the explanation of phenomena occurring in global politics (Donnelly 
2000). It is more surprising that FPA equally failed to include parties in its list of key elements 
affecting foreign policy-making process within states. In fact, this sub-field was born out of the need 
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to challenge three fundamental assumptions of the realist paradigm: the unitary nature of the state, its 
rationality and, foremost, the focus on broad changes in the distribution of power among countries 
rather than, to use a quotation from Waltz (1979, 121), “why state X made a certain move last 
Tuesday”, i.e. foreign policy behaviour (Hudson 2005; 2014; 2016). Nevertheless, while 
investigating the impact of domestic-level variables such as bureaucracies (Allison 1971) and 
dynamics of group decision-making (Janis 1972), FPA has consistently neglected to explore how 
parties, through their elaboration of policy agendas and their pervasive presence in the executives of 
democratic and non-democratic regimes alike, affect foreign policy.  
 
In recent years, interest in political parties as crucial actors in foreign policy has significantly grown, 
giving life to a lively and flourishing research agenda. A substantial impulse in this development 
came from “a domestic turn” (Kaarbo 2015) in the field in IR, exemplified in the well-known 
democratic peace theory, positing a dyadic relationship between democracy and lack of conflict 
among states (Bremer 1993; Maoz and Russett 1993). Successive studies attempted to unpack the 
category of democracies analysing which factors decreased the states’ propensity to be involved in a 
military dispute (Ireland and Gartner 2001; Palmer et al. 2004; Reiter and Tillman 2002). By doing 
so, these works paved the way for studies on the impact of political parties on peace and conflict in 
the world, arguably the most fundamental and explored issue in IR. For instance, in their often-
mentioned study, Palmer et al. (2004) found right-wing parties to be significantly more hawkish than 
left-wing parties. In addition, Prins and Spreecher (1999) indicated that coalition cabinets, i.e. those 
executives formed by more than one party, are more war-prone than single party governments. 
 
Synthetically, three different research agendas touched on the relevance on political parties in shaping 
states’ foreign policy and, in particular, propensity to be involved in military conflicts. First, various 
studies focused on the impact of partisanship on a number of foreign policy issues such as troop 
deployments (Rathbun 2004; Wagner et al. 2017; 2018), foreign aid (Thérien and Noël 2000), and 
support for multilateral organizations (Hofmann 2017; Hooghe et al. 2002). Interestingly for this 
dissertation, the aforementioned divide between doves on the left and hawks on the right was further 
tested with regards to support for military interventions (Mello 2014; Schuster and Maier 2006; 
Wagner et al. 2017; 2018). Second, more recent works on the impact of coalition politics and foreign 
policy delved into the composition of multiparty cabinets, inevitably stumbling in dynamics of party 
politics (Clare 2010; Kaarbo and Beasley 2008; Oktay 2014). In particular, the capacity of smaller 
coalition parties (junior partners) to shape foreign policy outcomes by hijacking larger coalition 
parties (senior partners) was emphasized (Oppermann and Brummer 2014; Ozkececi-Taner 2005). 
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Finally, some scholars had to take into account party preferences in order to fully explain national 
parliaments’ extent of control and oversight on troops deployments (Kesgin and Kaarbo 2010; Raunio 
and Wagner 2017). Ideological distance and incentives to cooperate between government and 
opposition parties were found to have a significant impact on legislative empowerment vis-à-vis the 
executive (Lagassé and Saideman 2017; Oktay 2018).  
 
This dissertation locates within this emerging academic debate on the party politics of military 
interventions. Moreover, it seeks to contribute to its development by tackling familiar research 
questions and formulating new ones. First, the crucial question of why party support military 
intervention will be addressed. I will test the validity of hypotheses concerning the impact of 
ideology, presence in government and, innovatively, how the specific characteristics of the mission 
and partisanship interacts with each other. Secondly, establishing a bridge between the literature on 
partisanship and troop deployments and the one on parliamentary war powers, the effect of law-
making procedures on party contestation will be scrutinized. To my knowledge, this is the first study 
in which such element is taken into account in the explanation of party support for peace and security 
operations. Finally, in contrast with studies on coalition politics and foreign policy, I will assess the 
impact of a foreign policy decision (participating in a military operation) on a coalition cabinet rather 
than vice versa. In particular, junior partners’ decision to stay in the cabinet in the face of contested 
troop deployments will be explained.  
 
Case selection: Italian parties and MOAs during the Second Republic 
 
The decision to select Italy in the period between 1994 and 2013 as a case study to investigate the 
party politics of military interventions require a series of justifications. First of all, the choice of 
focusing on a single country needs a thorough discussion. In fact, the vast majority of the studies on 
the party politics of military intervention have a comparative perspective. They tend to focus on two 
or more countries, often belonging to the category of Western democracies. For instance, in his 
seminal book on the role of partisanship in military interventions, Rathbun (2004) examined how 
parties in the three major European powers – United Kingdom, France and Germany – positioned on 
the Balkan crises, namely Bosnia and Kosovo. In order to comprehensively describe party 
contestation in Europe, Wagner et al. (2017) gathered data from 28 different states. Undoubtedly, 
comparative works conduce to empirical findings with stronger external validity with respect to 
single-country studies. In other words, conclusions are more generalizable. However, single-country 
studies enable the researcher to control for potentially troublesome intervening variables. For 
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instance, with regards to the issue of the party politics of military interventions, variation in national 
strategic culture (more or less militarist) and party system (two-party system or multiparty system) 
can arguably decisively increase the complexity of the analysis. In this sense, the comparison with 
Great Britain, a country marked by a militarist strategic culture and a two-party system, and Germany, 
a viscerally pacifist nation after WW2 with a multiparty system, may create some issues in terms of 
research design. To sum up, limiting the scope of this dissertation to one country has a clear 
disadvantage in terms of external validity of the findings, but, concurrently, an advantage in terms of 
parsimony in the number of intervening variables.  
 
Secondly, the choice of Italy as a country of interest has to be discussed. Three element makes of this 
state a particularly relevant case: its position as a middle power in global politics, the remarkable 
number of MOAs in which armed forces participated since the end of the Cold War, and, finally the 
peculiar characteristics of the party system. First, as a middle power (Giacomello and Verbeek 2011; 
Santoro 1991), Italy is a worthwhile case study to be examined with regards to military interventions. 
Middle powers find themselves in a peculiar position when it comes to provide a contribution to peace 
and security operations. Due to the significant size of their armed forces, they are a target for great 
powers interested in burden-sharing. Moreover, they are also willing to do contribute to increase their 
status and their reputation vis-à-vis Great Powers. Italy could be considered as a representative 
example in this sense, similarly to the Netherlands and Canada for instance. In addition, due to the 
aforementioned post-Cold War activism in guaranteeing global security, the Italian case has the 
potential to offer fruitful insights in the exploration of parties’ behaviour. In fact, party positioning 
and interaction could be observed across a number of different missions with diverging scope, 
international framework and domestic salience. Thirdly, and finally, fragmentation and the 
polarization in the party system makes the Italian case particularly promising for the scope of this 
work. In fact, a considerable number of parties belonging to all families can be taken into account as 
observations, from social democrats to conservatives, form the extreme-left to the far-right. 
 
Thirdly, the choice of restricting the time span of the dissertation from 1994 to 2013, deserves some 
attention. Such decision mainly depends on the necessity to keep the unit of analysis, i.e. political 
parties, as constant as possible. 1994 parliamentary elections in Italy marked the shift from the “First” 
to the “Second Republic”. While the institutional structure of the political system remained the same, 
the party system underwent a radical change. Citing the title of Verzichelli and Cotta’s (2000) seminal 
book chapter, Italy gradually moved from a party system characterized by “constrained coalitions” to 
one of “alternating governments”. The post-war competition between Christian Democrat party 
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(Democrazia Cristiana) and the communist party (Partito Comunista Italiano), was replaced by an 
alternation of centre-left and centre-right coalitions (Bardi 2007; Bartolini et al. 2004). Social 
democrats (Partito Democratico della Sinistra and later Democratici di Sinistra), the successor of 
the communist party, were always the largest party within the centre-left coalition. The entrepreneur 
and media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi emerged as the leader of the centre-right coalition. In a context 
of a passage from a polarized multi-party system (multipartitismo polarizzato) (Sartori 1970) to a 
limited bipolarism (bipolarismo limitato) (D’Alimonte and Chiaramonte 2010), some parties 
disappeared, like the Christian democrats, other ones transformed, such as the post-fascist Movimento 
Sociale Italiano turning into the more moderate Alleanza Nazionale and, finally new ones emerged, 
like the populist and regionalist Lega Nord. Choosing a time span encompassing this fundamental 
watershed in Italian politics would therefore produce considerable issues in terms of stability of the 
unit of analysis. For this reason, fixing 1994 as a starting point arguably constitutes an appropriate 
decision.  
 
According to some scholars (Calossi and Cicchi 2018; Pasquino and Bull 2018), 2013 elections 
coincided instead with the beginning of the end for the Second Republic. The polls certified the rise 
of Movimento 5 Stelle (Bordignon and Ceccarini 2013; Conti and Memoli 2015), a new populist party 
that attracted roughly a quarter of all the voters. Both social democrats (Partito Democratico) and 
Berlusconi’s party Forza Italia lost considerable ground in term of vote share and were forced form 
a coalition government together. Five years later, at the following parliamentary election, for the first 
time since 1994, these two parties were simultaneously at the opposition. Notably, various party 
families experienced transformations in these years. Extreme-left parties almost disappeared in terms 
of parliamentary representation. Centrist and Christian Democrat parties changed denominations and 
experienced significant electoral losses too. In a nutshell, it is clear how Italy’s party system has 
recently undergone another seismic change. Therefore, the choice of setting 2013 as the end of the 
time span considered in this dissertation should sound also reasonable in terms of continuity of the 
unit of analysis.  
 
Furthermore, from 2011, Italy’s activism in MOAs slightly declined in terms of number of financial 
resources and military units. Two factors probably contributed to provoke this slight decline in Italian 
presence in peace and security operations. First, the negative externalities of the 2011 intervention in 
Libya had a deep effect on Italy’s willingness to embark in successive military interventions. Aimed 
at protecting civilians from the regime’s brutal repression of public protest, the NATO-led operation 
led to even more stability in a neighbouring country, which in turn, increased the arrival of illegal 
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migrants on Italian shores. For this reason, this operation is still widely contested among Italy’s 
policymakers and considered as a failure in the protection of national interest and security. Secondly, 
the 2011 debt crisis forced successive Italian governments to cut public expenditure in various 
sectors, including defence. The reduction of funds had also obvious repercussions on troop 
deployments outside national borders, that had to undergo a substantial strategic re-thinking.  
 
Data and methods 
 
This dissertation employs various sources of data and methods, both quantitative and qualitative, in 
order to address the different research questions1. In the second chapter, the first “empirical” chapter, 
in order to explain party support for MOAs in Italy, I use the unsupervised scaling algorithm Wordfish 
(Slapin and Proksch 2008) to extract party position from 12 parliamentary debates on the six most 
relevant missions during the so-called “Second Republic”. In a second step, these measures represent 
the dependent variable in two OLS regression models. Independent variables in this dataset are either 
taken from the Chappell Hill Expert Survey (CHES) or attributed on the basis on the author’s 
knowledge. The use of a technique of automated content analysis constitutes an absolute novelty in 
the measurement of party support for peace and security operations, the Italian and the international 
context as well. Cross-national comparative studies relied on proxies contained in existing projects 
such as CHES (Wagner et al. 2017) or interpretation of various bibliographical sources, including 
parliamentary debates, statements, and interviews (Rathbun 2004). Works focusing on the case of 
Italy also adopted mainly qualitative methodologies, at best complemented with a coding of the most 
recurrent words in parliamentary speeches (Calossi and Coticchia 2009; Coticchia and Giacomello 
2011; Ignazi et al. 2012)2. Therefore, chapter 2 provides a significant methodological sophistication 
to the research agenda on party contestation of military interventions, in Italy and Europe.  
 
In the successive chapter, I further assess party support for MOAs but on a different dataset and 
through different regression models. This time the dependent variable is constructed on the basis of 
the party voting patterns in all parliamentary votes occurred at the Chamber of Deputies during the 
so-called “Second Republic”. In total 62 single parliamentary votes and 483 party-vote observations 
are taken into account. Yes votes and abstentions are considered as supportive votes and no votes as 
against. Independent variables are again taken either from CHES or attributed through author’s 
 
1 A section on data and methods could be find in each of the empirical chapters: chapter 2, chapter 3 and chapter 4. 
2 For an example of a mixed method approach to the analysis of how and Italian elites and media framed the Iraq War in 
Italy and its consequences on public approval of military force see Olmastroni (2014a).  
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knowledge. Given the dichotomic structure of the dependent variable, hypotheses are tested through 
Probit models. To my knowledge, only a couple of works have collected and quantitatively analysed 
parliamentary votes on troop deployments (Ostermann et al. forthcoming; Wagner et al. 2018). 
Therefore, to some extent, Chapter 3 could also be considered as innovative in terms of data and 
method employed with respect to the current literature on party politics of military interventions. 
 
Finally, chapter 4 adopts a qualitative methodology to explain extreme junior partners’ permanence 
in the government despite the decision to participate in MOAs. Among the various operations in 
which Italy took part, I select two cases of contested troop deployments: the one for Operation Allied 
Force in Kosovo (1999) and the one for Operation Unified Protector in Libya (2011). In order to 
uncover reasons underlying junior partners’ decision not to defect, I conducted a series of interviews 
with relevant policymakers and collected a number of bibliographical materials, including 
parliamentary debates, parliamentary questions, newspaper articles and memoirs. These sources are 
qualitatively analysed to provide possible explanations of the phenomenon.  
 
Structure of the thesis   
 
This thesis is divided in four chapters, plus a conclusion. In the first chapter, I provide an overview 
of the academic debates on the party politics of military interventions in Italy and abroad, locating 
this dissertation. I extensively discuss existing literature on these issues and how this dissertation 
contributes to its development. I also present original data resuming Italy’s involvement in MOAs 
during the Second Republic to provide a comprehensive assessment of the phenomenon. In the second 
chapter, as said, I investigate and explain party support for the six most relevant troop deployments 
occurred during the time span considered in this dissertation: Albania, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Lebanon, Libya. I test the impact of ideological leaning on both the left-right axis and the GAL/TAN 
dimension, membership in the government coalition, and the interaction between features of the 
specific mission (international legitimation and presence of national interest at stake) and party 
position on the left/right axis.  
 
In the third chapter, I explore again the drivers of party support for military operations through the 
analysis of all parliamentary votes casted on the issue in this period. In addition to the previous 
chapter, I also assess the effect of law-making procedures (law decrees) on party propensity to vote 
in favour of MOAs and scrutinize how presence in the coalition governments affect party support on 
the basis of their ideological leaning. Furthermore, taking into account all peace and security 
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operations and not only the most salient ones, this chapter provides a more accurate description of 
party contestation on troop deployments in Italy. As suggested, in the fourth chapter, I explain why 
extreme partners have never made a government collapse on these issues, cases from the intervention 
in Kosovo (199) and Libya (2011). Two factors are hypothesized to lead to such outcome: the lack 
of salience attributed to opposition to the military interventions and the fear of being blamed by voters 
to make the government collapse. By analysing extreme parties with completely different ideological 
leaning, the results also shed light on different types of party contestation among extreme Italian 
political parties. Finally, in the conclusions, I resume the main findings of this work. Furthermore, I 
describe how they contribute to the debates on the party politics of military interventions and Italy’s 
post-Cold war foreign and security policy. I then indicate how this work may be useful to interpret 
the role of political parties in Italy’s troop deployments in the near future, under a radically changed 
party system.  
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Chapter 1: 
Political parties, foreign policy and Italy’s involvement in 
Military Operations Abroad 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
“Politics stops at the water’s edge” famously asserted the United States Senator Arthur Vandenberg 
in 1947, leading the isolationist Republican Party to support President Harry Truman’s 
internationalist agenda at the outset of the Cold War. From that moment on, American policymakers 
and commentators employed this sentence as a mantra to affirm that, when it comes to foreign policy, 
the national interest should prevail on partisan fights. However, especially since the end of the 
Vietnam War, (party) politics has increasingly permeated U.S. foreign policy and its decision-making 
process. Republican harsh opposition in Congress to the agreement on nuclear proliferation with Iran 
promoted by democratic President Barack Obama is just one of the latest examples of such a 
mounting confrontation among the two main American parties on this policy area. However, the 
penetration of partisan politics into foreign policy has crossed the Atlantic, reaching Western Europe. 
For instance, in August 2014, party politics dynamics led to defeat of British Prime Minister David 
Cameron on a vote concerning a potential intervention in the Syrian civil war (Kaarbo and Kenealey 
2016; Strong 2015).  
While Zürn (2014) talked of a “politicization of world politics”, referring to the growing involvement 
of societal actors in decision-making process at the international level, IR scholars has consistently 
underestimated the importance of political parties as key actors in states’ foreign policy. However, in 
recent years, parties seemed to have finally entered into the debate, either from the front door or from 
the backdoor. Works that somehow incorporated them into the analysis of international politics could 
be divided in three main categories: 1) studies on the impact of government’s ideology on foreign 
policy, 2) studies on coalition politics and its effect on foreign policy, 3) studies on parliament’s role 
in security policy. Notably, most of these works concentrated on states’ propensity to be involved in 
military conflicts. This dissertation locates within this research agenda, investigating Italy’s party 
support for military operations abroad (MOAs) during the so-called “Second Republic” (1994-2013). 
This case study is particularly interesting given the high extent of fragmentation and polarization in 
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the party system and Italian extraordinary commitment to military interventions in this period 
(Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012). Moreover, existing literature on security and defence policy in 
Italy has paid limited attention to the role of political parties (Calossi and Coticchia 2009; D’Amore 
2001). 
In this chapter, I will place this dissertation within the broader debates on the role of domestic 
variables in international politics and foreign policy, the party politics of military interventions and, 
the post-cold War developments in Italy’s foreign and security policy. In particular, as far as the 
literature on parties and foreign policy is concerned, a comprehensive overview of the state of the art 
is currently missing3. Therefore, this chapter offers a considerable contribution to the debate, by 
systematizing works on this issue. Moreover, while various studies analysed Italy’s remarkable 
involvement in MOAs after the end of the Cold War (Carati and Locatelli 2017; Coticchia 2011; 
Ignazi et al. 2012), few provided extensive quantitative data to describe the size and the evolution of 
this phenomenon4. In this chapter, I will collect and analyse various existing data including the 
number of MOAs in which Italy was involved, their division by institutional framework and region, 
and the number of personnel and funds committed between 1994 and 2013.  
The structure of this theoretical chapter is the following. In the first section, I will emphasize how 
International Relations has taken “a domestic turn” after the end of the Cold War. Secondly, I will 
provide an overview of the work on parties and foreign policy. Thirdly, I will discuss the debate on 
Italian foreign policy and the MOAs, emphasizing the role of political parties. Finally, in the 
conclusion, I will resume how the thesis contributes to the development of each of these academic 
debates. 
The domestic turn in International Relations 
 
For decades, IR as a discipline has consistently neglected domestic factors as key explanatory 
variables of phenomena of world politics. Much of the blame is to be attributed to the longstanding 
dominance of realism. Originating in the thought of Thucydides, Macchiavelli and Hobbes, realism 
established as a point of theoretical reference in IR after the end of the Second World War, 
 
3 Overviews of the single debates on partisanship and foreign policy, coalition politics and foreign policy and 
parliamentary war power instead exist. See respectively Wagner et al. (2017); Opperman et al. (2017); Raunio and Wagner 
(2017). 
4 Two exceptions are Carati and Locatelli (2017); Rosa (2014).  
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contributing to the departure of the discipline from the broader field of Political Science5. Therefore, 
it is not surprising that one of the core realist assumptions was that international politics 
fundamentally differs from domestic politics. However, while emphasizing the inherent egoism in 
human nature as an inherent source of conflict among states, classical realists (Morgenthau 1948) 
entailed some similarities between domestic and international politics, giving primacy to the anarchic 
nature of the international relations, neorealists successively (Gilpin 1981; Mearsheimer 1990; Waltz 
1979) widened the gap between the two spheres. According to neorealism, the distribution of 
capabilities in the system dictates to states’ rational strategies to survive and thrive in world politics. 
In this theoretical and analytical framework, domestic variables such as the type of government or 
public opinion had little space, at least in influencing broad patterns of behaviour.  
 
Neoliberalism (Keohane 1984; Keohane and Nye 1977), a theory considered as rival to realism, 
managed to incorporate these elements while, simultaneously, not questioning the premise of the 
unitary dimension of the state. Robert Putnam’s seminal article on two-level game theory (1988) 
instead marked the first significant attempt to establish a theoretical bridge between international 
politics and domestic politics, by shedding light on the interplay between the two. Employing a 
rationalistic perspective, he suggested that during states’ negotiations, the national political leader 
lies at the intersection of two spheres, the domestic one and the international one, and attempts to 
maximize his gains by playing on both. For instance, by restricting his own margin of manoeuvre on 
the domestic sphere, the leader may increase its negotiating power on the international sphere by 
forcing the other state to accept a less favourable deal.  
 
However, a few years later, the end of the Cold War boosted what Kaarbo (2015) appropriately 
defined as a “domestic turn in IR theory”6. As Hudson claimed (2016, 30), scholars suddenly realized 
that “it is impossible to explain or predict system change on the basis of system-level variables alone”. 
This transformation mostly depended on the development of the so-called “democratic peace” 
theory7. The proposition at the basis of this theory is that democratic regimes are more peaceful than 
non-democratic regimes. Following this assumption, the spreading of democracy will automatically 
lead to the eradication of war from international politics. Originally developed by the philosopher 
Immanuel Kant, the democratic peace theory emerged from the ashes when the collapse of the Soviet 
Union left the United States as the only global hegemon in international politics and led to 
 
5 For an overview on Realism see Donnelly (2000). For a critical account see Guzzini (2004).  
6 For an overview of domestic explanations of international relations see Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2012). 
7 For an overview on democratic peace theory see Chan (1997); Ray (1998).  
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democratization in a number of states around the world. Employing increasingly sophisticated 
statistical methods and different time spans, several quantitative studies tested the effect of democracy 
on states’ propensity to go to war (Doyle 1983; Bremer 1993; Maoz & Russett 1993; Rummel 1983). 
They found that while democracies are not in general more dovish than non-democracies, they 
“almost never fight against one another with the exception of a few questionable cases” (Chan 1997, 
62). Levy (1998, 662) asserted that this pattern is “as close as anything we have to an empirical law 
in International Relations”. The causal mechanisms underlying the correlation between democracy 
and peace turned out to be much less clear-cut. From different perspectives, a number of scholars 
have attempted to provide theoretical foundations for the democratic peace theory (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. 1999; Maoz and Russett 1993; Owen 1994; Risse-Kappen 1995; Weart 1994). Two 
main explanations have initially confronted: a structural one, taking into account the higher number 
of veto player in democracies than in non-democracies, and a normative one, emphasizing the role of 
shared norms and values among democracies. While empirical evidence favoured the latter over the 
former (Maoz and Russett 1993; Risse-Kappen 1995; Weart 1994), rationalist approaches based on 
divergence in domestic incentives and audience costs between democratic and authoritarian leaders 
have also provided insightful explanations (Bueno De Mesquita et al. 1999; Fearon 1994).  
 
However, as Kaarbo noted (2015), IR attempt to finally take into account domestic factors was not 
limited to democratic peace and invested all three main contemporary theoretical approaches: 
(neo)realism, liberalism, and constructivism. As far as realism is concerned, “neoclassical 
realism"(NCR) successfully managed to fill this gap (Lobell et al. 2009; Rose 1998). While sharing 
with realist approaches an emphasis on power and its distribution in an anarchic international system, 
NCR scholars claimed that external incentives do not dictate a state’s foreign policy but rather define 
the boundaries of it. In fact, their impact is mediated by the perception and calculations of political 
leaders that are in turned influenced by a wide range of domestic factors like interest groups and 
public opinion. This interaction between exogenous independent variables and endogenous 
intervening variables accounts for the variation in foreign policy. In the camp of liberalism, Utilitarian 
Liberalism (UL) is a case in point (Moravcsik 1997). Moravcsik (1997) advocated the primacy of 
rational societal groups such as transnational companies or NGOs that, through their interest and their 
values, capture the state and determine its foreign policy preferences. However, the external 
environment also has an impact on states’ preferences, as domestic actors have an increasingly 
transnational dimension. These preferences determine state behaviour and, eventually, international 
relations. Finally, the rise of constructivism highlighted the crucial role of norms as an important 
independent variable to explain international politics and individual state’s foreign policy (Checkel 
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1998; Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1992). Norms are value-based and intersubjective expectations 
regarding the appropriate behaviour a state should perform in the international environment. Their 
sources are both external and domestic as they are generated in the constant process of socialization 
that occurs outside the border of the state through interactions with other states, and within the border 
of the state as part of national culture and identity.  
 
Such development has brought IR closer to the sub-discipline of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA)8. 
Alden and Aran (2017, 3) defined FPA as “the study of the conduct and practice of relations between 
different actors, primarily states, in the international system”, having at its heart “an investigation 
into decision-making, the individual decision-makers, processes and conditions that affect foreign 
policy and the outcomes of these decisions”. This definition emphasizes the nature of both the 
dependent and independent variables of the field: foreign policy behaviour and political, social, 
cultural and even psychological factors influencing decision-makers and decision-making process, 
respectively. In its evolution, FPA has taken three main directions (Hudson 2005; 2014). The first 
route consisted in investigating foreign policy decision-making process in a narrow sense, by 
highlighting the role of group and bureaucratic dynamics (Allison 1971; Janis 1972; Snyder et al. 
1954). The second route, taken by Rosenau (1968), attempted to balance the tendency of the discipline 
to pursue actor-specific theories with the need for widely applicable systemic theories. Finally, the 
third route examined psychological and cognitive factors affecting political leaders (Jervis 1976; 
Sprout and Sprout 1957).  Also due to its interdisciplinary approach, creating links with other fields 
such as comparative politics and even psychology (Hudson 2005), FPA has established itself as a 
distinct discipline within the broad umbrella of IR.  
 
Therefore, as said, in the last years IR and FPA have consistently looked at domestic variables to 
explain international politics and state’s foreign policy. For instance, the impact of factors such as 
leader’s personality and public opinion has been extensively scrutinized (Chan and Safran 2006; 
Dyson 2006). Less attention has been paid instead to political parties, that have gone under the 
spotlight at best accidentally in studies on the role of government’s ideology (Palmer et al. 2004; 
Thérien and Noël 2000), coalition politics (Clare 2010; Kaarbo and Beasley 2008), and parliaments 
(Raunio and Wagner 2017) on foreign policy. This dissertation contributes to fill this literature gap 
in IR and FPA, by exploring the behaviour of Italian political parties on troop deployments between 
1994 and 2013. 
 
 
8 For an overview on the evolution and latest development in FPA see Smith et al. (2016); Alden and Aran (2017).  
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Political parties and foreign policy 
 
As  just said, notwithstanding a growing interest for the influence of domestic elements on foreign 
policy and international politics, both FPA and IR scholars have consistently neglected the relevance 
of political parties. Given FPA’s longstanding focus on within-state variables, such neglect is even 
more surprising. In this sense, Kesgin and Kaarbo (2010, 33) argued that foreign policy analysts 
“have paid limited attention to political parties in parliamentary systems’ foreign policymaking”. In 
this regard, Alden and Aran (2017, 80) described parties as a “neglected element” in FPA. To raise 
the attention on the relevance of this element, Schuster and Maier (2006, 237) urged to “bring parties 
in” the debate as they “offer a promising field of research, especially for the study of foreign policy 
formulation in parliamentary systems”.  
 
This lack of interest is noteworthy as parties “can be seen as the key site of a number of activities 
attributed in FPA to domestic actors in foreign policy” (Alden and Aran 2017, 80). Among their 
various functions, political parties formulate distinct foreign policy agendas to be implemented once 
they will be in government. These agendas are based on the beliefs of the part of the society that they 
represent. Therefore, parties bring ideas from (segments of) public opinion to the state. Furthermore, 
it has to be acknowledged that foreign policy decisions are often taken at the party level rather than 
at the government level (Alden and Aran 2017). This is true for democratic regimes and especially 
for parliamentary systems, in which executives depend on party support to survive. The role of parties 
is supposed to be even stronger in countries such as China, in which a single party controls all the 
aspects of political life.  
 
Studies acknowledging (more or less directly) the role of political parties in foreign policy can be 
distinguished in three broad categories. First, a number of works investigated the impact of 
government ideological leaning on the left-right axis and state’s behaviour in a number of policies 
from involvement into military conflicts to foreign aid. These studies established a link between 
partisanship and foreign policy, empirically demonstrating that parties do articulate different 
positions and implement them when they are in government. They also paved the way for more recent 
works specifically focusing on exploring party contestation. Secondly, other works assessed the effect 
of coalition politics on foreign policy. This research agenda inevitably stumbled in political parties 
which are the fundamental components of coalition cabinets. In particular, they found that, under 
certain conditions, small coalition (junior) partners may have a disproportional influence on foreign 
policy. Third, a recent literature on parliamentary war powers has emerged. Rather than homogeneous 
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institutions, legislatives could be seen as aggregations of parties. Party strategies decisively 
parliament’s capacity and willingness to scrutinize the government over military deployments.  
 
Ideology and foreign policy  
 
The idea that party ideology has an impact on foreign policy rests on two assumptions (Rathbun 
2004). First, different beliefs regarding the way a state should be organized domestically lead to 
diverging positions on the way a state should behave at the international level. As Rathbun (2004) 
argued, different parties present dissimilar positions on foreign policy. Various studies have 
underlined how party ideology fundamentally structures contestation on foreign policy. McCormick 
and Wittkopf (1992) showed that, since the Vietnam war, United States Congress has voted in an 
increasingly partisan way, reflecting a mounting gap between Democrats and Republicans. Hofmann 
(2017) highlighted consistent divergencies among French parties regarding the relationship with 
NATO.  Bjereld and Demker (2000) identified in ideological divisions the main source of 
disagreement in foreign policy in Sweden. Second, political parties are committed to these positions 
and try to implement them when they are in government. Borrowing a definition from comparative 
politics, parties behave as policy seekers on foreign policy issues, rather than vote-seekers or office-
seekers. A policy-seeking party is primarily concerned about attempts to maximize its effect on public 
policy (Strøm 1990). Klingemann et al. (1994) empirically confirmed this hypothesis, suggesting that 
foreign policy is a domain with a comparatively high level of correspondence between party 
manifestoes and actual policies. Heffington (2018) also found strong congruence between hawkish 
and dovish position expressed in parties manifestoes and government’s propensity to involve the 
country in a military conflict. 
 
In terms of ideology, in Western democracies, the division between left and right has defined the 
sphere of politics. According to Bobbio (1995, 80), “the relevant criterion to distinguish between left 
and right is the different approach towards the concept of equality” 9. On the one hand, the left strives 
for greater equality among individuals within a society, to be achieved through the promotion of the 
welfare state and the right to higher education. On the other hand, the right legitimizes inequality as 
a condition in the society and defends freedom in terms of minimal state regulation, free enterprise, 
free-market economy. A further distinction between left and right concerns attitudes towards civil 
and social rights. On the one hand, left promotes a more progressive and inclusive idea of society, 
 
9 See also a discussion of Bobbio’s distinction between left and right and its empirical application in Jahn (2011).  
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paying attention to minorities and disadvantaged groups. On the other hand, right is more 
traditionalist and conservative, protecting the existing community and the dominant groups.  
 
This division concerning the way domestic society should be organized reflects in different 
worldviews and approaches to foreign policy. With regards to conflict resolution, arguably the most 
relevant issue in international politics, as Rathbun (2004) claimed, leftists are expected to be more 
dovish and rightist to be more hawkish. Bringing their inclusive idea of domestic political community 
into international politics, left-wing people are concerned about the negative impact of a war for the 
whole system. Furthermore, rejecting the use of coercive means to obtain political goals, leftists are 
also inherently anti-militarist10. To the contrary, the emphasis on self-reliance and an excluding idea 
of society lead rightist to consider the use of force as a way to promote national interest. Moreover, 
conceiving hierarchy as a value, right-wing people tend to be more militarist as well. Predictably left-
wing and right-wing parties reflect these diverging opinions among the electorate. In fact, analysing 
several party manifestoes across a number West European countries, Klingemann et al. (1994) has 
found that right-wing parties are more militarist than left-wing parties. 
 
A number of quantitative studies demonstrated that such divergence between left and right policy 
have an impact on states’ conflict behaviour (Arena and Palmer 2009; Koch 2009; Koch and Sullivan 
2010; Mello 2014; Palmer et al. 2004; Schuster and Maier 2006). Palmer et al. (2004) found that 
countries led by right-wing governments are more likely to be involved in a military dispute than left-
wing governments. Arena and Palmer (2009) suggested that right-wing executives are more likely to 
initiate military disputes. Koch (2009) discovered that right-wing cabinets also engage in longer 
conflicts than left-wing cabinets. Koch and Sullivan (2010) demonstrated that right-wing government 
are less likely to terminate wars when their public support decrease than left-wing government. A 
few qualitative works further indicated such a cleavage. Shuster and Maier (2006) observed how, in 
Western Europe, with the notable exception of Great Britain and France, countries led by right-wing 
governments participated in the Iraq War while countries led by left-wing governments did not. 
Comparing the cases of military interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, Mello (2014, 187) 
concluded that the impact of partisanship across this cleavage is “dissimilar across cases” but “some 
evidence suggests that right governments are, in general terms, more willing to engage militarily than 
their left counterparts”. Notably, Clare (2014) took this division so much for granted to the point of 
equating left-wing and right-wing parties with dovish and hawkish attitudes respectively. 
 
 
10 For an extensive discussion of leftist ideology and foreign policy see also Walzer (2018).  
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Against this background, in the last decades, the increasing number of military interventions other 
than war such as peacekeeping operations (Wheeler 2000) and the emergence of a new transnational 
cleavage between parties in West European countries (Hooghe et al. 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2018), 
called for a questioning of the neat-left/right divide. In particular, a couple of seminal studies 
theoretically and empirically challenged the distinction between left-wing dovish parties and right-
wing hawkish parties (Rathbun 2004; Wagner et al. 2017). Taking into account the involvement of 
three European countries – United Kingdom, France and Germany – in Bosnia and Kosovo, Rathbun 
(2004) pointed out that humanitarian operations pose a double dilemma for political parties. On the 
one hand, left-wing parties have to choose between protecting human rights and confirming their anti-
militarism. On the other hand, right-wing parties have to decide between preserving state’s 
international prestige and deploying troops to “save strangers”. Given these premises, left-wing party 
may support military interventions, while right-wing counterparts may oppose them. For instance, 
Haesebrouck (2017) found that countries led by left-wing governments were more inclined to provide 
a contribution to the 2011 military intervention in Libya than their right-wing counterparts. In their 
recent quantitative study, Wagner et al. (2017) questioned even more convincingly the left-right 
divide. In fact, analysing the positions of over 237 political parties across 28 European countries, they 
described a curvilinear model over the left-right axis for peace and security operations. In other words, 
partisan support is minimum at the extreme left, increases towards the centre, and then decreases 
further moving to the far right.  
 
Various studies demonstrated the impact of partisanship as measured on the left-right axis across 
other foreign policy issues other than states’ military behaviour. Thérien and Noël (2000) showed 
that the cumulative presence of left-wing parties in power leads to an increase in the amount of money 
spent in foreign aid. Milner and Tingley (2013) observed that, in the United States, representatives of 
left-wing constituencies are more favourable to economic aid and colleagues in right-wing districts 
prefers foreign aid. Shifting to trade policy, Milner and Judkins (2004) demonstrated that left-wing 
parties are consistently more protectionist than right-wing parties. Frid-Nielsen (2018) found that left-
wing parties in the European Parliament adopted a more inclusive approach on immigration policy. 
 
However, in this dissertation, I focus on security and defence policy, and, specifically Military 
Operations Abroad (MOAs). The literature on the party politics of peace and security operations has 
mainly pursued comparative agenda. While providing findings with stronger external validity, 
comparison among countries may miss peculiarities of the single cases linked to factors such as 
military culture and party system features. Limiting the focus to Italy’s parties during the so-called 
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“Second Republic” and their support for the MOAs in which the country participated in, this 
dissertation is able to provide an original contribution. In fact, such a case selection allows to control 
for intervening variables and limit the variation in terms of party systems. Furthermore, advancing 
the research on party politics of military interventions, this dissertation scrutinizes how the impact of 
partisanship is mediated by other factors. In their successive article, Wagner et al. (2018) found that 
the presence at the government is a decisive variable to explain party support for peace and security 
operations in Europe. In chapter 2 and 3, not only I test the impact of this factor on Italy’s parties, but 
I also explore how its effects changes according to the position in the left-right axis. The same authors 
also called for disaggregating to military operations, as to understand which features prompt parties 
to support a specific mission. Following this recommendation, in chapter 2, I investigate how 
legitimacy of the mission and its linkages with national interest interact with party support on the left-
right axis.  
 
Coalition politics and foreign policy  
 
At the beginning of the new century, a number of studies investigated the impact of party composition 
of the cabinet on states’ propensity to be involved in a military conflict, distinguishing between 
single-party governments and coalition cabinets. However, expectations on the direction of the effect 
were contradictory. On the one hand, according to a structural interpretation of the democratic peace 
(Maoz and Russett 1993) and veto player theory (Tsebelis 2002), coalitions cabinets are supposed to 
be more dovish than single-party governments. The increase in the number of political actors involved 
in the decision-making process should produce higher constraints for the executive in pursuing an 
aggressive conduct of foreign policy. On the other hand, following the diffusion of responsibility 
approach (Powel and Whitten 1993), coalitions cabinets are presumed to be more hawkish than 
single-party governments. This is because they are better able to distribute the electoral audience 
costs of such an often-unpopular policy among parties11. Unsurprisingly, these studies produced 
inconclusive empirical findings. Most of the quantitative works did not find any statistically 
significant distinction between single party executives and coalition cabinets (Ireland & Gartner 
2001; Leblang and Chan 2003; Reiter and Tillman 2002). To put it bluntly, Leblang and Chan (2003, 
397) concluded that there is no evidence that “rule by a single party or by a coalition of parties makes 
a discernible difference in war involvement”. However, Prins and Spreecher (1999) found that that 
coalition cabinets are actually more hawkish than single-party governments. For instance, they argued 
 
11 For an overview of the two competing images of coalition governments in foreign policy see Kaarbo (2012); Oktay 
(2014). 
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that “coalition governments are more likely to reciprocate disputes in general, and particularly more 
likely to reciprocate with the actual use of military force” (285). To the contrary, complementary 
qualitative studies suggested that coalition cabinets are more dovish than single-party governments 
(Auerswald 1999; Elman 2000). Comparing four different cases, Auerwsald (1999, 498) suggested 
that “majority democracies (i.e. those usually led by single-party cabinets like UK) are more likely 
to use force than coalition parliamentary governments”.  
 
Subsequently, studies on coalition politics and foreign policy moved in two directions: exploring a 
wider range of foreign policy events other than war and delving into the category of coalitions in 
terms of number of parties, ideological fractionalization, parliamentary strength12. Kaarbo and 
Beasley (2008, 77) discovered that coalition cabinets are neither more peaceful nor more aggressive 
but more extreme in their foreign policy behaviour. Furthermore, they pointed out that in general 
“institutional and political dynamics of the coalitions affect the character of their foreign policy”.  
Clare (2010) found that, while cohesive coalitions are as aggressive as single-party governments, 
ideologically fractionalized coalitions present a different propensity to initiate a military dispute 
according to the position of the outlier party on the left-right axis. Confirming the aforementioned 
left-right divide, extreme left-wing parties push the coalition to be more dovish and extreme right-
wing parties drive the coalition to be more hawkish. Beasley and Kaarbo (2014) highlighted that the 
number of parties, cabinets’ parliamentary strength, and the presence of critical small parties are 
crucial variables to coalitions’ foreign policy behaviour in terms of commitment, engagement and 
propensity to conflict. For example, in contradiction with the structural interpretation of democratic 
peace, they found that an increase in the number of parties lead to a more conflictual foreign policy. 
Taking into account similar independent variables, Oktay (2014) found that coalitions are more or 
less committed according to their arithmetic and ideological fragmentation.  
 
Most of these studies emphasized the relevance of junior partners, i.e. those coalition parties holding 
a smaller number of seats in parliament and cabinet posts. Clare (2010, 966) argued that junior 
partners “can exercise powerful, even disproportionate, influence on foreign policy”. However, 
scholars considerably disagree about which factors increase junior partner’s influence on coalition 
foreign policymaking. Comparing cases in Israel and Germany, Kaarbo (1996) identified the arena 
in which decisions are taken, cohesion within coalition partners and junior partner strategy of 
influence as crucial variables to explain junior partner. Analysing a number of cases of disagreement 
 
12 For an overview of the existing quantitative studies on coalition politics and foreign policy and their division between 
a first and a second wave see Oktay and Beasley (2017).  
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between coalition partners in Turkey, Ozkececi-Taner (2005) emphasized that junior partners have 
to perceive an issue as salient and develop a distinct position in order to play a constraining role on 
foreign policymaking. Moreover, juxtaposing United Kingdom and Germany foreign policy-making, 
Oppermann and Brummer (2014) highlighted that control of key ministries like foreign affairs and 
defence and departmental autonomy are crucial to explain junior partner’s influence. Greene (2019) 
and Brommeson and Ekengren (2019) also pointed out how that the margin of manoeuvre conceded 
by the senior partner have a decisive explanatory power in increasing or decreasing junior partner’s 
influence.  
 
However, junior partners’ influence should not be overestimated. In fact, in most cases it ends up 
being the loser in the conflict within the coalition. Kaarbo (2012) highlighted a few surprising cases 
of lack influence considering the above-mentioned criteria. For instance, in the Netherlands, the small 
but pivotal Democrats 66 was able to delay but not prevent the government’s much-contested 
decision to deploy troops in an extremely dangerous area of Afghanistan in 2006. In a very similar 
way, notwithstanding the fact that the coalition was ruled by one of their representatives, the Japanese 
Socialist Party let the stronger Liberal Democrats to prevail in the decision to make a military 
contribution to the UN peacekeeping missions in the Golan Heights in 1995. Analysing the Swedish 
case, Brommeson and Ekengren (2019, 14) concluded that junior partner’s influence was present “but 
only to a limited extent” and was more related to symbolic issues than real policy outcomes. 
Investigating junior partner’s behaviour, Coticchia and Davidson (2018) made the same point.  
 
In this dissertation, I will contribute to the study of coalition politics in two ways. First, I will shed 
light to the little-explored case of radical coalition partners in Italy and MOAs. In fact, as seen, while 
countries such as Germany, Israel, Netherlands and Turkey received substantial coverage in the 
literature, to my knowledge, Coticchia and Davidson (2018) represents the only study on coalition 
politics and foreign policymaking in Italy. Therefore, by extending this work in Chapter 4, I will 
contribute to the enlargement of the whole research agenda. Secondly, while putting a lot of attention 
on the foreign policy outcomes, this literature has completely neglected to consider how conflicts 
between coalition partners on foreign policy affect the survival of the government. There are some 
evidences that coalition disagreements over foreign policy seldom lead to government’s termination. 
For example, out of the aforementioned twelve cases of conflict in Kaarbo’s volume (2012), only 
once a junior partner decided to defect, thereby causing the collapse of the entire cabinet13. The 
 
13 In 1995, the Turkish Republican People’s Party decided to abandon the coalition government in which it was the junior 
partner as a consequence of the signing of a custom union treaty with the EU. 
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reasons underlying junior partner’s permanence in the cabinet in spite of an adverse foreign policy 
outcome can shed light on their different approach to foreign policy. Italy is an interesting case as 
disagreement within coalitions on military operations was substantial but never provoked the fall of 
a cabinet during the Second Republic.  
 
Parliament and war  
 
A normative debate about the desirability of providing the parliament with considerable power to 
constrain and monitor the executive on security policy exists. On the one hand, the involvement of 
the legislature in the decision-process may jeopardize the effectiveness of a military strategy, often 
based on rapidity and secrecy. Furthermore, debates in parliament may expose potential 
disagreements within the political elites on the issue, affecting a country’s credibility vis-à-vis its 
international partners. On the other hand, providing parliament with strong war powers increases 
transparency and accountability in an area which is particularly relevant for the daily lives of citizens. 
Proponents of this argument also suggest distinguishing between reactions to outside attacks and so-
called “war of choice”, that should be put under stronger parliamentary scrutiny14.  
 
Historically speaking, executive-legislative relations on security policy has often been highly 
unbalanced in favour of the former over the latter. In fact, national constitutions and other legal 
provisions often grant to governments a significant margin of manoeuvre on this issue. In United 
Kingdom, the Monarch is given a “royal prerogative” over parliament when it comes to declaring 
war (Strong 2015). In France, foreign policy is an exclusive domain of the president (Ostermann 
2017). Furthermore, in parliamentary democracies, the executive often controls a majority of seats in 
the parliament, strongly affecting the result of votes on these matters. However, changes in the law-
making process to approve military deployments and other recent events highlighted a presumedly 
increasing relevance of parliament in security policy. Approved after the end of Vietnam War, the 
War Power Resolution is arguably the most famous attempt to find a balance in the executive-
legislative relationship on the issue. Over the years, it eased collective action problems in the 
Congress and constrained Presidents in the use of force (Auerswald and Cowhey 1997). In 2003, 
Turkish parliament voted against the executive’s decision to allow U.S. to use its military bases for 
the Iraq War (Kesgin and Kaarbo 2010). More famously, in 2014, as said, the House of Commons 
 
14 For an overview of these this nromative debate see Peters and Wagner (2011); Raunio (2014). 
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prevented the British government from deciding to participate in a potential military intervention in 
the Syrian civil war (Kaarbo and Kenealey 2016; Strong 2015).  
 
As a consequence, a number of studies began to explore parliamentary war powers in a comparative 
perspective (Borns and Hanggi 2005; Dietrich et al. 2015; Peters and Wagner 2011). Dietrich et al. 
(2010) distinguished between four types of parliamentary war powers: legislative and budgetary, 
control, communication-related and dismissal. Arguably, the veto power on the executive’s decision 
to use military force and the capacity to make the government collapse are the strongest ones. On the 
basis of these powers, they categorized parliaments as more or less powerful on security issues. Other 
studies found considerable and increasing variation in the extent of parliamentary war powers across 
countries (Bono 2005; Born and Hanggi 2005; Dietrich et al. 2010; Peters and Wagner 2011). It is 
also worth underlining how, beside formal powers, parliaments can exercise scrutiny over troop 
deployments in more informal ways. In their analysis, Peters and Wagner (2011) argued that the lack 
of an external threat, an history of military failure and a constitutional tradition of civil law are 
explanatory factors for stronger parliaments. Moreover, in contrast to anecdotal evidence, in strictly 
legal terms, studies found no evidence of a generalized trend towards a “parliamentarization” of 
security policy (Peters and Wagner 2011; Raunio and Wagner 2017). In other words, parliaments are 
not becoming more assertive in their relationship with the executive on war matters overall.  
 
According to a structural interpretation of the democratic peace (Maoz and Russett 1993), the 
substantive involvement of the legislative in the decision-making process should discourage the 
executive from bringing the country into a military conflict. Therefore, countries in which 
parliamentary war powers are stronger are presumed to be more peaceful than those in which 
parliaments are weaker. At the empirical level, a number of studies found mixed empirical support 
for the “parliamentary peace” hypothesis. (Auerswald 1999; Dieterich et al. 2011; 2015; Haesebrouck 
2018; Mello 2014; Wagner 2018). Examining democratic states’ contributions to the Iraq war, 
Dietrich et al. (2015) demonstrated a significant correlation between countries with strong 
parliamentary war powers and less involvement in the conflict. Haesebrouck (2018) underlined that 
the absence of a legislative veto was a crucial variable to explain national contributions in the 
bombings against the self-proclaimed Islamic State. To the contrary, studies take into account a larger 
sample of missions questioned this argument. Analysing five recent military operations, Wagner 
(2018) found that the negative correlation between parliamentary veto powers and state’s 
participation is statistically significant in only three of them. In its aforementioned work, Mello 
(2014) concluded that its findings “shed doubts” on the parliamentary peace proposition.  
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By exploring their formal war powers and the impact of this power on foreign policy, parliaments are 
treated as unitary actors. However, parliaments are fundamentally composed by political parties. As 
Wagner and Raunio (2017, 7) argued, parliament can be conceptualized as “party-political institutions 
where political parties and individual MPs have different motives and opportunities for influencing 
foreign policy”. In other words, in order to appropriately investigate legislative-executive relationship 
in security policy, parties’ ideological leaning, strategies and incentives have to be taken into account. 
Oktay (2018, 105) argued that such an approach to the study of legislatures in security policy 
“elucidate the ways in which executive-legislative relationship take place”.  
 
Various studies empirically demonstrated the decisive role of parties in empowering (or depowering) 
parliament in the decision-making process over the use of force. Kesgin and Kaarbo (2010) showed 
that divisions within the cabinet were at the basis of Turkish parliament rejection to concede military 
bases for the Iraq War. In order to explain the aforementioned House of Commons’ veto on Syria, 
Kaarbo and Kenealey (2016) mentioned factionalism within Conservatives and Labour party’s 
strategy as decisive factors. Analysing cases from four different countries, Raunio and Wagner (2017) 
highlighted that left-wing parties are more supportive of stronger parliamentary war powers than 
right-wing counterparts. Lagassé and Saideman (2017) showed that variation in the extent of 
parliamentary scrutiny in Canada about the military operation in Afghanistan was driven by the 
incentives provided to the opposition parties by the political system. Questioning the idea of a 
stronger involvement of parliament in security policy, Lagassé and Mello (2018) found that Canadian 
and German parties’ collusion on the intervention in Afghanistan led to less responsiveness towards 
the public opinion. Comparing three different cases, Oktay (2018) highlighted how agreements 
between weak coalition governments and opposition parties may lead a decrease in the parliament’s 
role in the decision-making process.  
 
As much as the research on partisanship and foreign policy, the literature on parliamentary war 
powers had a strongly comparative dimension. Single case studies are rare and tend to focus on 
specific decisions rather than exploring legislative-executive relations across time. This is also due to 
the fact that, as found by Peters and Wagner (2011), the high extent of variation among countries 
contrasts to little cross-time variation within countries. Italy is an interesting case study in this sense 
as law-making procedures to approve and fund military operations changed considerably during the 
so-called “Second Republic” as the parliament attempted to increase its powers vis-à-vis the 
executives, which circumvented constitutional restriction to deploy troops abroad. Providing a much-
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needed clarification in the scholarly debate, in chapter 3, I will attempt to reconstruct the process of 
approval and (re) funding of MOAs in Italy and describe whether and how parliament managed to 
improve its position. This contorted process provoked the coexistence of different law-making 
procedures to approve MOAs (Bono 2005). The legal value of the vote produced incentives or 
disincentives for parties to support troops deployment. Chapter 4 will also evaluate the impact of this 
factor, by itself and in interaction with party ideological position, breaking new ground for the study 
of party politics of military interventions. 
 
Political parties and military operations abroad in Italy during the Second Republic 
 
Exploring the behaviour of Italian political parties on Military Operations Abroad (MOA) between 
1994 and 2013 represents a fruitful way to provide insights on the role of parties in foreign and 
security policy. The reasons are twofold. First, Italian party system has always been characterized by 
a relatively high extent of fragmentation and polarization. After 1994, in the shift from the so-called 
“First Republic” to the “Second Republic”, the cleavage between Christian Democrats and 
communists was replaced by a bipolar competition between centre-left and centre-right coalitions 
that alternated in power. Despite such development, fragmentation and polarization continued to 
characterize Italian party system (Bardi 2007). These elements are presumed to offer variation in 
terms of party positions and preferences. Secondly, since the end of the Cold War, Italy participated 
in a vast number of MOAs across the world, radically transforming its own foreign and security 
policy. Italian militaries have been deployed in all major areas of crisis, including Kosovo, 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. However, literature on how political parties behaved on this issue is still 
limited.  
 
Italian political parties: from the First to the Second Republic 
After the end of World War II, the party system of the nascent Italian Republic rapidly structured 
along the international cleavage between communism and anti-communism15. The latter camp was 
represented by the Democrazia Cristiana (DC). From 1946 to 1994, DC has been the most voted 
party in each general election. Its exponents were present in all cabinets that alternated in power and 
the Prime Minister was often affiliated to this party (Curini and Pinto 2015; Verzichelli and Cotta 
2000). However, in order to go govern, in most cases, DC had to form coalition cabinets with smaller 
 
15 Between the 1946 and 1948, a coalition of all parties that were involved in the transitional government during the war 
(Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale in Italian), including the communist party, was in power. 
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centrist and centre-left parties16. The other camp was instead represented by Partito Comunista 
Italiano (PCI). Throughout these decades, PCI was always the second most voted party reaching up 
to 34 per cent of the vote share in 1978. Furthermore, it had a deep penetration in the Italian society, 
especially in its strongholds in the centre and centre-north of the country (Diamanti 2009). However, 
due to their ties with the Soviet Union, communists were perceived by the majority of the Italian 
electorate and political elites as a threat for the stability of the country. For this reason, they were 
invariably excluded from power17. It has to be noted that PCI was not the only party that was 
consistently banned from the government. In fact, the post-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) 
was also damaged by the so-called “conventio ad excludendum” (from Latin, “agreement to 
exclude”)18.  
Historians and political scientists have employed several definitions to describe the post-war Italian 
party system. Galli (1966) coined the term of bipartitismo imperfetto (imperfect two-party system). 
In a similar way to traditional two-party systems such as United Kingdom, in Italy two parties, DC 
and PCI, collected a vast majority of votes. However, the imperfectness of the system consisted in 
the aforementioned exclusion of one of these two parties from power. Ten years later, in a more 
sophisticated way, Sartori (1976) described Italy as a case of pluralismo polarizzato (polarized 
pluralism). Through this term, he emphasized the high extent of fragmentation (number of parties) 
and ideological polarization (distance among the most extreme parties) in the party system. Combined 
with the anti-system nature of PCI and MSI, this polarization prevented any alternation in government 
that in turn provoked a centrifugal competition and lack of responsibility among government and 
opposition parties alike19.  
At the beginning of the nineties, due to three major events, this party system rapidly crumbled (Bardi 
1996; Cotta and Isernia 1996). First, the fall of the Berlin Wall had major repercussions on PCI (Bull 
1991). In fact, in February 1991, the party definitively abandoned the communist ideology, embracing 
social democracy and changing its name in Partito Democratico della Sinistra (PDS) (Ignazi 1992). 
 
16 During the First Republic, DC governed formed 13 minority cabinets out of the total 54 cabinets (Curini and Pinto 
2015). According to the composition of the cabinet in government, various phases can be distinguished in this period: 
Centrismo, Centro-sinistra, Pentapartito in chronological order. For an overview of cabinets in this period see Cotta and 
Verzichelli (2016); Curini and Pinto (2015). 
17 Between 1976 and 1979, PCI provided external support in Parliament for two Christian Democrat executives in the 
period of Solidarietà Nazionale (National Unity) against frequent terrorist attacks in the country.  
18 MSI was member of a coalition government only once (Tambroni cabinet), between March and July 1960.  
19Questioning the hypothesized ideological polarization, Di Palma (1978) underlined the presence of a high extent of 
bipartisanship in the approval of laws in Parliament.  
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The most radical fraction did not accept this development and decided to form a new extreme-left 
party called Rifondazione Comunista (RC). Such development also affected DC that lost its role as a 
protector against the communist threat (Cotta and Verzichelli 2016). Secondly, political elites were 
shaken by a massive judiciary investigation regarding corruption called tangentopoli (Waters 1994). 
This scandal drastically decreased the electorate’s trust in parties. Unsurprisingly, 1992 national 
elections saw the sharp decline of Christian Democrats (Morlino 1996). After the election, the party 
split in two factions: Partito Popolare Italiano (PPI) and Centro Cristiano Democratico (CCD). The 
socialist Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI), a key governing party in the previous decades, was the 
most affected by the scandal and entered in an endless crisis. This election also marked the rise of 
Lega Nord (LN). This regionalist and populist party advocated stronger fiscal autonomy for the 
northern part of the country (Passarelli and Tuorto 2012). Its success was rooted in the erosion of 
DC’s electoral hegemony in the north-east of Italy, riding a wave of anti-establishment sentiments 
(Biorcio 1999). Thirdly, in 1994 the media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi entered into Italian politics with 
his liberal-conservative party Forza Italia (FI). Berlusconi portrayed himself as an anti-communist 
champion and appealed to the moderate voters, promising to reduce burdensome taxes and 
bureaucracy (Ignazi 2014). He joined forces with LN and Alleanza Nazionale (AN), MSI’s successor. 
In 1994 elections, the first ones competed with the new quasi-majoritarian electoral system 
(D’Alimonte and Chiaramonte 1993), this coalition surprisingly obtained the majority in parliament 
and Berlusconi became Prime Minister (Bartolini and D’Alimonte 1995).  
This result marked the beginning of a transition towards a new party system, based on the competition 
between centre-right and centre-left coalitions that almost perfectly alternated in power (Verzichelli 
and Cotta 2000; Bartolini et al. 2004; D’Alimonte and Bartolini 2007)20. The centre-right coalition 
pivoted around Berlusconi and its “personal party” Forza Italia21. The two aforementioned parties, 
LN and AN, were always in the coalition with FI. In 1994, these parties were also joined by the 
conservative Christian democrats (CCD), that in 2002 merged with Cristiani Democratici Uniti 
(CDU) to form Unione di Centro (UDC)22. In March 2008, FI and AN merged in Popolo delle Libertà 
(PdL). Such development led to a victory in 2008 elections and to the fourth (and last) Berlusconi 
government but ultimately revealed as a failure and the party returned to the previous denomination 
in 2013. In the centre-left coalition, PDS, which in 1998 shortened its name in Democratici di Sinistra 
 
20 For an overview of the cabinets alternating in power during the Second Republic and their composition see the 
Appendix. Data are taken from the Parlgov database (Döring and Manow 2016).  
21 On personal parties in Italy and Forza Italia as a personal party see Calise (2015).  
22 For an overview of the splits and merges in the post-DC parties see Pizzimenti (2007).  
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(DS) was the main actor. In order to go to power, the Social Democrats were forced to find agreements 
with a fragmented group of parties. Centre-left coalitions were also extremely heterogeneous in terms 
of ideological distance, bringing together communists and Christian democrats. In particular, the 
communist Rifondazione Comunista proved to be a troublesome coalition partner, making the first 
Prodi cabinet (1996-1998) collapse. A split within this party over the support for the centre-left 
coalition government, in October 1998, led to the establishment of Partito dei Comunisti Italiani 
(PdCI)23. The green party Federazione dei Verdi (FdV) was also always part of the centre-left 
coalition cabinets. Finally, PPI, the more leftist Christian Democrats, decided to join this camp. In 
2002, this party contributed to the establishment of La Margherita (Mar). The merge of this latter 
party with the DS gave life in 2009 to a broad centre-left platform called Partito Democratico (PD).  
Commentators defined the transition as a shift from a “First Republic” to a “Second Republic”. In 
narrow terms, such distinction is erroneous. In fact, there was not any substantial alteration in Italy’s 
institutional structure and the type of government (D’Alimonte and Bartolini 1997). However, this 
definition has been extremely successful in the political, public and even academic debate24. As 
suggested, what surely changed was the party system. D’Alimonte and Chiaramonte (2010) coined 
the definition of Bipolarismo Limitato (“limited bipolarism”) to describe the new landscape. This 
definition underlines the bipolar tendency but also stress how the fluidity of the actors prevented a 
completely dichotomous competition between two parties. Bardi (2007) argued that two different 
party systems coexisted during the “Second Republic”: one with a centripetal competition during 
elections and another one with a centrifugal in inter-electoral periods. Bartolini et al. (2004) identified 
in this peculiar overlapping between parties and coalitions and the fragmentation of the system the 
limits of Italian bipolarism during these years.  
In fact, in spite of the implementation of a quasi-majoritarian electoral law (Pasquino 2007), the 
number of parties even increased with respect to the already fragmented party system of the “first 
republic” (Bardi 2007). This trend inverted only between 2006 and 2008, when parties in the centre-
left and centre-right coalitions aggregated in broad platforms, PD and PdL respectively. Furthermore, 
analysing the distance between the two most extreme parties in the system, the ideological 
polarization also remained fairly high, with only a slight decrease with respect to the “First Republic” 
(Morlino 1996). However, such decrease is less pronounced if we consider as opposite poles of the 
party systems the centre-left and centre-right coalitions (Bardi 2007; Pappalardo 1996). Against the 
 
23 On RC and PdCI see Calossi (2007). 
24 A number of academic studies on Italian politics refer explicitly to the First or the Second Republic. Only in the 
realm of the analysis of Italy’s foreign and security policy see Varsori (2015); Walston (2007). 
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background of a certain extent of continuity, the new party system had a substantial impact on various 
aspects of Italian politics. For instance, the presence of pre-electoral coalitions led to a significant 
increase in the duration of the cabinets (Curini and Pinto 2015; Pritoni 2012). Moreover, 
confrontation in the legislative arena slightly increased as executives had stronger incentives to 
implement their own agenda (Giuliani 2008; Pedrazzani 2017). The end of the contraposition between 
Christian Democrats and the shift towards this new party system also arguably affected foreign and 
security policy (Brighi 2013; Carbone 2007), that is the policy area under investigation in this work.  
In the recent years, this weak bipolar system entered in crisis (Bull and Pasquino 2018; Pasquino and 
Valbruzzi 2015). 2013 elections saw the rise of a third force in the system, the populist Movimento 5 
Stelle (M5S). At its debut, M5S became the most voted party for the Chamber of Deputies (Bordignon 
and Ceccarini 2013; Tronconi 2015). Five years later, this party managed to even increase its share 
of votes and formed a new government with Lega Nord (Pritoni and Vignati 2018), which in the 
meantime had underwent a radical transformation, transforming into a typical far-right populist party 
(Albertazzi et al. 2018). Therefore, to keep consistency in the unit of analysis, i.e. parties, this 
dissertation restricts its timespan to 2013. It is also worth pointing out that, while the “Second 
Republic” party system has surely disappeared, it is still too early to guess which party system will 
replace it. Describing the new party system and its impact on Italy’s foreign policy will require time 
and further research.  
Italian foreign policy in the Second Republic: between continuity and change 
 
For over four decades, from the end of the Second World War to the fall of the Berlin Wall, Italian 
foreign policy has been marked by low-profile and even passiveness (Brighi 2013; Mammarella and 
Cacace 2006; Santoro 1991). A combination of external and domestic factors produced such a 
cautious approach. On the one hand, the Cold War dynamics, i.e. the bipolar competition between 
United States and Soviet Union, were crucial in constraining Italy’s margin of manoeuvre the 
international arena (Romano 2002; Santoro 1992). In comparison with other West European countries 
such as France or United Kingdom, the strength of this constraint was amplified by Italian geographic 
position, in the middle between the two blocs. In this sense, Santoro (1991, 198) identified the 
dynamics of the global contexts “as the key independent variable in deciding Italian foreign policy”. 
On the other hand, the aforementioned high extent of ideological polarization in the political system, 
provoked by the presence of such a successful and penetrating communist party, pushed Italy’s 
policymakers to be very prudent such area of policy (Panebianco 1977). In fact, controversial and 
divisive decisions could have led to the de-stabilization of the already fragile Italian republic. In this 
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sense, Panebianco (1977, 863) talked of a fundamental “Incompatibleness between domestic goals 
(protection of the political equilibria) and external goals (enhancement of national status)”.  
 
Against this background, Italy managed to locate itself in the middle of three circles (Mammarella 
and Cacace 2006; Santoro 1991). The first circle consisted in the relationship with the United States 
(Nuti 2003). Such relationship was based on mutual interests. On the one hand, the alliance with the 
U.S. guaranteed to Italian governments security and funds for the economic recovery, through the 
adhesion to NATO and the Marshall Plan respectively. On the other hand, Washington was keen on 
keeping a country with such a strategic position and the presence of the largest communist party in 
Western Europe under control. The second circle corresponded to Europe (Bindi 2011; Matarazzo 
2011). In fact, joining the process of European integration was perceived by Italian policymakers as 
an opportunity to quietly enhance the international status of the country in the world and, 
simultaneously, cooperate with more industrialized economies such as (Western) Germany and 
France. Atlanticism and Europeanism conflicted at times, with Italian foreign policymakers called to 
reconcile tensions between these two guidelines of foreign policy. Notably, PCI was initially critical 
of both choices. However, by the end of the seventies, through the so-called Compromesso Storico, 
communists accepted Italy’s membership in the NATO and became solid supporters of the European 
integration project. Therefore, a solid consensus came to underpin these two pillars of Italy’s foreign 
policy. The third circle consisted in the Mediterranean (Coticchia et al. 2011; Croci and Valigi 2013). 
From the sixties, Italy tried to impose itself as a bridge between Europe and the West and Northern 
Africa and Middle East, by establishing strong ties with a number of countries in the region. Such 
efforts were mainly motivated by the need to secure oil and gas supplies, through the investments of 
the Italian state-owned energetic company, Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI).  
 
At the beginning of the nineties, two events opened unprecedented opportunities for a change in 
Italian foreign policy. First, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
Cold War came to an end. Such development lessened the American grip on West European countries 
that could in turn develop more autonomously their own external relations, attempting to raise their 
status. This is what Italy did, increasing its own assertiveness in the international stage (Brighi 2013; 
Carbone 2011; Giacomello and Verbeek 2011). Secondly, as said, only a few years later, the existing 
party system, based on the competition between Christian democrats and communists, was gradually 
replaced by an alternation in power between centre-left and centre-right coalitions. In theory, such 
change in domestic politics could have provoked two opposing effects on foreign policy. On the one 
hand, a less ideologically polarized party system was supposed to cause an even more consensual and 
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consistent approach. On the other hand, alternation in power of different coalitions with the presence 
of extreme parties was expected to bring to the fore divergencies and new priorities.  
 
Among scholars and commentators, a vivid and unsettled debate on continuity and change in Italian 
foreign policy exists25. As argued by Croci and Valigi (2013, 52), “most of the recent articles on 
Italian foreign policy take a position on this debate on continuity and change”. On the one hand, some 
scholars highlighted differences in the foreign policy approaches of the two coalitions. In their view, 
while the centre-left favoured a multilateral approach, reflected especially in an enthusiastic 
commitment to the EU, the centre-right preferred bilateral relationships, with United States but also 
with other countries such as Russia, Israel and Libya (Andreatta 2008; Carbone 2007; Cladi and 
Webber 2011; Menotti 2007; Quaglia and Radaelli 2007). As argued by Carbone (2007, 917), “for 
the centre-right coalition national interest is promoted through a pragmatic bilateralism and reinforced 
Atlanticism, whereas for the centre-left through active multilateralism and reinforce Europeanism”. 
Some commentators even claimed that Berlusconi has brought a radical change in Italian foreign 
policy (Aliboni 2003; Ignazi 2004; Romano 2006). For example, according to Ignazi (2004, 268), the 
second centre-right government (2001-2006) has “redefined Italy’s traditional priorities”. Such 
arguments are mainly driven by the unwavering support provided by Berlusconi to U.S. President 
George W. Bush in his controversial “Global War on Terror” that, together with other squabbles, 
created substantial rifts with Italy’s European partners. Moreover, these scholars often mentioned the 
enormous efforts made to bring the country in the single currency in the first wave made by the first 
centre-left government as an evidence of its commitment to Europe.  
 
Other analysts instead saw continuity in Italian foreign policy guidelines between the “First” and the 
“Second Republic” and similarities in the approaches of the two coalitions, with differences limited 
to Berlusconi’s flamboyant style rather than substance (Croci 2003; 2005; 2008; Walston 2004; 2007; 
Ratti 2012)26. As claimed by Croci (2008, 153), “Post war Italian governments have viewed 
Atlanticism and Europeanism substantially in the same manner and pursued similar policies”. For 
example, this argument is based on the fact that centre-right governments never jeopardized 
engagement in the European integration process and centre-left executives never questioned loyalty 
to United States and NATO, as shown by the participation in the intervention in Kosovo in 1999. 
 
25 For a more extensive account of this debate see Brighi (2013); Isernia and Longo (2017).  
26 Within this debate, interestingly, through the metaphor of pendulum, Brighi (2007; 2013) took a middle-ground position 
with Italy alternatively emphasizing commitment to Europe and loyalty to United States.  
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Further evidence is provided by a substantial bipartisanship regarding Italy’s contributions to Military 
Operations Abroad (MOA) (Calossi and Coticchia 2009; Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012).  
 
Italy and Military Operations Abroad 
During the Cold War, material and cultural factors consistently prevented Italy from making use of 
force outside the national borders. On the one hand, as suggested, Italian governments did not need 
to engage in military conflicts with other states as national security was guaranteed by United States. 
On the other hand, the disastrous legacy of World War II and shared dovish attitudes within Christian 
and Marxist thought paved the way for the spreading of a pacifist strategic culture, among political 
elites and public opinion alike (Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012; Rosa 2014). As a consequence, 
Italian army developed as an exclusively defensive force preparing to protect the country from a 
rather unlikely attack from the Eastern border (Coticchia and Moro 2015; D’Amore 2001). Troop 
deployments in foreign countries only occurred in the form of contributions to UN peacekeeping 
operations27.  
As already suggested, things changed completely afterwards. In fact, participation in MOAs arguably 
constitute the most remarkable development in Italian post-Cold war foreign policy and the most 
evident manifestation of a more assertive posture in the international arena (Brighi 2013; Coticchia 
2011; Ignazi et al. 2012; Menotti 2007). In this sense, Ignazi et al. (2012, 2) defined troop 
deployments in peace and security operation outside national borders as “the domain the most 
represent Italy’s dynamism” in its external relations and “the most novel trait of Italian foreign 
policy”. Employing Walston’s (2007, 91) often-quoted metaphor, from the beginning of the nineties, 
Italy turned from being a “security consumer” into being a “security provider”.  
In order to analyse the magnitude of such change, some quantitative data are useful. From 1994 to 
2013, the period under consideration in this dissertation, Italy contributed to around 60 MOAs28. As 
 
27 For example, during the Cold War, Italy took part in peacekeeping operations in Lebanon, at the border between India 
and Pakistan, and in Congo. In terms of number of troops deployed and political salience, the involvement in 1982 
operation in Lebanon was particularly important for the post-Cold War evolution of Italian Security and Defence policy. 
For a more detailed account of this event see Coticchia (2011); Mammarella and Cacace (2006). 
28 This number and Figures 1 and 2 are based on authors’ elaborations from the website of the Minister of Defence and a 
report on MOAs released by the Chamber of Deputies on February 2017 (Camera dei Deputati 2017). Data are surely 
indicative but could not be completely accurate for two reasons. First, especially for MOAs in which very limited 
personnel was involved, the website of the Minister of Defence provides sometimes incomplete information regarding 
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shown by figure 1, the number of military operations in which Italian troops were deployed 
considerably increased in the nineties and reached its peak of 29 in 2005. Subsequently, it stabilized 
across the years. The figure also shows how the involvement of new multilateral actors in peace and 
security operations is crucial to explain this increase. In fact, in addition to the UN, NATO and the 
European Union started to make a contribution to regional and global security in these years.  Italy’s 
troop deployments took place all around the world, but especially in (Northern and Sub-Saharan) 
Africa, the Balkans and the Middle East. These three regions account for over 80% of the MOAs in 
which Italian personnel participated, with a smaller portion being located in Asia and other regions. 
To sum up, as Coticchia (2011, 9) acknowledged, Italian troops have been deployed “basically in any 
regional crisis in which the international community or multilateral organizations activated”. 
Figure 1: Number of Italy’s MOAs divided by institutional framework (1994-2013)29 
 
 
 
 
 
the beginning and the end of the operations. Secondly, some MOAs were aggregated differently across the two sources. 
For a complete overview of all the missions included in the dataset see the Appendix.  
29 In the category “other” are included those operations conducted by so-called “coalitions of the willing” (see for instance 
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan) and those based on bilateral agreements with the other state (see those aimed to tackle 
illegal immigration from Albania for instance). 
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Figure 2: Number of Italy’s MOAs divided by region (1994-2013)  
 
Looked from a comparative perspective, the Italian participation in these missions is extraordinary as 
well. From 2006, the year in which the peacekeeping operation UNIFIL in Lebanon was substantially 
enlarged by the UN, Italy has become the largest contributor to UN Peacekeeping Operations in 
Europe30. In a recent article, Carati and Locatelli (2017) calculated that in 2014 Italian ratio of troops 
deployed in MOAs on the total of active forces overcame those of United Kingdom, France and 
Germany. They stated that, “in comparative terms, Italy seems to have contributed to military 
operations abroad more than other European countries like France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom, indeed many of them preferred not to get involved in some operations” (Carati and 
Locatelli 2017, 88). This record is even more striking considering that Italy had a consistently lower 
level of military expenditure with respect to all of these three countries in absolute terms (see Figure 
3) and less than France and UK as share of GDP. Between 1994 and 2013, Italian funds for the 
defence never met the 2% minimum threshold recommended by NATO (See Figure 4)31.  
 
 
 
30 It currently still is. In 2018, Italy ranked 21st among all UN member countries for personnel contribution to 
peacekeeping operations. See the website of UN Peacekeeping Operations for the complete ranking.  
31 These figures cover expenses that are not strictly linked to military operations, such as salaries and pensions of 
militaries. However, they clearly highlight the resource gap between Italy and its major European partners. 
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Figure 3: Italy’s military expenditure in billions of dollars (1994-2013)32 
 
Figure 4: Italy’s military expenditure as share of GDP (1994-2013)33 
 
As Figure 5 shows, funds allocated to MOAs steadily grew between 1994 and 2013. In 1998, when 
conflict in the Balkans was intensifying, Italy spent less than a hundred million of euros in troop 
deployments outside national borders. Only five years later, in 2003, the year marked by the 
 
32 Author’s elaboration on data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) military expenditure 
database. The figures are expressed at constant prices for the year 2017.  
33 Author’s elaboration on data from SIPRI military expenditure database. GDP is expressed at current market prices 
(nominal values). 
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beginning of the Iraq War, that figure has become more than ten times higher, breaking one billion 
of euros in total. Albeit with some oscillations, Italian expenditure for MOAs continued to increase 
until 2010, reaching more than 1,5 billion of euros. This figure constituted a rather small fraction of 
the overall defence budget. Nevertheless, the skyrocketing increase of expenditure for military 
missions in Italy in absolute terms has to be considered as a remarkable phenomenon. 
However, Figure 5 also suggests a declining trend in funds allocated to military operations in the last 
years of the Second Republic. Following the 2010 peak, expenses for troop deployments were cut of 
almost a third in the following three years, returning to 1 billion of euros. Afterwards, in a period not 
covered by this dissertation, funds stabilized. In 2018, they were 1,137 billion (Camera dei 
Deputati/Senato della Repubblica 2018). However, it must be acknowledged that this level of 
expenditure is similar to the one recorded at the beginning of the century, a period in which Italy 
embarked in two very relevant operations: Afghanistan and Iraq. Analysing the number of personnel 
deployed in MOAs, Italy’s decreasing engagement in MOAs becomes more evident. As demonstrated 
by Figure 6, from 2005 to 2013, the number of military units abroad diminished of around 40%, from 
over ten thousand units to little more than six thousand units. Following a similar pattern, in the 
following years this figure stabilized. In 2018, the number of personnel deployed were a little more 
than 6,5 thousand (Senato della Repubblica/Camera dei Deputati 2018a). Nevertheless, as already 
suggested, Italy is still a leading contributor to multilateral operation across the world, both in 
absolute and relative terms, compared to other European countries. Italian soldiers are involved in 
manifold MOAs including the UN peacekeeping mission in Lebanon and the international coalition 
against the self-proclaimed Islamic State.  
To sum up, the latest trends in Italian engagement in MOAs present a fuzzy picture. On the one hand, 
it is evident how the amount of human and financial resources has significantly shrunk in the last 
years of the period under consideration in this dissertation and stabilized in the following years. The 
2011 debt crisis is surely one of the main causes of this development. Italian policymakers were 
forced to cut the defence budget and, concurrently, the funds for the missions. Furthermore, the end 
of Operation Antica Babilonia in Iraq and the progressive disengagement from Afghanistan had a 
substantial impact on the reduction of the overall number of troops. In addition, the disastrous legacy 
of the 2011 intervention in Libya, leading to yet unresolved violence and unrest in a very proximate 
country, arguably negatively affected how political elites and public perceived Italian involvement in 
MOAs. The government’s decision not to participate in the air strikes in the operation against Daesh 
can be considered as a consequence of the previous failure in Libya (Coticchia and Davidson 2019). 
On the other hand, Italy has undoubtedly remained a major security actor in the world until 2013 and 
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beyond. While slightly declining, the amount of resources committed to MOAs have stayed fairly 
high compared to that of other European states.  
Figure 5:  Italy’s expenditure for MOAs in millions of Euros (1994-2013)34 
 
Figure 6: number of personnel deployed by Italy in MOAs (2004-2013)35 
 
 
34 Author’s elaboration on two Chamber of Deputies report (Camera dei Deputati 2010; 2017). The figures are expressed 
at current prices (nominal values). For a quantitative assessment of Italy’s involvement in MOAs see also Olmastroni 
(2014b).  
35 Author’s elaboration on a Chamber of Deputies report (Camera dei Deputati 2017). Unfortunately, consistent and 
reliable data covering all the period under scrutiny in this dissertation do not exist.  
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As just suggested, among all the MOAs in which Italy embarked between 1994 and 2013, variation 
in terms of resources, political debate and tasks is considerable. In some missions, thousands and 
thousands of units were at work. For example, operations Enduring Freedom and ISAF/Nibbio in 
Afghanistan (2001-2014), Antica Babilonia in Iraq (2003-2006), and UNIFIL II/Leonte in Lebanon 
(2006-) involved a vast number of troops along various years. In a much shorter amount of time, 
thousands of militaries took part in operations Alba in Albania (1997), Allied Force and Allied 
Harbour during the conflict in Kosovo (1999), in Operation Unified Protector in Libya (2011)36. Due 
to the relevance for the equilibria in international relations and the size of the Italian contribution, 
these operations also attracted considerable attention from political parties, media and public opinion. 
In some cases, the debate was particularly vivid and confrontational. For instance, the operation 
Antica Babilonia, aimed at restoring security and peace in Iraq in the aftermath of the war, was highly 
criticized by opposition parties and a majority of the public opinion as linked with Berlusconi’s 
support for the controversial U.S. intervention (Davidson 2008; Calossi and Coticchia 2009; 
Olmastroni 2014a). To the contrary, the remarkable contribution to UNIFIL found little dissent 
among political elites and the electorate alike. Furthermore, across these MOAs (and even more so 
taking into account all the smaller ones), Italian troops performed a wide array of tasks and duties, 
ranging from the more “humanitarian” ones such as delivering shelter, food and medical assistance 
to civilians, to the more “combat” ones such as conducting air strikes on a target and guaranteeing 
the security of an area from an external threat. For instance, in the case of the war in Kosovo both 
these dimensions were visible: while Allied Force basically constituted a bombing campaign against 
Serbian armed forces, Allied Harbour was aimed at assisting the refugees escaping from Kosovo to 
the near Albania and Macedonia.  
Such a transformation in Italian security and defence policy stimulated a considerable debate among 
scholars and academics (Carati and Locatelli 2017; Cladi and Locatelli 2018; Coticchia 2011; Ignazi 
et al. 2012;). First and foremost, various works sought to provide convincing explanations of the 
 
36 The name of the multilateral operation precedes the name of the Italian contributions to it, when existing. In parenthesis, 
it is indicated the name of the country in which the MOA took place, and the year of beginning and, if existing, end. 
Employing 1000 unit as a threshold, Italy participated in further two key missions before 1994 – Desert Storm (Iraq 1991) 
and UNSOM II/Ibis (Somalia, 1992-1994) – and further two after 2013 – Prima Parthica (Iraq, 2014-2016) and 
EUNAVFOR Med – Sophia (Mediterranean Sea, 2015-). On Desert Storm and Ibis see Coticchia (2011); Ignazi et al. 
(2012), and the websites of the Air Forces (Desert Storm) and the army (Ibis). On Prima Parthica see the website of the 
Italian Army. On the Italian participation to EUNAVFOR Med – Sophia see Ceccorulli and Coticchia (2017) and the 
website of the Ministry of Defence.  
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remarkable Italian contributions to MOAs across the world (Carati and Locatelli 2017; Ceccorulli 
and Coticchia 2017; Cladi and Locatelli 2018). Quest for international prestige and status is widely 
considered as the main explanatory variable for Italy’s outstanding involvement in multilateral 
operations after the end of the Cold War. In fact, successive Italian governments saw in the 
participation in MOAs a foreign policy instrument to show the country’s commitment to multilateral 
institutions and loyalty towards the United States (Davidson 2011; Carati and Locatelli 2017; Cladi 
and Locatelli 2018). In addition, humanitarian concerns and the interests of the military-industrial 
complex were also crucial variables to explain this phenomenon. On the one hand, as Rosa suggested 
(2014), the humanitarian aims covering the vast majority of post-Cold War military interventions fed 
into Italy’s deeply rooted pacifist culture. On the other hand, Ceccorulli and Coticchia (2017) 
demonstrated how interests within the military-industrial complex were sufficient conditions to 
explain Italy’s projection of force abroad37.  
Various studies attributed to political parties composing the new party system a central role in shaping 
Italy’s participation in MOAs and the public debate around it (Brighi 2013; Calossi and Coticchia 
2009; Coticchia 2011; 2015; Ignazi et al. 2012; Olmastroni 2014a; Verbeek and Zaslove 2015). In 
fact, starting from the missions in the Balkans (Albania and Kosovo), i.e. the first missions occurring 
during the Second Republic, a bipartisan consensus among the main parties emerged on the issue. 
The main centre left-party, the Social democrats, and the main centre-right party, Berlusconi’s Forza 
Italia, substantially agreed on troops deployment outside national borders as part of multilateral 
interventions, albeit occasionally voting against while being at the opposition for strategic reasons 
(Calossi and Coticchia 2009; Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012). Party consensus on MOAs included 
also centrist parties and post-DC parties affiliated to both coalitions, such as La Margherita and UDC, 
and even the far-right AN. However, confirming a slightly different approach to foreign policy, it 
must be noted how centre-left parties were keener on emphasizing the multilateral dimension of the 
missions, while centre-right parties stressed the centrality of the alliance with the United States and 
regarded the use of military forces as a source of national pride. Extreme-left parties like RC and the 
autonomist LN were the only consistently dissenting voices, for diverging reasons (Calossi et al. 
2013; Verbeek and Zaslove 2015). Such widespread support for MOAs was grounded on a shared 
humanitarian narrative, justifying the use of force (Calossi and Coticchia 2009; Coticchia 2011; 
Ignazi et al. 2012). Successive governing parties, notwithstanding their colour, repeatedly pointed out 
 
37 Employing Italy’s participation in MOAs as an independent rather than dependent variable, Coticchia and Moro (2015) 
underlined its crucial role in the transformation of the armed forces, by providing invaluable learning on the ground in 
civil-military and counterinsurgency missions and obtaining funds in a period of declining public expenditure for defence.  
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how these missions were aimed at helping the local populations, thereby removing the military 
dimension and the presence of any sort of enemy. In other words, these missions were never depicted 
as acts of aggression against another state or armed group but invariably as peace operations to protect 
and support civilians. 
Together with a low-profile approach and the occasional use of caveats at the operational level, this 
discourse was crucial to lower the intensity of the political and public debate around MOAs. As Brighi 
(2013, 139) argued, “in the use of force abroad, Italy’s conduct was not only influenced by 
international factors but also by domestic concerns”. In fact, the humanitarian narrative was useful to 
convince reluctant extreme parties to support specific MOAs (Brighi 2013; Coticchia and Davidson 
2018). Furthermore, it enabled policymakers to obtain the support of a traditionally pacifist public 
opinion38. For instance, Coticchia (2014; 2015) demonstrated how bipartisanship regarding the 
narrative covering a mission decisively increased the extent of public support for a specific MOA. To 
the contrary, when the justification of troops deployment deviated from humanitarian concerns, 
public contestation increased. As Coticchia and De Simone (2016) showed, this was the case for the 
ISAF operation in Afghanistan during the last Berlusconi’s government. To further the point, 
Olmastroni (2014a) demonstrated that the ambiguous framing adopted by Berlusconi during the 
earlier phase of the Iraq War affected public support for successive Italian humanitarian mission.  
The dissertation builds upon this research agenda on the role of political parties in Italy’s participation 
in MOAs during the Second Republic. However, it aims to provide an original contribution to it, by 
comprehensively explaining party support for this issue. In other words, this work addresses the 
following questions: “Why did parties support MOAs?”, “How did variables like ideology, party 
competition, law-making procedures, international legitimization for the mission affect party support 
for MOAs?”. Even the fourth chapter, investigating why extreme junior partners decided not to leave 
the government in spite of Italy’s participation in a mission, sheds light on why they did not support 
MOAs in principle. By using a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, the findings of 
this work may confirm, question or clarify results obtained by previous works on this issue. 
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I provided an overview of three debates that are extremely relevant for my dissertation. 
First, I described how IR as a field of research have not regarded variables at the domestic level such 
 
38 On Italian public opinion, its foreign policy beliefs and its attitudes towards the use of force see Isernia (2000); Coticchia 
(2014).  
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as regime type as fundamental to analyse international politics and how, from the beginning of the 
nineties, scholars in this field of research have paid more attention, thereby closing the gap with the 
sub-field of FPA. In this process, the development of the democratic peace theory and, in particular, 
empirical tests of the structural explanation laid the foundation for successive studies exploring the 
role of parties in states’ propensity to go to war. Secondly, I reviewed the state of the art on the party 
politics of foreign and security policy, by dividing the works in three categories. Such works have 
been rarely, if ever, employed as an explicit point of departure for analysing the role of Italian parties 
in foreign policy. Conversely, the investigation of this case study may benefit to the development of 
this flourishing academic debate. Thirdly, I contextualized this dissertation by briefly discussing the 
evolution of the party system and foreign policy in Italy between the first and the second republic. In 
particular, I shed light on Italian remarkable involvement in MOAs during the Second Republic, 
discussing the size of this phenomenon, its drivers and the role of political parties.  
The main aim of this chapter was to locate the dissertation within existing academic debates. In the 
successive empirical chapters, I will instead provide a substantial contribution to these research 
agendas. In particular, the dissertation addresses the research agenda of party politics of military 
interventions by trying to explain party support on such issue in a single country over time. As said, 
such a perspective is currently missing, as most of works adopts a cross-national approach. This is 
particularly true for studies on the impact of partisanship and coalition politics on foreign policy. 
Furthermore, chapter 2 and 3 will make an advancement in the explanation of party support for peace 
and security operations, by scrutinizing the interaction between ideology (on both the left-right axis 
and the GAL/TAN dimension) and a series of factors linked to domestic politics (presence in 
government and law-making procedure) and the specific operation’s characteristics (extent of 
international legitimation and presence of a strong interest at stake). In addition, chapter 4 will extend 
the research on coalition politics on foreign policy by examining the impact why junior coalition 
partners remained in the government, despite a much disliked the decision to participate in a military 
operation.  
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Chapter 2 
Explaining party support for Military Operations Abroad:  
evidence from the quantitative analysis of parliamentary speeches39 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
On the morning of 15 April 2003, Franco Frattini, then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the centre-right 
coalition government, announced before the Chamber of Deputies, the lower chamber of Italian 
parliament, the decision to deploy around 3000 soldiers in Iraq for the mission Antica Babilonia, in 
the aftermath of Saddam Hussein’s regime fall40. During his speech, Frattini repeatedly emphasized 
the humanitarian dimension of the operation, aimed at delivering food, medical assistance and 
security to the Iraqi people. “The Italian mission significantly differs from the ones undertaken in 
Afghanistan and in Kosovo” as it aims at “improving the living conditions and guaranteeing the 
security of the civilians”, he remarked at a point. Frattini also said that the armed forces would have 
to merely “provide a security framework” in which a “serious and effective help” to the local people 
could unfold, with no specific combat tasks required41. 
 
Despite the apparently commendable scope of the operation, the centre-left opposition vigorously 
criticized the stance of the executive on the issue, making the parliamentary debate particularly 
heated. Part of the reason is that, the then Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, was a staunch 
supporter of the extremely controversial United States’ intervention in Iraq from the very beginning. 
According to Davidson (2008), only considerable public opinion’s scepticism towards the war 
 
39 A previous version of this chapter was published as a research article on the journal West European Politics with the 
title “Where are the doves? Explaining party support for Military Operations Abroad in Italy”. 
40 For an overview of the operation Antica Babilonia with a description of the aims, troops committed, and casualties 
among Italian militaries see the Supreme Command of Defence’s report (Stato Maggiore della Difesa 2006). To read the 
entire debate see the report (Camera dei Deputati 2003). For a general overview of the political debate around this 
operation see Calossi and Coticchia (2009); Coticchia (2011); Ignazi et al. (2012).  
41 All these quotations are drawn from the report of the parliamentary debate and translated in English by the author. The 
pages are in parentheses. 
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convinced the government not to provide a contribution in the earlier phase of the invasion42. To the 
contrary, centre-left parties always described the invasion of Iraq as a serious mistake that would 
worsen rather than solving the threat of Islamic terrorism. They also criticized the government’s 
ambiguous stance on the Italian participation in the conflict43. Even the decision to eventually provide 
a contribution in the post-conflict phase did not please them at all. During the debate in parliament, 
the main opposition party, Democratici di Sinistra (DS), demanded a stronger effort to situate the 
Italian contribution within a multilateral framework, instead of the “coalition of the willing”. Piero 
Fassino, the leader of DS parliamentary group at the Chamber of Deputies, described the war as 
“illegitimate” and, while supporting a mission to help the civilians, he demanded the executive to 
“act with determination to push for a multilateral action in Iraq”. The extreme-left Rifondazione 
Comunista went further, accusing the government of acting slavishly to please the United States and 
violating the constitution. “The government does not manage to distinguish itself from its big ally but 
only to bring Italy to the banquet of war”, a communist MP said. Centre-right coalition parties 
eventually managed to see their own resolution approved, even without the votes from the centre-left 
coalition.  
 
This debate clearly underlines the presence of party contestation on Military Operations Abroad 
(MOA) in Italy between 1994 and 2013. As a starting point in the analysis of how Italian parties 
behaved on this important but yet overlooked issue, this first chapter aims to explain the extent of 
party support for MOAs, assessing the role of a series of factors, related to ideology, domestic politics 
and specific features of the operations. In other words, it addresses the following question: “why did 
Italian parties support troop deployments?” and “which factors increased (or decreased) party support 
for MOAs in Italy?”. As said, various studies have already explored how Italian parties positioned on 
this issue, qualitatively analysing their narratives and discourses (Calossi and Coticchia 2009; 
Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012). In this chapter, I will employ a different methodology. In order 
 
42 According to a survey conducted in June 2002, only 10% of Italian public opinion was in favour of a potential American 
unilateral intervention in Iraq (German Marshall Fund, quoted in Coticchia 2014) and only 17% supported the 
participation of the country in such a military operation (ISPO, quoted in Coticchia 2014).  In May 23, after the end of 
the US invasion, 83% of the Italian public opinion stated that the choice of not participating was right (Pew Research 
Centre, quoted in Coticchia 2014). Massive public protests were also organized against the war in the country in 2003 (Il 
Corriere della Sera, February 16, 2003).  
43 On January 25, Luciano Violante, former president of the Chamber of Deputies and prominent DS exponentsclaimed 
that “there were no reasons to invade Iraq” (La Repubblica, 25 January 2003). A few days later, the leader of the party, 
Massimo D’Alema, stated that the intervention would lead to “a hundred years of terrorism” (La Repubblica, 31 January 
2003).  
 45  
 
to extract party positions, I will analyse a selection of twelve parliamentary debates on the six most 
relevant MOAs occurred during the Second Republic (1994-2013) through the scaling algorithm 
Wordfish (Slapin and Proksch 2008). This unsupervised automated content analysis technique 
enables the researcher to locate political actors on a one-dimensional space through the assessment 
of the word frequencies across texts. Wordfish has been employed extensively in the field of political 
science, especially to scale party positions on the left-right axis (Ceron 2015; 2016; Frid-Nielsen 
2018; Proksch and Slapin 2009; Proksch et al. 2011; Slapin and Proksch 2008). However, as far as I 
know, it has never been used so far to measure party positions on military interventions, in Italy as 
well as in other countries. Successively, these positions are included in an original dataset and 
considered as dependent variables in a couple of OLS linear regression models. This final step enables 
me to test the impact of a series of factors on party support for MOAs in Italy. All in all, as suggested 
in the introduction, this chapter represents a methodological advancement for the emerging research 
agenda on party politics of military interventions, in Italy and beyond. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows. First, on the basis of the existing literature of the party politics 
and military intervention and the debate around Italian foreign policy during the Second Republic, I 
will formulate a series of hypotheses concerning the factors explaining party support for MOAs. 
Secondly, I will explain how I selected and collected the parliamentary speeches and how I extracted 
party positions on this issue through Wordfish. Thirdly, I will provide a brief explanation of the 
variables included in the dataset. Fourthly, I will analyse the regression models and discuss the results. 
Finally, in the conclusion, I will briefly resume my findings and discuss them in the light of the 
broader literature on the party politics of military interventions.  
 
Hypotheses 
 
As suggested in the previous chapter, there is a lack of consensus concerning the impact of positioning 
on the left-right axis on support for military interventions. Scholars have provided theoretical and 
empirical support for two different models of party competition on MOAs across this ideological 
cleavage. The first one predicts a linear and positive relationship between the position of a party in 
the left-right axis and support for involvement in military conflicts (Palmer et al. 2004). In a nutshell, 
right-wing parties are more hawkish than left-wing party. The second one instead hypothesizes a 
curvilinear and bell-shaped relationship (Wagner et al. 2017). According to this model, centrist parties 
are presumed to be prone to view the involvement of the country in military interventions more 
favourably.  
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The linear model seems more intuitive as left-wing parties are commonly regarded as more dovish 
than right-wing parties. As argued, translating domestic preferences in the realm of foreign policy, 
Rathbun (2004) motivated leftist antimilitarism with their resistance to the use of coercive means to 
achieve political goals and their emphasis on egalitarianism. He claimed that “leftists are more 
reluctant to use force in international relations as a means of resolving conflicts” (Rathbun 2004, 21). 
To the contrary, right-wing parties’ domestic emphasis on order and hierarchy turn into a more 
hawkish stance on foreign policy. As Rathbun stated (2004, 21), “International hard-liners are 
domestic hard-liners as well”.  
 
However, the curvilinear model could be more appropriate to describe party of contestations over 
post-Cold War multilateral interventions such as those in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya. The use 
of force in peace and security operation is often not justified on the basis of national and territorial 
defence from an external threat but rather as aimed at protecting foreign people. Acknowledging such 
difference, Rathbun suggested a potential deviation from the left-right divide. Due to their inclusive 
conception of national interest, left-wing parties may give primacy to the goal of saving lives over 
the use of military means to achieve such objective. This creates a broad party consensus for peace 
and security operations: left-wing parties support them as they have a humanitarian dimension; right-
wing parties because support them as troop deployments are a source of pride for the country. In such 
a context, opposition to these missions is confined to the extreme sides of the left-right ideological 
axis, where parties with strong antimilitarist and nationalist ideologies are placed respectively. On 
the one hand, in contrast to moderate left-wing parties, extreme left parties may not be willing to 
compromise their scepticism towards the use of force even with the need to save the lives of foreign 
peoples. In addition, as opposed to moderate right-wing parties, far right parties may place the 
tangible domestic security over an intangible sense of pride deriving from the deployment of national 
troops. To sum up, while centre-left and centre-right parties resolve their values-based tensions on 
the issue by supporting peace operations, extreme left and extreme right parties do the same by 
opposing them.  
 
This divide has therefore ideological roots, but it is also spurred by the structure and the incentives 
of the political competition, opposing “establishment” or “mainstream partners” on the one hand, and 
“challenger”, “niche” or even anti-system parties on the other hand (Meguid 2005; Hobolt and Tilley 
2016; Wagner 2011; Zulianello 2018). Path dependency stemming from previous experiences in 
government may constrain mainstream parties to take a supportive position on this issue (Hooghe and 
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Marks 2018). For instance, the decision to deny the support for a military intervention at the 
opposition would appear inconsistent if they also promoted other ones when they were in government. 
To the contrary, extreme partners are unconstrained to take more radical positions on the issue, acting 
as issue entrepreneurs and politicizing it (Hobolt and De Vries 2015). In this case, this would mean 
opposing a military operation on the basis either of the use of military force or its lack of connection 
with the protection of national security. Extreme parties are further incentivized to take a more radical 
position when it is closer to that of the median voter. In such sense, after the end of World War II, 
pacifism became a widespread sentiment among Italian public opinion (Coticchia 2014; Isernia 
2000). Therefore, in principle, opposition to MOAs has to be considered as a position closer to the 
median voter in Italy. 
 
All in all, I expect to find stronger empirical evidence for the curvilinear model rather than the linear 
one. Furthermore, as suggested in chapter 1, qualitative research has indicated a centrist and 
bipartisan consensus on this issue in Italy (Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012).  
 
H1a: Right-wing parties are more supportive of MOAs than left-wing parties 
 
H1b: Centre-left and centre-right parties are more supportive of MOAs than extreme-left and far-
right parties 
 
In recent years, the GAL/TAN scale has emerged as an innovative dimension to measure party 
competition in Europe (Bakker et al. 2015; Hooghe and Marks 2018; Hooghe et al. 2002). It captures 
the cleavage between parties emphasizing post-materialist and environmental concerns 
(Green/Alternative/Libertarian) and those stressing traditional and nationalist values 
(Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalism). Parties with low values on this scale are associated with the 
GAL pole, while party with higher scores are associated with the TAN pole. Therefore, while the left-
right axis also measures position on economic issues, the GAL/TAN dimension specifically reflects 
a cleavage emerged on social issues in recent decades. To sum up, it captures a conflict between two 
starkly diverging vision of politics: one liberal and internationalist, based on principles such as direct 
democracy and environmentalism, and the other one, conservative and nationalist, aiming to protect 
national sovereignty.  
 
Following Rathbun’s (2004) aforementioned theoretical argument, parties closer to the GAL pole are 
presumed to be more favourable to peace and security operation because they are more concerned 
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about the lives and rights of foreign people. To the contrary, parties closer to the TAN pole are 
expected to be more sceptical because of their narrow focus on the protection of the domestic 
community. Furthermore, location of parties across this dimension seems crucial to distinguish their 
support of the European Union, with liberal parties viewing further integration more positively than 
authoritarian and nationalist parties (Hooghe and Marks 2018; Hooghe et al. 2002; Marks et al. 2006). 
Support for multilateralism is expected to translate also into support for military interventions since 
most of them are conducted by international organizations such as the United Nations, NATO and 
the EU itself. In fact, in their recent cross-national study on parliamentary votes, Wagner et al. (2018) 
found that parties scoring high on the GAL pole to be more supportive of peace and security 
operations than parties scoring high on the TAN pole. I expect positioning on this dimension to be a 
predictor of party support in for MOAs in Italy as well.  
 
H2: Parties with low values on the GAL/TAN scale are more supportive of MOAs than those with 
high values 
 
Whether a party controls the executive, individually or in coalition with other parties, is presumed to 
decisively affects its extent of support for MOAs. In a few words, parties in government are expected 
to be more supportive of troops deployment in peace and security operations than those that are at the 
opposition. Incentives for governing parties to support MOAs comes from both the international and 
the domestic environment. At the international level, governing parties are heavily concerned about 
the reputation costs for the country deriving from not participating in multilateral interventions. In 
the context of the NATO operation in Afghanistan, Kreps (2010) demonstrated how political parties 
in a number of countries were particularly sensitive to these reputational costs. However, as Wagner 
et al (2018, 6) argued, “such pressures are primarily felt in government […], whereas parties in 
opposition remain less constrained from such considerations”. In fact, national governments are 
directly accountable to the international community for taking the decision to deploy troops in 
multilateral operations. Therefore, being part of the government entails stronger pressures from the 
external environment than being at the opposition.  
 
At the domestic level, incentives for governing parties to support MOAs are linked to the fundamental 
relationship between parties and government in modern democracies (Katz 1987; Gallagher et al. 
2011). According to the model of party government (Katz 1987), all the main decisions are taken by 
the parties composing the cabinet and members of the cabinet are responsible of their actions in front 
of the parties that have elected them. Therefore, in the first place, it is presumable that the decision 
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to participate in a multilateral intervention is taken only after the agreement of the only governing 
party in single-party government or a negotiation between the various governing parties in a coalition 
cabinet. In parliamentary democracies, where the survival of the government depends on the support 
of parties forming a legislative majority and the head of state is not directly elected, the involvement 
of parties in the decision-making process is supposed to be even stronger44. Furthermore, in such 
countries, governing parties are further discouraged to take an ex-post position against a MOA 
promoted by the government as it would undermine the stability of the executive itself, questioning 
their permanence in power. For example, voting against a mission in parliament, they would seriously 
put the life of the government at risk. To the contrary, opposition parties are often pressured to 
confront in order to defeat the cabinet in parliament and present themselves as alternative at the eyes 
of the electorate. Therefore, they may instrumentally use troops deployment to signal their opposition 
to the executive, especially if the intervention is unpopular among the electorate (Williams 2014).  
 
Wagner et al. (2018) empirically showed that the presence in the government significantly increases 
the extent of party support for peace and security operation. I expect this variable to have the same 
effect in the Italian case. In addition, it is worth underlining that Italy is a parliamentary democracy 
in which parties have always played a fundamental role in the decision-making process and the 
stability of the government (Cotta and Verzichelli 2016). Furthermore, Italian governing coalitions 
have been relatively cohesive on this issue in parliament. In fact, from the end of the Cold War, only 
once an executive was defeated in a parliamentary vote on a matter of foreign and security policy45. 
Therefore, I hypothesize that parties being member of the governing coalition are more supportive 
than parties at the opposition.  
 
H3: Parties in government are more supportive of MOAs than opposition parties 
 
Moreover, features of specific mission are expected to have a varying impact on the extent of party 
support across the left-right axis. As Rathbun (2004) suggested, left-wing parties strongly uphold the 
principle of multilateralism to justify the use of force. This depends on their general preference for 
coordinated efforts among countries to tackle common issues over the pursuit of free-for-all 
strategies. In the words of Rathbun (2004, 23), “left-wing parties are more likely to consider national 
 
44 For a distinction between parliamentary and presidential democracies see Lijphart (2012).  
45 On 21 February 2007 the second Prodi government was defeated at the Senate in a vote on the renewal of Italian 
commitment to NATO Operation ISAF in Afghanistan and the expansion of a U.S. military base in Italy due to the 
defection of a couple of MPs from the extreme left. For a more detailed account of this event see Carbone (2007). 
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needs to be similar to those of the international community and consequently are more comfortable 
limiting discretion over policy”. Following such an approach, multilateral military interventions can 
be considered as legitimate since they are the product of a collective decision-making process rather 
than the initiative of a single state to attack another one. To the contrary, because of their excluding 
interpretation of national interest, right-wing parties are more sceptical of multilateral institutions to 
achieve political goals. As Rathbun (2004, 23) argued, they instead “view unilateralism as an end in 
itself”. Therefore, they are less concerned about the multilateral dimension of a military operation. 
Analysing the Italian case, as said in the previous chapter, several authors have stressed that centre-
left governments have adopted a more multilateral approach to foreign policy than centre-right 
counterparts (Andreatta 2008; Brighi 2013; Carbone 2007; Cladi and Webber 2011; Quaglia 2007). 
As Carbone (2007, 917) argued, “for the centre-right coalition national interest is promoted through 
a pragmatic bilateralism and a reinforced Atlanticism, whereas for the centre-left through active 
multilateralism and reinforced Europeanism”46. The United Nations (UN) is arguably the most 
emblematic example of a multilateral organization. Through resolutions approved by the Security 
Council, the body in charge of guaranteeing peace and security among its members, UN provides the 
ultimate source of juridical legitimacy for a military intervention. The relevance of UN legitimation 
within the Italian political is evident from the aforementioned debate on the Iraq War (Calossi and 
Coticchia 2009; Ratti 2011). To sum up, given their stronger emphasis on multilateralism, I expect 
Italian left-wing parties to be more supportive of those MOAs that have received such multilateral 
legitimation than right-wing parties. 
 
H4: Left-wing parties are more supportive of those MOAs with a strong multilateral legitimacy than 
right-wing parties 
 
To the contrary, right-wing parties are more inclined to justify the use of military force when it is 
required to guarantee the well-being of the national community, in security and economic terms. As 
suggested, despite being more militarist, right-wing parties are not particularly in favour of troops 
deployment in foreign countries for humanitarian aims. However, their extent of support is expected 
to increase if the intervention provides substantial security, political and economic benefits for their 
own country or, quoting Rathbun (2004, 26), if it “affects tangible national interests”. This is often 
the case when the military operation occurs in a geographically proximate country for two reasons. 
 
46 As underlined in the previous chapter, the academic debate on this issue is not settled. Other scholars do not find any 
significant difference between centre-left and centre right coalition governments on foreign policy in Italy. For studies 
formulating such argument see Croci (2003; 2005; 2008); Walston (2004; 2007).  
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First, contributing to the mission is a manner to bring stability in the area and avoid spreading of the 
conflict at home (Gleditsch 2007). Second, intervening is a way to preserve or increase influence on 
the post-conflict political and economic affairs of the country in which the operation takes place. 
Unsurprisingly, Bove and Elia (2011) have found that geographic proximity is a strong predictor of 
a country’s probability to provide a contribution to peace and security operations. Therefore, as they 
are interested in the protection of the national community in their foreign policy approach, right-wing 
parties are expected to be particularly concerned about the geographical location of the MOAs. In 
line with this conception, in Italy, centre-right governments arguably distinguished themselves for a 
“nationalist” approach foreign policy (Brighi 2013). Therefore, I hypothesize that Italian right-wing 
parties are more likely to support those MOAs having among their goals the clear protection of 
national security and economic interests.  
 
H5: Right-wing parties are more supportive of those MOAs in which national interests are at stake 
than left-wing parties 
 
Measuring party support for MOAs through Wordfish  
 
In order to measure party support for MOAs, this paper employs the unsupervised scaling algorithm 
Wordfish (Slapin and Proksch 2008). This automated content analysis method is specifically designed 
to extract and scale positions of political actors on a one-dimensional ideological space, from the 
assessment of word frequencies across texts. In brief, Wordfish assigns words a value of beta, the 
discriminating parameter, according to their frequencies. Those with low frequencies are assigned 
either positive or negative values, locating political actors at the extremes of the dimension, while 
those with high frequencies are assigned values close to zero, not contributing to the distinction 
among political actors to the same extent.  
 
A number of studies have employed this algorithm to scale party positions on the left-right axis 
(Proksch and Slapin 2009; Proksch et al. 2011; Slapin and Proksch 2008). However, Wordfish can be 
also used to locate parties and other political actors on different issues as well. For instance, 
employing this method, Frid-Nielsen (2018) estimated the positions of individual Members of 
European Parliament (MEPs) on asylum policy. In fact, as an unsupervised method, Wordfish is able 
to extract positions only through the distribution of words across texts, without an ex ante definition 
of the dimension under investigation. This is contrast with Wordscores, a supervised scaling 
technique which requires the identification of the dimension beforehand through the use of reference 
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texts47. When consisting information regarding appropriate reference texts is available, Wordscores 
is even more accurate than Wordfish in estimating positions (Hjort et al. 2015). For example, due to 
the wide range of existing sources of measurement, reference texts for scaling parties in the left-right 
axis are very reliable. However, when such a priori information is missing or scant, Wordfish is a 
more adequate method (Hjort et al. 2015). This is the case for very specific and understudied policy 
issues such as military interventions. Therefore, this paper employs Wordfish to explore variation of 
party support for MOAs in Italy due to its capacity of scaling political actors without a-priori 
definition of the dimension under investigation and consistent information regarding appropriate 
reference texts.   
 
In order to scale party positions through Wordfish, scholars have used either party manifestoes or 
party representatives’ speeches as sources48. This paper extracts Italian parties’ positions on MOAs 
from a selection of parliamentary speeches for two reasons. First, references to security and defence 
issues in Italy’s party manifestoes are extremely rare and, when they occur, are often vague. Given 
that, it is unsurprising that the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), arguably the most quoted and 
accurate project estimating party positions on the basis of manifestoes, has mostly labelled Italian 
parties during this period as missing values for the variables “war participants: positive”, “military: 
positive”, “international peace”49. Second, during the Second Republic, parties that were member of 
the same coalition often presented common manifestoes at the elections, making distinctions between 
them through these documents impossible. For example, for the 2001 general elections, centre-left 
and centre-right coalitions presented two common manifestoes, agreed by all the parties being 
members of the two coalitions. Given this, the choice of employing parliamentary speeches is the 
only viable.  
 
Therefore, as a first step to measure party positions, I collected the speeches of Italian main parties’ 
MPs and government representatives during twelve key parliamentary debates at the Chamber of 
 
47 For an extensive overview of unsupervised and supervised scaling methods see Grimmer and Stewart (2013).  
48 For applications of Wordfish on party manifestoes see Proksch et al. (2013); Slapin and Proksch (2008). For 
applications on parliamentary speeches see Frid-Nielsen (2018); Proksch and Slapin (2009). However, some scholars 
raised concerns about the application of Wordfish on parliamentary speeches (Lauderdale and Herzog 2016: Lowe and 
Benoit 2013). In particular, in contrast to manifestoes, parliamentary speeches are strongly conditioned by government-
opposition dynamics.  
49 For examples of descriptions and applications of CMP see Budge et al. (2001); Klingemann et al. (2006). 
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Deputies on six extremely important MOAs, between 1994 and 201350. These operations were 
relevant in terms of resources committed and significantly contributed to the evolution of Italian 
security policy after the end of the Cold War (Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012). Furthermore, due 
to the extent of the contribution and the high domestic salience, parliament devoted individual debates 
for these operations. This element makes it possible to extract party positions on each of the specific 
mission. In some cases, debates occurred before the beginning troop deployment while in other ones 
occurred afterwards. However, they could be interpreted as crucial for the approval and prosecution 
of the operation. To be precise, the military operations considered are: Alba (Albania, 1997), Allied 
Force and Allied Harbour (Kosovo, 1999), Enduring Freedom/Nibbio (Afghanistan, 2001-2002), 
Iraqi Freedom/Antica Babilonia (Iraq, 2003-2004), Operation UNIFIL/Leonte (Lebanon, 2006), 
Operation Unified Protector (Libya, 2011)51. The division of debates per mission is the following: 
one for Alba, three for Allied Harbour, three for Enduring Freedom, three for Iraqi Freedom, one for 
UNIFIL, and one for Unified Protector.  
 
The decision to focus exclusively on debates occurred at the Chamber of Deputies and overlooking 
the ones taking place in the Senate, the upper chamber of Italian Parliament is based on two criteria. 
First, MPs of the same party in the two chambers coordinate among themselves and have no 
incentives to do otherwise. Positions and narratives are presumed to be identical across parties in the 
two Chambers. Therefore, not considering debates in the Senate is a strategy to avoid uninformative 
repetitions in the analysis. Moreover, in the case of the participation in the MOAs in Kosovo, debates 
at the Chamber of Deputies were not consistently followed by similar debates at the Senate.  
 
With the exception of the single debate on UNIFIL, all the other ones always revolved on the 
government’s communications to the Chamber of Deputies. Despite not being constitutionally 
necessary, this parliamentary step was usually followed for important MOAs. UNIFIL debate 
concerned instead the conversion of a law decree into a proper law. Law decree is a temporary act 
issued by the executive, which must be converted into law within sixty days. These acts were only 
 
50 All the speeches have been collected from reports of the debates available on the digital archive of the Chamber of 
Deputies. 
51 The names of the operations refer to both the international denomination and the Italian contributions to them. The 
years in the parentheses correspond to the ones in which the debates took place and not the beginning and the end of the 
missions. Contributions to related operations Allied Force and Allied Harbour in Kosovo were discussed in the same 
debates.  
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occasionally employed to approve specific military operations52. To the contrary, they were 
extensively used for a general re-funding of all the ongoing operations53. During all these debates 
MPs affiliated to the various parties employed a rather politically polarized vocabulary to express 
their consent or dissent for the deployment of troops in the military operations. As Hjort et al. (2015) 
argued, this element increases the validity of positions extracted through Wordfish.  
 
As it was suggested in the previous chapter, Italy had a remarkably fragmented party system in these 
years (Bardi 2007; Bartolini et al. 2004; D’Alimonte and Bartolini 1997). Therefore, I decided to 
select only some of the parties among the several holding seats in the Chamber of Deputies. In order 
to choose them, I followed two criteria: political relevance and presence of a distinct point of view 
on military operations. First, during this period, all the parties taken into account either held enough 
seats to form their own parliamentary group or were crucial for the survival of the governing 
coalition54. Secondly, as shown by Calossi and Coticchia (2009) these parties contributed to the 
parliamentary debates in a meaningful way, articulating substantially different stances on MOAs. For 
example, this meant proposing different motions on government’s communications to the Chamber. 
In alphabetic order the selected parties are: Alleanza Nazionale (AN), Centro Cristiano Democratico 
and Crisitani Democratici Uniti (CCD-CDU, considered jointly), Democratici di Sinistra/ Partito dei 
Democratici di Sinistra (PDS) (PDS/DS), Federazione dei Verdi (FdV), Forza Italia/Popolo delle 
Libertà (FI/PdL, considered jointly), Italia dei Valori (IdV), Lega Nord per l’Indipendenza della 
Padania (LN), La Margherita (Mar), Partito dei Comunisti Italiani (PdCI), Partito Democratico 
(PD, Partito Popolare Italiano and I Democratici (PPI-Dem, considered jointly), Partito della 
Rifondazione Comunista (PRC), Unione di Centro (UDC)55.  
 
52 The mission Iraqi Freedom is another example of a mission formally approved through a legal decree, even though 
government referred on it in Parliament before. Other ones are: UNMIBH (Bosnia), Allied Harmony (Macedonia), and 
UNSMIS (Syria).  
53 The conversion of law decrees was also an opportunity to debate other smaller MOAs not taken into account in this 
chapter. The next chapter will provide a more extensive discussion on the evolution of law-making procedures to approve 
and fund MOAs in Italy.  
54 According to the Italian law, the minimum number of seats to form a parliamentary group is 20. In order to give more 
homogeneity to the data, I continued to take into account a pivotal junior coalition partner moving to the opposition after 
election, even though it did not hold enough seats.  
55 For a distribution of the debates, missions and parties see the Appendix. DS is how PDS was renamed after 1998 and, 
consequently, the two parties are considered as one. FI and PdL are considered as a unique party because PdL was how 
the party was re-named after the merging with AN in 2008. CCD and CDU were considered as a unique party because 
they shared the same party family (Christian democrat), collocation in coalition governments or opposition, and 
parliamentary group before finally merging in 2002 to form UDC. PPI and I Democratici were considered as a single 
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In addition to the MPs affiliated to these parties, I also collected the speeches made by government 
representatives during these debates. As suggested in the introduction, prominent members of the 
executive – Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Ministers of Defence and even the Prime Ministers – spoke 
at length, announcing the decision to take part in the military operations, describing the terms of 
Italian involvement and occasionally replying to MPs’ speeches. In total, summing together speeches 
from MPs and government representatives, I collected 296 single speeches. As a second step in the 
process, I aggregated all the speeches made by individual MPs during each debate in single text 
documents according to their party affiliation. This is a necessary step as parties are my units of 
analysis56. The speeches made by government representatives were also aggregated separately in 
other text documents. Eventually, I ended up with 116 text documents with an average length of 
around 3000 words. As more parties participated in the same debate, documents containing speeches 
made by MPs were the vast majority (104). Documents containing speeches made by government 
representatives were instead one for each debate (12). Thirdly, I analysed these documents. After 
removing stopwords (articles and prepositions) and punctuation, which can potentially bias the 
scaling process, I ran separate analysis for each debate using Wordfish57. In such a way, I obtained 
party positions on all the specific MOAs with respect to the government. In fact, the documents 
containing the speeches made by government representatives were considered as parameters for party 
support for MOAs. For instance, in the case of the debate mentioned in the introduction on Antica 
Babilonia, the text document containing the speech made by Minister of Foreign Affairs was chosen.  
 
This procedure is unconventional given that Wordfish is designed to scale political actors without the 
requirement of reference texts. However, through their speeches, government representatives 
significantly set the topics and the tone of the debates. As previously suggested, these debates 
specifically pivoted around the government’s stance and conduct on a specific MOA. Therefore, 
parties expressed their point of views by either supporting or opposing the executive. Furthermore, 
 
party as they also were part of the same centre-left coalition at the end of the nineties and they merged to form La 
Margherita.  
56 This procedure admittedly neglects potential intra-party disagreements. 
57 Separate analyses for each of the debate were made to control for the variation of the language across the single debates 
and missions. The algorithm was also run on all parties’ text documents. As expected, results were strongly biased. 
Moreover, Wordfish was also run after the document frequency matrix was trimmed to keep only those words that are 
present in all text documents. As to confirm the high extent of variation in the language used across missions and debates, 
all the texts shared only two words in common, those usually employed by MPs to address the President of the Chamber 
and their colleagues. Any application of Wordfish on this sample was consequently meaningless.  
 56  
 
various studies showed how successive Italian government employed humanitarian narratives to 
justify troop deployments in MOAs (Coticchia 2011; 2015; Ignazi et al. 2012). Stressing the 
humanitarian aspects of a mission, members of the executive were able to shape the parliamentary 
debate on this issue.  The inclusion of a text representing the government’s position can be considered 
as a strategy to control for this potential bias, thereby improving the validity of the measures58. 
 
For example, Figure 1 shows the scaled positions for the aforementioned debate on the Italian 
contribution to the military operation in Iraq. The positive values are associated with support for the 
mission, while the negative ones correspond to opposition. Predictably, the position of the 
government (Gov) is the most supportive of all. As expected, three parties included in the centre-right 
coalition government, Unione di Centro (UDC), Forza Italia (FI) and Lega Nord (LN), present a 
significantly positive degree of support. Alleanza Nazionale (AN) is the only outlier within the 
coalition government, having a slightly negative score. The slightly positive score of Democratici di 
Sinistra (DS), the main party of the centre-left opposition, might look surprising as well. However, 
as suggested in the introduction, DS were substantially in favour of the humanitarian side of operation 
and only criticized the lack of a multilateral framework for it. The centrist La Margherita (Mar) 
shared the same position and, in fact, has a similar score. The greens (Verdi) and the extreme left 
parties Rifondazione Comunista (RC) and Partito dei Comunisti Italiani (PdCI) were more vocal in 
criticizing Italy’s involvement in the operation Iraqi freedom. In fact, they present the most negative 
scores, with RC and PdCI placed in a very distant position from all the other parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 As a robustness check, party positions were also extracted excluding the texts containing the speeches made by members 
of the government. However, positions extracted including these texts were slightly more in line with those underlined 
by previous qualitative studies (Calossi and Coticchia 2009; Coticchia 2011). Correlations between the two measures is 
nevertheless high (r = 0,7166) and statistically significant (p<0,01). See the Appendix.  
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Figure 7: Party positions extracted from the debate on the mission Antica Babilonia, 15/4/200359  
 
 
In order to assess their reliability, party positions extracted through Wordfish need to undergo a 
careful process of validation (Grimmer and Stewart 2013). I qualitatively validated the positions by 
investigating both the discriminating (lowest and highest values of beta) and the non-discriminating 
(values of beta close to 0) words across texts in each debate. The analysis was elaborated on positions 
extracted including the texts containing the speeches made by government representatives60.  
 
Among the words with the highest values of beta, indicating strong support for a MOA, two patterns 
emerge. First, there is a high presence of technical words regarding the military operations such as 
“task force” and “rules of engagement” reflecting that representatives of the government had to 
provide details of the operations61. Second, the density of references to humanitarian concerns is 
higher, confirming the employment of a “pacifist” narrative among supportive parties. Among the 
words with the lowest values of beta, indicating opposition to MOAs, I identified three patterns. First, 
 
59 For the “Eiffel Tower” regarding this debate, with values of betas and psi for each of the words in the text documents, 
see the Appendix.  
60 The author can provide a complete list of these words on request. The validation process has been repeated with the 
positions extracted not including texts containing the speeches made by government representatives. The results are very 
similar.  
61 The words are translated from Italian by the author. 
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there is a constant presence of words with a negative connotation like “brutal”, “horrible”, 
“hypocrisy”, signalling harsh criticism towards the specific MOA. Second, words like “legitimacy” 
or its contrary “illegitimacy” occur frequently, pointing out how parties opposing MOAs often 
question the legitimacy of the mission. Third, some words concerning the core beliefs or identity of 
specific parties like “socialism” for the extreme left Rifondazione Comunista or “Padania” for the 
regionalist Lega Nord appear in the list. A few studies have identified both parties as sceptical of 
military interventions (Calossi et al. 2013; Verbeek and Zaslove 2015). The analysis of words with 
high frequency instead concretely demonstrates that the debates actually pivoted around the MOAs 
under scrutiny. I observed three groups of meaningful words. First, as expected, the presence of key 
words like “mission” and “war” is pervasive. Secondly, names of the countries in which missions 
took place such as “Kosovo” and “Iraq” appear very frequently. Thirdly, words related to the specific 
context like “terrorism” for the operation in Afghanistan are also very common. To sum up, words 
with high frequency across texts show that the algorithm successfully managed to capture party 
contestation of MOAs as dimension and not general positions on the left-right axis.  
 
Description of the dataset 
 
The extracted positions are used as dependent variables in my dataset62. However, since my goal is 
explaining party support for MOAs, I only considered those associated to parties, removing the ones 
associated with the government. To sum up, the dependent variable (Support) is composed by 104 
observations in total. The positions range from a minimum of -1,7581 to a maximum of 1,6989, with 
a mean of -0,165.  
 
The measures for the independent variables are instead either collected from existing datasets or 
attributed on the basis of author’s knowledge. Party positions on the right-left axis and the GAL/TAN 
scale are based on the variables lrgen and galtan in Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES) longitudinal 
dataset63. These surveys were conducted periodically from 1999 to 2014, covering almost perfectly 
the timespan of the debates64. The values of these variables (Rile) and (Gal/Tan) range from 0 to 10, 
from left to right and from GAL to TAN poles respectively. Interestingly, within the dataset, these 
two variables are highly (r = 0,894) and significantly (p < 0,01) correlated. Furthermore, minimum 
and maximum values, means and standard deviation also present similar values. Therefore, during 
 
62 The author can provide the full dataset on request.  
63 For the complete survey see Bakker et al. (2015); Polk et al. (2017). 
64 The scores were attributed on the basis of the closest survey in term of timing. 
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the “Second Republic”, Italian left-wing parties also had more liberal and alternative values, while 
right-wing parties had more conservative and authoritarian ones. This correlation reflects a broader 
pattern across West European countries across roughly the same years (Marks et al. 2006).  
 
The presence of a party at the government is measured through a dummy (Gov). It takes value 1 when 
the party is a member of the coalition government and 0 when it is at the opposition. I considered as 
governing parties also those parties that provided parliamentary support for the cabinet but did not 
hold cabinet posts. In Italy, such situations occurred during the so-called “technocratic governments” 
(“governi tecnici”). With this term are defined all those governments composed by experts not 
affiliated to parties and aimed at providing political stability required in period of economic 
turbulence or key decisions concerning the integration process within the EU (McDonnell and 
Valbruzzi 2014)65. These cabinets had to rely on the external support of existing parties in parliament. 
During the Second Republic (1994-2013), two technocratic governments formed: Dini (1995-1996) 
and Monti (2011-2013). Furthermore, as far as the other governments are concerned, between 1996 
and 1998, the communist party Rifondazione Comunista provided its external support to the centre-
left coalition government. 
 
UN legitimation for a MOA is also calculated through a dummy (UN). It takes value 1 when the UN 
Security Council (UNSC) approved a resolution authorizing the operation and 0 in the other cases. 
With the exception of missions in Kosovo and Iraq, all the other operations taken into account in this 
chapter have been authorized by explicit UNSC resolutions66.  As a proxy for the presence of a strong 
national interest at stake, I employed the proximity of the country in which the operation took place 
to Italian borders. This variable (Interest) is also a dummy taking value 1 for MOAs occurred in the 
Balkans (Albania and Kosovo) and Northern Africa (Libya) and 0 for the other ones occurred in not 
contiguous countries. For a more detailed description of the variables see Table 1. 
 
 
65 It is worth distinguishing technocratic governments from caretaker governments. In fact, while caretaker governments 
are led by politicians, technocratic governments are (at least partially) made of non-affiliated experts. 
66 After the end of Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, on June 10, 1999, UNSC approved Resolution 1244, authorising 
the international security presence in the region to use “all necessary means” to fulfil its responsibility to provide security 
and peace (UNSCR 1244). However, according to Chinkin (1999), this resolution does not provide an ex-post legal basis 
for the air strikes. The Italian contribution to the Operation Iraqi Freedom followed the approval of UNSC resolution 
1483 on May 22, 2003, encouraging states to assist the “people of Iraq to reform their institutions and rebuild their 
country” (UNSCR 1483). However, the US intervention in Iraq is considered as illegitimate by scholars and experts in 
international law, with UNSC resolution 1441 not providing coverage for such an act (Schmitt 2004). 
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Table 1: Description of the variables  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Support for MOA 
(Support) 
104 -0,165 0,851 -1,7581 1,6989 
 Position on the left-right 
axis (Rile) 
104 4,7041 2,444 0,6 8,71 
Position on the GAL/TAN 
Scale (Gal/Tan) 
104 5,074 2,7 0,63 8,88 
Presence in government 
(Gov) 
104 0,4615 0,501 0 1 
UN legitimation (UN) 104 0,4808 0,502 0 1 
National interest (Interest) 104 0,3846 0,4889 0 1 
 
 
Empirical findings  
 
On this dataset, I test my hypotheses through two OLS linear regression models with clustered 
standard error for parties67. The results are shown in Table 2. Model 1 only tests the hypotheses 
concerning the impact of ideology. The negative sign of the squared term indicates that support for 
 
67 I conducted five robustness checks on these models. First, I used as dependent variables the positions extracted not 
including the texts containing speeches made by government representatives. In such models, the statistical significance 
of the dependent term Rile squared drops considerably, while the effect of being in government is still strong and 
significant. This difference may be due to the increased accuracy in the measures obtained including the speeches made 
by the government representatives. Secondly, I replicated the same models with random effects for parties. Thirdly, I 
replicated the models with random effects for debates. In both cases, the differences with the models presented in the text 
are negligible. Fourthly, I ran two analysis replications dividing the debates occurred under the centre-left and centre-
right cabinets. The fact that the impact of the term Rile squared is negative and significant in both these models provides 
further validity in favour of the curvilinear model. Interestingly, the effect of the presence of the government becomes 
non-significant when the centre-right is in power. This might suggest that relevant MOAs approved under these cabinets 
were less contested by opposition parties. Given the anecdote described in the introduction of this chapter, this result is 
rather surprising. Finally, in order to confirm the conflict between moderate and extreme parties, I included in the model 
a variable measuring extremism as the squared distance from a hypothetical party collocated at the centre of the dimension 
(Marks et al. 2006). As expected, the impact is negative and significant (p<0,05 and p<0,01) in both models. For all the 
replication models see the Appendix.   
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MOAs on the left-right axis increases and then decreases again. The effect is also statistically 
significant (p<0,01). Therefore, as expected, in the Italian case party support for military interventions 
conforms to the curvilinear model (H1b) rather than the linear model (H1a). As expected in H2, 
support for MOAs decreases over the GAL/TAN scale.  In other words, liberal parties tend to be more 
in favour of military interventions than nationalist parties. However, the correlation with the 
dependent variable is not statistically significant. Therefore, the effect of positioning on the left-right 
axis is stronger than that on the GAL/TAN scale.  
 
Other than the impact of ideology, Model 2 tests the other hypotheses concerning the presence of a 
party at the government and the impact of operations features on parties across the left-right 
dimension. Even with the addition of new independent variables, findings obtained in Model 1 are 
substantially confirmed. Furthermore, as expected, parties at the government are more supportive of 
MOAs than those ones at the opposition (H3). The size of the coefficient is large, suggesting that 
presence in the executive is a very strong predictor of support for MOAs. Confirming H4, UN 
legitimation significantly (p<0,05) pushes left-wing parties to support a military operation. The 
negative sign in the first interaction terms also means that this factor negatively affects right-wing 
parties’ extent of support. In contradiction with H5, concerns for national security, measured as 
closeness of the military operation to Italian borders, do not provide incentives for right-wing parties 
to increase their extent of support. To the contrary, as the negative sign of the interaction term 
suggests, left-wing parties seem to be more sensitive to this variable. However, the effect is not 
statistically significant.  
 
Comparing the two models, it is worth underlining the remarkable increase in the R-squared. This 
indicator shifts from 0,108 in Model 1 to 0,493 in Model 2. It is true that the mere inclusion of further 
independent variables is supposed to increase the explanatory power of the models. However, such 
increase suggests that ideological positioning alone does not satisfactorily explain party support for 
MOAs in Italy. In order to better account for variation in the dependent variable, other factors, namely 
presence in the coalition government and features of the specific operation, have to be taken into 
account. This finding also underlines a certain contingency in party support for MOAs in Italy. 
Changing according to government-opposition dynamics and specific features of the operation rather 
than placement on ideological dimensions, party positions are rather unstable and context-dependent.  
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Table 2: Linear regression models with clustered standard error for parties 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
IV DV: Support DV: Support 
   
Rile 0.515*** 0.602*** 
 
(0.131) (0.164) 
Rile x Rile -0.048** -0.049*** 
 
(0.017) (0.015) 
GAL/TAN -0.010 -0.037 
 
(0.071) (0.061) 
Gov 
 
0.958*** 
  
(0.163) 
UN 
 
0.544* 
  
(0.270) 
UN x Rile 
 
-0.129** 
  
(0.050) 
Interest 
 
0.330 
  
(0.372) 
Interest x Rile 
 
-0.070 
  
(0.079) 
Constant -1.188*** -1.833*** 
 
(0.199) (0.271) 
   
Observations 104 104 
R-squared 0.108 0.493 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
On the basis of Model 2, Figure 8 shows the predicted distribution of support on the left-right axis. 
The extent of support is minimum at the extreme left, increases moving towards the centre, reaching 
its maximum at the median position, and then declines towards the right, forming an inverted U. 
Therefore, the graph describes the presence of a centrist consensus in Italy on MOAs. In the dataset, 
Democratici di Sinistra and Forza Italia, have scores approximately ranging around 3 and 7 
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respectively. The fact that in the plot parties with those scores have similar levels of support indicates 
that there is also bipartisanship on the issue. However, the width of the confidence intervals shows 
that level of support may vary considerably and even overlap between parties with close positions on 
the left/right axis. The graph on the left in Figure 9 instead describes the average marginal effect of 
position on the left-right axis. The effect is positive or negative according to whether the blue dots 
fall below the red line, placed on the 0 in the y axis. When the blue whiskers overlap with the line, 
the size of the effect is not significant; then they do not vice versa. Predictably, the effect is positive 
for left-wing parties and negative for right-wing parties. The effect of positioning on the left-right 
axis is significant (p < 0,1) at the extremes of the spectrum (values between 0 and 4 and between 8 
and 10) not significant for centrist parties (values between 5 and 7). This means that party positioning 
is a strong explanatory variable for extreme parties and instead has a non-significant impact on 
centrist parties. The graph on the right instead displays the frequency distribution of the variable Rile, 
through a histogram. As suggested, the peaks around 3 and 7 corresponds to the two main coalition 
parties. Moderate and centrist parties (PPI-La margherita and UDC) occupies the values between 4 
and 6. Extreme-left parties (RC and PdCI) gravitate close to 1, while far right parties (AN and LN) 
present values close to 8. Therefore, the effect of the variable Rile at the values 9 and 10 is not based 
on actual data but on the construction of the model. Besides this caveat, further evidence for the 
curvilinear model is provided by this figure.  
 
Figure 8:  predictive margins of position on the left-right axis 
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Figure 9: average marginal effects of position on the left-right axis (left) and distribution of the 
variable “Rile” (right) 
 
 
Figure 10 shows the impact of the presence in the executive on party support for MOAs. As said, 
governing parties are much more supportive than opposition parties. To be precise, being a member 
of the coalition government on average increases support of around 0,96 points. In other words, 
parties at the government present a twice and half higher extent of support than parties at the 
opposition. Therefore, the size of the effect is considerable. The graph also suggests that opposition 
parties were against MOAs. Such finding would contradict existing studies highlighting a generally 
high level of consensus among Italian parties on this issue (Coticchia and Giacomello 2011; Coticchia 
2012). However, the selection of the military missions analysed in this chapter probably affected the 
opposition party’s extent of support. In fact, as said, these MOAs were the most salient also in terms 
of domestic debate, producing a high extent of polarization among parties. Therefore, they are not 
completely representative of the level of party contestation on this issue in Italy.  
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Figure 10: Predictive margins for presence at the government 
 
 
Finally, Figure 11 shows how UN legitimation affects the extent of party support across the left-right 
axis. The plot on the left presents the effect of position on the left-right axis on those operation not 
covered by a UN Security Council resolution (UN=0). The plot on the right does the same thing for 
those who had such a source of institutional authorization (UN=1). In the plot on the left, the blue 
line steadily increases from 0 to 6 and then only slightly decreases. This means that support for 
missions without UN legitimation is very weak at the extreme left, considerably increases for centre-
left parties and it is maximum for centre-right parties. The plot on the right resembles a more balanced 
curvilinear model. Support for missions receiving UN legitimation therefore is again low at both 
extremes of the left-right axis and higher at the centre. However, contrasting the two graphs, UN 
legitimation acted as an incentive for extreme-left and left-wing parties to positively view the mission. 
To the contrary, this variable lowered right and especially far right’s extent of support. Figure 12 
describes instead the average marginal effect of party position on the left-right axis on party support 
for MOAs conditioned on the presence of UN authorization for the mission.  Again, the plot on the 
left shows the effect for operations not covered by a UNSCR (UN=0) and the plot on the right for the 
other ones (UN=1). Both these blue lines follow the same direction going downwards. However, the 
one on the left starts from a higher point and terminates also to a higher point. This confirms the 
previous findings as UN authorized missions find more support from left-wing parties than centre-
right counterparts. It is worth stressing that the effect of this interaction is again significant (p<0,1) 
only for the extreme values on the left-right axis (0 to 4 and 9 to 10) and non-significant for centrist 
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values. Furthermore, this finding may depend on the nature of the mission promoted by a party when 
in government. For instance, the centre-right coalition promoted the highly controversial mission 
Antica Babilonia, accounting for three out of the twelve debates in the dataset.  
 
Figure 11: predictive margins for UN legitimation of the mission conditioned to position on the left-
right axis 
 
 
Figure 12: average marginal effects (with 90% CIs) for UN legitimation of the mission conditioned 
to position on the left-right axis 
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Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I explained party support for the six most relevant military operations abroad in Italy 
during the so-called “Second Republic” (1994-2013). In order to measure party positions on this 
issue, I analysed a selection of twelve parliamentary debates through the unsupervised scaling 
algorithm Wordfish. This automated content analysis method allows to locate political actors across 
a one-dimensional ideological space only through the assessment of word frequency across texts 
(Grimmer et al. 2013; Hjort et al. 2015; Slapin and Proksch 2008). Wordfish has been successfully 
employed in comparative politics to measure party positions, in particular across the left-right axis 
(Proksch et al. 2013; Slapin and Proksch 2008). However, to my knowledge, studies that successfully 
use this scaling algorithm to extract and scale party positions on military interventions do not exist. 
Works on this issue have relied either on a qualitative analysis of discourse (Rathbun 2004) or roll-
call votes (Wagner et al. 2018). In this sense, this chapter provides a significant methodological 
advancement to the flourishing research on the party politics of military interventions, in the Italian 
context and comparative perspective.  
 
In order to test my hypotheses, I employed these measures as dependent variables in two linear 
regression models. The quantitative analysis produces interesting findings about the factors that 
increased (and decreased) party support for MOAs in Italy, with considerable implications for the 
comparative and cross-national perspective on the issue. First, ideological leaning had a significant 
impact on how Italian parties’ position themselves on this issue. In particular, location on the left/right 
dimension is a good predictor of party support for military operations. On this dimension, party 
support follows a curvilinear distribution: increasing from the left towards the centre, reaching its 
maximum at the centre and then decreasing again towards the right. In line with a number of studies 
on the issue (Calossi and Coticchia 2007; Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012), this finding confirms 
the presence of a bipartisan and centrist consensus among Italian parties on MOAs. Moreover, it 
provides further evidence in favour of the presence of a curvilinear and bell-shaped model of support 
across the left-right axis for peace and security operations in West European countries (Wagner et al. 
2017). To the contrary, placement on the GAL/TAN scale did not strongly affect party support for 
MOAs. Previous comparative studies also found position on the cleavage between liberal and 
authoritarian parties to be a less satisfactory explanatory variable than position on the traditional left-
right axis (Wagner et al. 2017; 2018). The results contained in this chapter provide further support 
for such a conclusion.  
 
 68  
 
Secondly, government-opposition competition was a crucial element to understand party support for 
MOAs in Italy between 1994 and 2013. As expected, parties at the government were much more 
supportive than the ones at the opposition. Considering that in most parliamentary systems the 
executive depends on a majority in parliament to be elected and stay in power, this finding is not 
surprising. Parties in government have very little incentives to side against a military operation 
promoted by the executive as this may undermine the stability of the cabinet. The relative lack of 
salience of foreign and security issues further reduce the incentive to oppose the cabinet’s decision. 
Across a number of West European countries, Wagner et al. (2018) showed that presence in 
government is a key variable to explain party support for peace and security operations. In the Italian 
case, this factor had probably an even stronger impact for two reasons. First, several studies have 
emphasized how domestic politics persistently conditioned foreign policy in Italy (Andreatta 2008; 
Carbone 2007). Secondly, anecdotal evidence showed that coalition cabinet have been extremely 
cohesive on this issue.  
 
Finally, specific features of the mission may have a different impact on party positions across the left-
right axis. For example, international legitimation in the form of UN authorization drove Italian left-
wing parties to be more supportive and right-wing parties to be less supportive. This finding has a 
very powerful implication within the debate on Italian foreign and security policy during the “Second 
Republic”. In fact, some scholars have argued that centre-left and centre-right government have 
adopted two substantially different approaches to foreign policy: while the former pursued a 
multilateral paradigm, placing stronger emphasis on integration within the European Union, the latter 
focused on bilateral relationships, standing shoulder to shoulder with United States and developing 
closer ties with other countries such as Russia and Israel (Brighi 2007; 2013 Quaglia 2007). This 
differentiated impact of UN authorization for military operations on support for MOAs provides 
empirical evidence for this argument. More broadly, this finding is in line with theories arguing that 
left-wing parties are more likely to pursue a multilateral way to solve international disputes. This 
depends on a more inclusive approach to international politics than right-wing parties (Rathbun 
2004).  
 
This analysis of party support for MOAs in Italy suffers of two main limitations. The first one regards 
a selection bias in the missions analysed. As noted, the high extent of domestic salience of the 
operation spurred an overestimation of the level of party contestation in Italy. The negative mean of 
the dependent variable may suggest a high level of contestation, defying the results of existing studies 
on the issue (Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012). However, as suggested, such conclusion is 
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misleading. It must also be pointed out that assessing of the general level of party contestation on 
troop deployments was not among the aims of this chapter. Secondly, voting patterns in parliament 
may not totally reflect the position articulated by their affiliated MPs. It goes without saying that 
votes have a more substantive effect than mere words. In the next chapter, I will therefore re-examine 
party support for MOAs through the analysis of all the parliamentary votes occurred in the second 
republic, also assessing the impact of law-making procedure in parties’ behaviour.  
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Chapter 3 
Explaining party support for military operations abroad:  
evidence from the analysis of roll-call votes68 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
On September 26, 2006, the Chamber of Deputies, was called to formally approve the deployment of 
around 2500 soldiers in Lebanon for the Operation “Leonte”. This represented Italy’s contribution to 
the broader peacekeeping mission led by United Nations, UNIFIL, which had been in place in the 
area since the end of the seventies. According to the UN Security Council Resolution 1701, after the 
resurfacing of tensions at the southern border between the armed group Hezbollah and the Israeli 
Defence Forces during summer 2006, the mission was expanded to monitor the end of the hostilities 
between the two sides involved in the conflict, support the local population in the process of 
reconstruction and assist the Lebanese regular forces69.  
 
The parliamentary debate in Italy to approve operation Leonte was not particularly intense but 
different positions among the parties emerged anyway. Centre-left governing coalition parties 
generally praised UNIFIL, underlining its evident peacekeeping dimension and undisputable 
multilateral legitimation. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Massimo D’Alema, affiliated to the senior 
coalition partner Democratici di Sinistra, claimed that it “could represent a breakaway not only for 
Lebanon and Iraq but for the whole Middle East” (44). The extreme left junior partner, Rifondazione 
Comunista, also emphasized the stark differences with the Iraq War, supported a few years before by 
the centre-right cabinet. Opposition parties were broadly supportive but raised some notable remarks. 
The centre-right Forza Italia (FI), the main opposition party, was concerned about the risks for the 
soldiers involved in the mission and criticized the lack of an effort from the United Nation to disarm 
 
68 A previous version of this chapter, with a different dataset and analysis, has been published as a research article on the 
journal Government and Opposition, with the title “Italian Political Parties and Military Operations Abroad: An Empirical 
Analysis of Voting Patterns”.  
69 For an analysis of the conflict in Lebanon see Giunchi (2007). For an overview concerning the developments and 
current activities of UNIFIL see the website of the international operation. For the Italian contribution to UNIFIL see the 
reports in the websites of the Ministry of Defence and the Army. In this sense, see also Coticchia (2011); Ignazi et al. 
(2012). For an explanation of Italy’s participation to the mission see Cladi and Locatelli (2018).  
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Hezbollah. Furthermore, the leader of the parliamentary group at the Chamber, Fabrizio Cicchitto, 
stated that its party had a different vision of multilateralism with respect to the government, grounded 
on the unity among western countries against the Islamic terrorism rather than on pitting Europe and 
United States against each other. Nevertheless, FI cohesively voted in favour of the deployment of 
Italian troops in Lebanon in the Operation Leonte. The far right and regionalist party Lega Nord was 
more consistent in opposing the mission and decided to vote against it. In order to justify FI’s 
seemingly contradictory behaviour, Cicchitto made two arguments. First, he emphasized that the 
party wanted to demonstrate its support for the United States, Israel and the other moderate Arab 
countries. Second, he claimed that they felt the responsibility of not letting down Italian soldiers, by 
denying the required funds to participate in the operation70.  
 
This anecdote highlights how the presence of potential divergencies between the positions articulated 
by Italian parties on troops deployment and their parliamentary votes on the same issue. In the 
previous chapter, I explained party support for MOAs through the quantitative analysis of 
parliamentary speeches. In this chapter, I will attempt to re-explain party support for military 
deployments outside national borders in Italy through another original dataset, based on all 
parliamentary votes occurred in the Chamber of Deputies during the so-called “Second Republic”. In 
other words, I will assess how a series of factors increase (or decrease) the probability for a party to 
vote in favour of MOAs in Italy.  
 
In the previous chapter, I found that ideological leaning along the left-right axis and presence in the 
government did have a significant impact on party support for Italian participation in military 
interventions. In this chapter, I test the effect of a further variable: the law-making procedure. 
Literature exploring party support for military operations and the role of parliament in security policy 
has completely overlooked this factor (Dieterich et al. 2010; Peters and Wagner 2011; Raunio and 
Wagner 2018). This is probably due the high extent of cross-national variation (Peters and Wagner 
2011) and, simultaneously, the low extent of within-country variation on law-making procedures to 
approve troops deployments. However, as the present work focuses only on Italy, variation among 
countries is non-existent. Furthermore, during the time span taken into account, the attempt to fill a 
juridical gap concerning the approval of military operations other than war and the necessity to keep 
up with the steady increase in Italian involvement in such missions has paved the way for an 
ambiguous set of law-making procedures.  
 
70 To read the entire debate on Operation Leonte/UNIFIL see the report of the debate at the Chamber of Deputies (Camera 
dei Deputati 2006). All the quotations are drawn from the report and translated in English by the author.   
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Furthermore, the effort of re-addressing the same research question of the previous chapter on this 
different dataset is worthwhile for two reasons. First, as the aforementioned anecdote suggest, there 
may be considerable divergence between the way a party articulates its position on MOAs and the 
way it votes on it. In contrast to unconstrained speeches, during which MPs can freely express their 
point of view on the issue, parliamentary votes may have substantive effects on troop deployments 
and the struggle between parties for the political power. It is therefore particularly interesting to 
investigate how incentives affect different parties according to their presence in the government: Do 
government parties are even more cohesive in supporting MOAs when it comes to voting? Do 
opposition parties feel a stronger pressure to side with the government? Secondly, this dataset 
includes votes on a number of smaller and less salient MOAs that were excluded from the analysis in 
the previous chapter. As noted, on the basis of the findings contained in the previous chapter, 
conclusions concerning the general extent of party contestation should be taken with the extreme 
caution. In fact, the high salience of the operations analysed arguably produced an overestimation of 
the overall extent of disagreement among parties. Adding a number of less salient MOAs to the 
analysis, this chapter may provide a more accurate description of the general level of party 
contestation on this issue in Italy.  
 
This chapter is structured as follows. First, I will explain why it is useful to analyse party position on 
military operations abroad through the employment of roll-call votes in parliament. Secondly, I will 
review the evolution of law-making procedures to approve and re-fund MOAs in Italy. Thirdly, I will 
sketch out the new hypothesis concerning the impact of law-making procedure on party support for 
military operations abroad. Fourthly, I will describe how I collected the votes and how I coded all the 
variables. Fifthly, I will test my hypotheses with both descriptive statistics and the use of Probit 
regression models. Finally, I will sum up the main findings of the chapter.  
 
Mapping party positions on military operations through roll-call votes  
 
Parliamentary votes are the most commonly used source of data to measure policy positions of 
individual legislators in the United States. In particular, in order to locate Congressmen and Senators 
on a policy space, a few studies have relied on roll-call votes, i.e. those recorded votes in which all 
legislators have to publicly vote in favour or against a bill (Poole 2005; Poole and Rosenthal 1997). 
This method for scaling individual position in the US Congress through the analysis of roll-call votes 
has been called NOMINATE.  
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However, parliamentary votes have been rarely employed to map the position of legislators in other 
contexts for two reasons. First, roll-call votes are sometimes not recorded, preventing the researcher 
to map individual legislators’ positions through this source (Benoit and Laver 2006). For instance, as 
Benoit and Laver (2006) reported, in some countries such as Ireland and Hungary roll-call votes are 
simply unavailable. Secondly, in West European democracies, high intra-party discipline and the 
collective cabinet responsibility in parliament makes voting patterns of little information to locate 
individual legislators. The way in which a legislator votes is heavily driven by his affiliation to a 
specific party to the point that the object of the measure would become the position of the party rather 
than that of the legislator. As Laver (2014, 219) argued, in these cases, “NOMINATE mostly tells us 
which party each legislator belongs to and does not distinguish policy positions of legislators within 
the same party”.  In turn, in parliamentary democracies, parties that are member of the cabinet are 
likely to vote in favour of bill promoted by the cabinet. Conversely, opposition parties have strong 
incentives to vote against the executive to present themselves as alternative to governing parties and 
undermine the stability of the government. In this respect, Benoit and Laver (2006, 70) claimed that 
“high levels of party discipline combine with the parliamentary government system to undermine 
quite fundamentally the potential of roll-call analysis to give us useful information about the policy 
positions of either individual legislators or legislative parties”. To sum up, in parliamentary 
democracies, individual legislator’s behaviour in roll-call votes basically reflects the presence of his 
own party at the government rather than his/her own policy position.  
 
Beside the US Congress, the European Parliament (EP) is the other prominent case in which the 
NOMINATE system has been employed to locate individual legislator’s in a policy space and explain 
their positions (Hix 2002; Hix et al. 2005). This depends on the availability of roll-call votes, the 
absence of such a strong discipline within European groups and the lack of a strong government-
opposition dynamic. Hix (2002) underlined how national party policies are the strongest predictors 
of individual voting behaviour in the EP.  Hix et al. (2005) identified in the classic left-right cleavage 
the strongest dimension of conflict within this legislative arena. However, it has to be underlined that 
roll-call votes are used selectively in the EP on the basis of groups’ strategic considerations. This 
produces a selection bias in a comprehensive analysis of individual MEPs positions through such data 
(Carrubba et al. 2006). The issue can emerge in other cases of countries in which roll-call votes 
represent just a fraction of the total votes issued by parliament71. 
 
 
71 For a more extensive debate on advantages and drawbacks of measuring policy positions through roll-call votes see 
Benoit and Laver (2006); Laver (2014); Spirling and McLean (2006).  
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Against this background, roll-call votes may still constitute a valuable tool to measure party positions 
on issues of foreign and security policy. Unlike any other policy area, foreign and security policy is 
supposed to cut across partisan divisions, overcoming ideological divergencies and incentives related 
to the political competition for power. Involving issues of national security and reputation within the 
international community, foreign policy is expected to be an area protected from substantial party 
contestation. Therefore, roll-call votes may be indicative of party positions on this issue. Furthermore, 
executives have been historically dominated the legislative on issues of national security. The need 
for secrecy and effectiveness in the decision-making process has provided a normative argument 
against the involvement of parliament (Peters and Wagner 2011). However, recent literature has 
increasingly investigated parliamentary powers over the approval and scrutiny of military operations 
(Bono 2005; Dieterich et al. 2010; 2015; Fonck and Reykers 2018; Kesgin and Kaarbo 2010; Lagassé 
and Mello 2018; Peters and Wagner 2011; Raunio 2014; Raunio and Wagner 2017; Wagner 2018). 
Moreover, notwithstanding the lack of a trend towards the “parliamentarization” of security policy 
(Peters and Wagner 2011; Raunio and Wagner 2017), events such as the House of Commons vote to 
halt the British government decision to military intervene in the Syrian civil war suggests the need to 
take into account the role of parliament on security policy (Kaarbo and Kenealy 2016; Strong 2015). 
Therefore, the analysis of roll-call votes is also a way to explore such legislative-executive relations 
on this issue.  
 
Following such premises, the project Deployment Vote Watch was established to create a database 
of roll-call votes on military deployments occurred in Western democracies after the end of the Cold 
War. A first version of the project included only four countries: United Kingdom, Germany, France 
and Spain (Wagner et al. 2018). Recently the data were extended to cover further seven countries, 
including the United States and Italy (Ostermann et al. 2019). In particular, the Italian case seems 
particularly promising to investigate party positions on peace and security operations through roll-
call votes for three reasons. First, as Figure 13 suggests, the number of roll-call votes in Italy is very 
high in comparison with the other countries, providing a larger universe of cases. Secondly, within 
the dataset, as Figure 14, shows, Italy presents one of the highest level of party contestation of military 
interventions, with an average of 69% of votes in favour. This may seem to contrast with the presence 
of a centrist and bipartisan consensus, empirically found in the previous chapter. However, a 
relatively high of contestation with respect to other countries may be due to the fragmentation of 
Italian party system and the constant presence of extreme and anti-system parties in parliament  
Finally, these votes regarded bills with different legal value and content, enabling the researcher to 
investigate the impact of different law-making procedures.  
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Figure 13: percentage of votes occurred by country in the Development Vote Watch dataset (from 
Ostermann et al. 2019) 
 
 
Figure 14: average agreement index on votes by country in the Deployment Vote Watch dataset (from 
Ostermann et al. 2019)72 
 
 
72 The Agreement Index is calculated with the formula developed by Hix et al. (2005). Values range from 0 to 1, 
representing minimum and maximum parliamentary cohesion in each vote respectively.  
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The evolution of the role of parliament and law-making procedures on MOAs in Italy 
 
The role of Italian parliament in the approval and scrutiny of military deployments abroad are very 
controversial. On the one hand, some studies have suggested that parliamentary war powers in Italy 
are strong or, at least, significant. Dieterich et al. (2010) included the Italian legislative among those 
with “very strong powers”. Moreover, Mello (2014) considered it as a parliament with ex ante veto 
powers, i.e. the capacity to block military operations before they begin. On the other hand, other 
studies had a very different view. For example, Wagner (2018) placed Italian legislature in the 
category of parliaments with no ex ante veto power. All in all, the case is debatable to the point that 
Wagner et al. (2010, 63) admitted that Italian parliament competences on military operations abroad 
are “far from clear cut” and categorised the case as “inconclusive”. The reasons for such a lack of 
consensus are mainly two. First, the executive has been able to circumvent constitutional rules 
guaranteeing the parliament strong power on war by stressing the humanitarian and multilateral 
dimension of military operations (Bono 2005). Secondly, in the last decades, several procedures and 
practices have been adopted to fill this gap (Di Camillo and Tessari 2013; Ronzitti 2017).  
 
Approved in 1947, in the aftermath of the Second World War and the collapse of the fascist regime, 
Italian constitution solemnly rejects war as a mean of resolution of disputes among states and heavily 
discourages executives from bringing Italy in a conflict with other countries (Elia 2003; Panebianco 
1997). First of all, war is considered as a violation of the international law and the well-being of the 
foreign people. The often-quoted article 11 of the Constitution says that “Italy condemns war as a 
mean to offend the freedom of other people and to solve international disputes”73. Such a statement 
is only partially moderated by the following sentence, suggesting a “limitation of sovereignty required 
by an international order that ensures peace among nations”. Furthermore, any attempt to declare war 
is subjected to the approval of the parliament. In fact, article 78 instead states that the “the two 
chambers must approve the state of war and give the executive the powers to implement it”74. To sum 
up, according to the Constitution, Italy must not go to war unless it is strictly necessary for 
guaranteeing national security in an act of self-defence or recommended by international institutions 
and should only do it after the approval of the parliament.  
As seen, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the number of multilateral interventions steadily grew, 
providing Italy an outstanding opportunity to radically transform is own foreign security policy, by 
 
73 Article 11, Constitution of the Italian Republic (Senato della Repubblica 2012). Quotations were translated by the 
authors from Italian.  
74 Article 78, Constitution of the Italian Republic (Senato della Repubblica 2012).  
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deploying its troops in the major areas of conflict around the world. However, when it came to 
approve the use of military force abroad, successive Italian governments had to overcome the 
aforementioned binding constitutional limitations. The rhetorical and juridical strategy adopted by 
policymakers was twofold. On the one hand, they articulated a humanitarian discourse, emphasizing 
how such military operations were aimed at bringing peace and stability to foreign people. On the 
other hand, they stressed the multilateral dimension of these operations (whether it came from the 
UN, NATO, EU or even ad hoc coalitions) as it constituted a legitimization for the use of force, 
accordingly to the caveat contained in art. 11. To sum up, when contributing to these multilateral 
operations, Italy was not declaring war to any country but rather participating in humanitarian and 
peacekeeping operations, with a more or less substantive international coverage. The political debate 
surrounding Italian contribution to Operation Desert Storm in Iraq in 1991 set a precedent in this 
sense. The then Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti underlined how the embargo against Saddam 
Hussein was “not an act of war” (68875). He also repeatedly pointed out how the operation was 
authorized by the UN Security Council Resolution 661.75 Such a narrative underpinned other 
successive troops deployment as well. In 1999, the then Prime Minister Massimo D’Alema explicitly 
argued that the NATO-led bombing campaign in Kosovo “was not a war against Serbia” 76. Four 
years later, the approval bill for a troop deployment in Iraq in the aftermath of Saddam Hussein’s fall 
was titled “urgent assistance to the Iraqi people”. Overall, as said, various studies highlighted the 
employment of a discourse based on solidarity and multilateralism concerning Italy’s involvement in 
military operation (Coticchia 2011; 2015; Coticchia and De Simone 2016; Ignazi et al. 2012).  
If these military operations were not considered as acts of war, then the government was not forced 
to consult parliament beforehand to seek approval as the constitution would require. In other words, 
the executive was able to circumvent parliamentary veto and avoid being scrutinized on military 
deployments. Governments were therefore capable of avoiding audience costs and the attribution of 
responsibility, deriving from the decision to deploy military troops (Coticchia and Moro 2017). As 
part of a comprehensive restructuring of competences within the Ministry of Defence, law 25/1997 
tried to address this problem. It stated that the Minister of Defence had to illustrate once a year to the 
parliament “the evolution of the military commitments”77. However, the law did not prescribe 
whether and how parliament should express on such reports. The steady increase in the amount of 
 
75 To read the entire debate on Operation Desert Storm see the report of the Chamber of Deputies (Camera dei Deputati 
1991).  
76 To read the entire debate on Operation Allied Force see the report of the Chamber of Deputies (Camera dei Deputati 
1999). 
77 For the complete text of the law see the website of the Chamber of Deputies.  
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missions in which Italy was involved encouraged legislators to fill the normative gap for the approval 
of MOAs. The “Ruffino Resolution”, approved in 2001, introduced the practice of fund or re-fund all 
the ongoing troop deployments through law decrees issued once or twice a year by the executive. 
Such a development markedly increased the number of votes on MOAs but did little to alter the 
unbalanced legislative-executive relationship for three reasons. First, the law decrees often did not 
contain precise information regarding the details of the missions and how funds were divided among 
them. Secondly, by issuing a single vote on a number of operations, the law decrees forced parties to 
support missions on which they disagreed in order to keep in place the ones they favoured. Third, as 
the executive controls the majority in parliament, most of the amendments to the law decree presented 
by opposition parties were inevitably defeated78. With the adoption of the “comprehensive law” 
(Legge Quadro) at the end of 2016, Italy finally established an ad hoc law-making procedure for the 
approval of MOAs that guarantees the legislative a real veto power. According to the new law, at the 
beginning of each year, the executive has to provide detailed information regarding the allocation of 
funds and tasks of all the ongoing missions to the parliament. Furthermore, the missions are voted 
individually or grouped according to similar scopes, allowing political parties to discriminate between 
them in their votes79. In theory, this procedure should drastically improve the law-making process to 
approve MOAs in terms of transparency and accountability. However, the cases in which it was 
applied are currently not enough to assess its effects on parliamentary scrutiny party contestations 
over troops deployment80.  
Overall, law-making procedures for the approval of MOAs in Italy were erratic and ambiguous. As 
suggested, especially after the approval of the Ruffino Resolution, a number of military operations 
were approved all together through law decrees. However, law decrees were also occasionally 
employed to approve specific military operations. For example, the aforementioned Operation Leonte 
in Lebanon (2006) was approved in such a manner. Furthermore, as hinted in the previous chapter, 
seeking further legitimacy for their decisions, prominent members of the executive occasionally 
referred to parliament on the involvement in relevant MOAs. For instance, this was the case for 
Operations Allied Harbour and Allied Force (Kosovo, 1999), Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan, 2001) 
and Antica Babilonia (Iraq, 2003). The timing of votes with respect to the troop deployment also 
varied. In some cases, such as the Operation Alba (Albania, 1997), the vote took place before the 
 
78 For the complete text of the Ruffino Resolution see the website of the Chamber of Deputies.  
79 For the complete text of the comprehensive law see the website of the Official Gazette.  
80 In practice, the new law was applied three times, in the years 2017, 2018, 2019. Due to the timespan considered in this 
dissertation (1994-2013), these votes are not taken into account. Notably, a considerable delay in the law-making process 
occurred in 2019, with the final votes in the two Chambers staged in July, rather than at the beginning of the year.  
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beginning of the operations. In other ones, such as Unified Protector (Libya 2011), it took place 
afterwards81. 
Hypotheses 
 
As said, in this chapter, I will test again some of the hypotheses which have already been already 
formulated in the previous chapter to explain party support for MOAs. In particular, I will look for 
further empirical support concerning the role of ideology, both in terms of positions on the left-right 
axis and the GAL/TAN scale, and the impact of presence in government82.  
 
Furthermore, as said, I will investigate the impact of law decrees on party support for MOAs. In 
theory, votes to convert law decrees into proper laws are presumed to provoke higher confrontation 
in parliament with respect to the other bills. Law decrees are thought to be powerful tools in the hands 
of the government that formulate them without consulting the parliament. Therefore, their conversion 
through a parliamentary vote is expected to bring to the fore contestation from opposition parties and 
even from dissenting members of the coalition government. However, various studies have 
discovered that law decrees do not empower the government vis-à-vis the parliament in such a way. 
In the phase of their formulation, the government usually is forced to concede something to at least 
all the parties composing the coalition cabinet and, in case of conflict within the coalition, even to 
opposition parties that are willing to exploit divisions within the executive (Della Sala and Kreppel 
1998; Giuliani 2008). In other words, the government takes into account the position of other actors 
already in the phase of the drafting of the law decree. As Cox et al. (2008) underlined, the Italian 
executives own substantial agenda setting power to avoid potential defeats and being rolled. 
Therefore, law decrees are not as contested as they are presumed to be. Confirming such expectations, 
Giuliani (2008) showed that cohesion of Italian parliament decreases for law decrees only very 
slightly compared to ordinary laws, remaining at a substantially high level.  
 
Following the discussion in the previous section, I expect law decrees on MOAs to be even less 
contested than resolutions on government’s communications. In other words, I hypothesize that law 
decrees encourage individual parties to increase their extent of parliamentary support for MOAs. This 
 
81 For an exhaustive discussion of the law-making process for the approval of MOAs in Italy and the relationship between 
legislative and executive see Di Camillo and Tessari (2011); Ronzitti (2017). 
82 The presence of a number of law decrees on multiple operations does not allow to test the other two hypotheses 
contained in the second chapter regarding how specific features of the missions have affect party support for MOAs 
according to party position on the left-right axis.  
 80  
 
depends on three reasons. First, the peculiar law-making procedure for the re-funding of all the 
ongoing missions posed high constraints on parties to express a positive vote. In fact, parties were 
asked to cast a single vote to fund a number of very different operations with tasks ranging from the 
distribution of humanitarian aid to the fight against terrorism. Voting “no” meant terminating not 
only the MOAs on which the party disagreed on, but also the ones that it supported. Therefore, the 
procedure incentivized all parties to cast a positive vote. Second, the votes to convert law decrees 
were in most cases less salient than votes on the government’s communications in the Chamber. As 
noted, while government representatives usually referred the Chamber about significant troops 
deployments, law decrees were often employed to re-fund all existing operations, including very 
small ones in terms of number of personnel and resources involved83. For this reason, these votes 
received less media and public opinion attention. This produced an incentive for opposition parties 
to vote in favour of the government as they were more protected from potential domestic audience 
costs. Thirdly, the votes to convert law decrees were often issued after the funds for military 
operations were already allocated and troops were deployed. This obviously discouraged parties to 
vote against the military operations. In fact, the missing conversion of a law decree would have left 
military without funds while they are asked to fulfil their tasks and provoked a reputational damage 
for the country at international level. All in all, due to the peculiar structure of the voting procedure, 
the lower extent of domestic salience and their ex-post timing with respect to the troop deployment, 
I expect law decrees to be less contested than votes on government’s resolutions.  
 
H6: MOAs voted through law decrees receive more parliamentary support than those voted through 
resolutions  
 
Moreover, in this chapter, I will also assess if and to what extent incentives deriving from competition 
within the domestic political system and law-making procedure differently shaped parties’ voting 
pattern, according to their position across the left-right axis. Given the findings of the previous 
chapter and the previous discussion, we expect presence in government and votes on law decrees to 
increase parties’ likelihood to vote in favour of MOAs. However, the size of the effect can vary on 
the basis of party ideological position on this issue and the salience that they attribute to it. On the 
one hand, it is presumable that these two variables will have a larger impact on parties that are more 
sceptical of military deployments for peace and security interventions than those that are supportive. 
In fact, the latter do not need any incentive to vote in favour of MOAs. On the other hand, among the 
non-interventionist parties, it is to expect that these two variables have a more substantive effect on 
 
83 For the consequences of this process on MOAs promoted by the European Union see Bono (2005). 
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parties that attribute lower salience to this issue than those that higher salience. Parties attributing 
relatively high salience to their opposition against involvement in military operations outside borders 
are expected to keep a rather consistent behaviour, irrespective of incentives deriving from being part 
of the government or the type of law-making procedure chosen for the vote. For instance, champions 
of anti-militarism may even vote against to a mission proposed by an executive in which they are 
involved as the electoral costs of backtracking could be higher than those of defying the whip. To the 
contrary, parties attributing relatively little salience to their opposition against MOAs are supposed 
to be much more subjected to changes of voting patterns, given the presence of the aforementioned 
incentives. For instance, not considering opposition to MOAs as a salient policy issues, they may be 
willing to renege on it when they are in government. In Italy, during the Second Republic, extreme 
left and post-marxist parties have a long history of pacifism (Calossi et al. 2013). To the contrary, far 
right parties had a diverging approach on this issue (Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012; Tarchi 2007;). 
While Alleanza Nazionale considered security and defence policy a salient issue and see involvement 
of Italian militaries in peace and security operations as a source of national pride, the autonomist Lega 
Nord has demonstrated to be sceptical of MOAs albeit not regarding security policy as a salient issue 
in their agenda. Given this discussion, I expect position in government and votes through law decrees 
to have a stronger impact on (extreme) right-wing parties in Italy than extreme left-parties.   
 
H7: The effect of the presence in government on support for MOAs is stronger for (extreme) right-
wing parties than (extreme) left-wing parties 
 
H8: The effect of voting through law decrees on support for MOAs is stronger for (extreme) right-
wing parties than (extreme) left-wing parties 
 
 
Description of the dataset 
 
In order to confirm these hypotheses, I constructed a second dataset on the basis of all votes on this 
issue casted at the Chamber of Deputies during the so-called “second republic”, i.e. between 1994 
and 2013. 
   
Italian parliament has a bicameral structure, composed by the Chamber of Deputies, the lower and 
larger chamber and the Senate, the upper and smaller chamber (Cotta and Verzichelli 2016). The two 
chambers have exact equal powers and each legislative bill needs to be approved by both chambers 
in order to pass. This is obviously true also regarding bills on foreign policy issues and, in particular, 
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the approval or the re-funding of troops deployments (Wagner et al. 2010). However, I decided to 
focus only on the votes that took place in the Chamber of Deputies for three main reasons. First, I 
sought to maintain consistency with the previous empirical chapter, in which only debates in this 
chamber were taken into account. Secondly, Senate votes are often a replication of the ones in the 
Chamber of Deputies, with parties voting in the exact same manner84. Thirdly, due to the lack of data 
availability, I was not able to code how each party voted on several resolutions and law decrees votes 
occurring at the Senate, especially prior to 2002.  
 
The dataset includes final votes on law decrees for the re-funding of all the ongoing MOAs and 
governing parties’ resolutions on communication given by members of the cabinets. Votes on 
amendments for law decrees were excluded for two reasons. First, they covered a wide range of 
specific issues regarding the individual operations. In some cases, amendments also concerned 
technicalities concerning the text of the bills or issues not strictly related to troop deployments. The 
inclusion of these amendments would lead to a stark increase in the heterogeneity of the observations. 
To the contrary, as suggested, the final votes narrowly focused on the approval of MOAs and were 
easily comparable with one another. Secondly, amendments alternatively expressed positive or 
negative views about the operations themselves. For instance, hypothetically, while an opposition 
party may propose an amendment to stop the involvement in the air strikes in Kosovo, another one 
may demand a stronger effort. Voting in favour to the first one is an evidence of opposition to MOAs 
while saying yes to the second means the contrary. In contrast, voting yes in the final votes 
unequivocally meant supporting the “package” of missions. This is basically the same reason why 
opposition parties’ resolutions on government communications were excluded as well. For instance, 
while voting yes to a resolution against the operation Antica Babilonia has the meaning of not 
supporting it, voting yes to a resolution approving the mission has the opposite meaning.  
 
In total the votes included in the dataset are 6285. 47 are (final) votes on law decrees and only 15 are 
(governing parties’) resolutions (see Figure 15). On the one hand, this distribution reflects the 
extensive use of law decrees for both the re-funding of all the ongoing missions and, more rarely, the 
approval of new ones. On the other hand, it highlights that governments seldom referred to parliament 
on military operations abroad. In fact, as noted, this procedure was adopted only for extremely salient 
and contested MOAs.  
 
84 Following this criterion, previous studies on law-making in Italy similarly focused exclusively on the Chamber of 
Deputies and neglected the Senate (Curini and Zucchini 2010; Pedrazzani 2014; 2017). 
85 For a summary of all the votes and details regarding date, cabinet, mission, type of act and parties see the Appendix. 
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Figure 15: Distribution of votes by legislative procedure 
 
The distribution of votes (law decrees and resolutions) by cabinet is instead summed up in Figure 16. 
The second Berlusconi government (2001-2005) is by far the executive under which most votes took 
place (19). The highest number of resolutions (7) also were cast during this cabinet. This should not 
come as a surprise given that it was the most long-lasting government in post-war Italian history and 
that highly salient contributions to military interventions such as Operation Enduring Freedom and 
ISAF in Afghanistan and Iraq were approved in those years. As said, the relevance of these operations 
required government representatives to refer before the parliament about their approval and the 
subsequent developments. Under the fourth Berlusconi government (2008-2011) several votes (12) 
occurred as well: 8 law decrees and 4 resolutions were approved. This cabinet also had a long duration 
compared to the other ones and it promoted Italy’s contribution to the military intervention Operation 
Unified Protector in Libya. Prodi and D’Alema governments covering years between 1996 and 1999 
were the ones in which more votes occurred, 9 and 7 respectively. Under these governments, 
contributions to significant MOAs in the Balkans were approved. The three debates on the 
intervention in Kosovo in spring 1999 accounts for all the resolutions.  
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Figure 16: Distribution of votes by cabinet, divided by resolutions and decrees 
 
 
Grouping the distribution for the colour of the cabinets, there is a slight prevalence of votes taking 
place under centre-right governments (34) with respect to votes occurred under centre-left 
governments (23). The remaining votes (5) took place when so-called “technical governments” (see 
Figure 17). While the distribution of votes in general is quite even between centre-left and centre-
right cabinets, there is a considerable unbalance in the proportion between laws decrees and 
resolutions. While resolutions make up for 11 of the 34 casted under centre-right cabinets (32%), 
only 4 resolutions in the dataset occurred under centre-left cabinets (17%).  
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Figure 17: Distribution of votes by colour of the coalition in government, divided by resolutions and 
decrees 
 
 
In order to maintain consistency with the previous chapter, I took into account the exact same parties 
of the other dataset. In alphabetic order the selected parties are: Alleanza Nazionale (AN), Centro 
Cristiano Democratico and Crisitani Democratici Uniti (CCD-CDU, considered jointly), 
Democratici di Sinistra and Partito dei Democratici di Sinistra (DS/PDS, considered jointly), 
Federazione dei Verdi (FdV), Forza Italia and Popolo delle Libertà (FI/PdL, considered jointly), 
Italia dei Valori (IdV), Lega Nord per l’Indipendenza della Padania (LN), La Margherita (Mar), 
Partito dei Comunisti Italiani (PdCI), Partito Democratico (PD), Partito Popolare Italiano and I 
Democratici (PPI-Dem, considered jointly), Partito della Rifondazione Comunista (PRC), Unione di 
Centro (UDC)86.  
 
Taking into account as the unit of analysis the vote of each party in each of the 62 votes, I ended up 
with a total of 483 observations in my final dataset. The dependent variable is the party whip in each 
vote. For party whip, I meant the official line of the party, as expressed by the voting patterns of its 
representatives in the Chamber. In other words, if a relative majority of the party voted in favour and 
a minority against, I considered the party line as in favour and vice versa. When all MPs belonging 
to the same parties completely deserted the vote, I considered the party whip as against. Other than 
voting yes or no, MPs can also abstain. Abstention may be interpreted as an evidence of disagreement 
and contestation. They are sometimes employed by parties to signal that they are not completely 
convinced but, simultaneously, they do not want to alter significantly the result of the vote. In fact, 
 
86 For an explanation of the selection criteria for these parties and the underlying reasons for the merges see the chapter 
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according to the rules of the Chamber of Deputies, abstentions are counted for the validity of the 
votes but not for the majority of votes to pass a bill or resolution. Therefore, abstentions are essentially 
an instrument to align with the majority of the Chamber, whether this is against or in favour of the 
bill. Since my dataset do not contain any rejected bill, I consequently counted all abstentions as if 
they were positive votes87. Consequently, I coded 1 when a party voted yes or abstained and, 
conversely, 0 when it voted against. As much as the aggregation of speeches in the previous chapter, 
this procedure admittedly neglects any intra-party disagreement. However, Sieberer (2006) has 
shown that party cohesion in roll-call votes across European parliamentary democracies rarely fall 
below 95%. Furthermore, focusing only on votes for military deployments, Ostermann et al. (2019) 
also found extremely high intra-party cohesion.   
 
The dataset includes a series of independent variables. As much as in the previous chapter, ideological 
positions on the right-left axis (Rile) and the GAL/TAN scale (Gal/Tan) are taken from the variables 
lrgen and Galtan respectively in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) trend dataset. They both 
range between 0 and 10, taking minimum values for parties on the left or associated with liberal 
values and maximum values for parties on the right or associated with authoritarian values 
respectively. In the same manner as the previous chapter, parties in government are coded 1, while 
parties at the opposition take value 0 (Gov). As discussed previously, parties are considered as part 
of the cabinet even when the provide external support for it. Finally, a dummy variable captures the 
distinction among law-making procedures among the various votes (Decree). It takes value 1 for law 
decrees and 0 for resolutions on government’s communication. This variable is fundamental to test 
the impact of law-making procedures on the overall level of support and party contestation for MOAs. 
For a complete summary of the variables see Table 3.  
 
The mean of the dependent variable (Support) already provides some evidences for the extent of 
parliamentary support for MOAs in Italy during the so-called “Second republic”, as measured through 
votes. In a nutshell, this value indicates that parties voted in favour of troops deployment in 74% of 
observations taken into account. In other words, a party was much more likely to support MOAs than 
not. As expected, this finding contrasts with the one obtained in the previous chapter. In fact, the 
mean of support as extracted by parliamentary speeches was slightly negative (-0,165). Therefore, in 
 
87 Applying the same criterion, other studies on legislative politics in Italy also count abstentions as a positive vote. See 
for instance Curini and Zucchini (2010), Pedrazzani (2014; 2017). Abstentions were also very few in my dataset. Out of 
483 observations, there were just 26 cases of observations, a little more than the five percent of the total.  
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line with the expectations, the inclusion of less salient MOAs, approved through law decrees, 
increases the extent of party support for military operations.  
 
Table 3: Description of the variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max 
Support (Yes and 
abstentions) 
483 0,7391304 0,4395642 0 1 
Rile (Position on 
the left/right axis) 
483 4,843101 2,472137 0,6 8,71 
Gal/Tan (Position 
on the GAL/TAN 
scale) 
483 5,105718 2,76974 0,63 8,88 
Gov (Presence at 
the government) 
483 0,4575569 0,4987119 0 1 
Decree (law-
making procedure) 
483 0,7556936 0,4301207 0 1 
 
 
Empirical findings 
 
The hypotheses concerning the impact of ideology on party voting on MOAs could be answered 
individually through descriptive statistics88. Figure 18 shows the percentages of supporting votes by 
party ordered by their position on the left/right axis. Communist parties have been the staunchest 
opponents of military interventions: PRC scores 29 per cent of votes in favour and PdCI 42 per cent. 
The green party (FdV) has been only slightly keener to support these operations, scoring 54% of votes 
in favour. The main social-democratic party (PDS/DS/PD), which changed names two times during 
this time span, has been much more supportive of MOAs in parliament. In fact, it voted in favour of 
them in 80% of the cases. Christian Democrat parties have also provided strong support for troops 
deployment outside Italian borders, with the more leftist one (PPI/Dem) being a little less supportive 
than the more conservative one (CCD/CDU) (79 to 91 per cent). The liberal IdV is the outlier in the 
model, recording an extent of support similar to that of extreme left parties. This populist party, 
founded by the former prosecutor Antonio Di Pietro in 1998, has expressed strongly pacifist positions 
 
88 To the contrary, the variation in the number of parties voting in each vote may produce biases in testing the other 
hypotheses through descriptive statistics.  
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across the years. Support further increases in the case of FI, Berlusconi’s conservative political 
platform. This party voted in favour in 96% of the cases observed. The far-right AN presents a similar 
score (93%). Lastly, support slightly drops at the extreme right of the spectrum with the populist and 
autonomist LN voting in favour of MOAs in less than 80% of the cases. In broad terms, confirming 
H1a, right-wing parties have provided more parliamentary support for troops deployment than left-
wing parties. However, the fact that the most extreme right-wing party opposed MOAs more 
frequently than other right-wing parties suggests that the curvilinear model is more appropriate to 
describe the Italian case than the linear one. Therefore, confirming the findings of the previous 
chapter, there is a stronger empirical support for H1b.  
 
More generally, this bar chart also indicates a generally high level of support for MOAs in Italy. In 
fact, seven out of the ten parties displayed have voted more than 50 per cent of the times in favour of 
military operations abroad. Five of them have supported military operations in more than 80 per cent 
of the votes analysed. As seen, the average of supporting votes is over 70%. In order to ascertain the 
extent of consensus, these two results must be compared with votes on the same issue in other 
countries and on other issues in Italy. As already noted, Ostermann et al. (forthcoming) ranked Italy 
among the countries in which deployment votes are more contested after the end of the Cold War. 
On average, Italian parliament is slightly less cohesive on this issue, than, for instance, German and 
French counterparts. Furthermore, as suggested in Chapter 1, various studies highlighted the 
generally high extent of bipartisanship and consensus among parties in the legislative arena, across 
various timespans and through different indicators (Di Palma 1977; Giuliani 2008; Giuliani and 
Capano 2001; Pedrazzani 2017). In particular, analysing the law-making process in the Second 
Republic, Pedrazzani (2017) showed that on average bills were approved with 85% of supporting 
votes in the Chamber of Deputies. Due to the presence of votes on government’s communication and 
divergencies in measurement, it is impossible to compare this figure with the one concerning only 
MOAs. Nevertheless, arguably, the extent of party support for troop deployments in Italy was 
substantial. To sum up, parties clearly provided a widespread parliamentary support for MOAs during 
the Second Republic. 
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Figure 18: Percentage of supportive votes by party ordered on the left-right axis (1994-2013)89 
 
 
Figure 19 instead describes how parties distributed on the GAL/TAN scale has voted on MOAs. This 
graph shows an inherent issue with the measurement of GAL/TAN positions in Italy during the time 
span considered. In fact, with only small exceptions, positions closely resembled those in the left-
right scale: left-wing parties are closely associated with liberal and alternative values and right-wing 
parties are related to conservative and authoritarian tendencies. Again, also in this dataset, these two 
dimensions are highly (r=0,9064) and significantly (p<0,01) correlated. Contradicting H2 and in 
contrast with the empirical evidence contained in the previous chapter, parties with high scores in the 
GAL/TAN scale have provided stronger and more consistent parliamentary support for MOAs than 
parties with low scores.  
 
89 The location of parties on the left/right axis is based on the 2006 CHES Dataset (Hooghe et al. 2010). Parties changing 
names are considered as single ones PDS/DS/PD, PPI/Mar, CCD/UDC, FI/Pdl to maximize the number of observations 
per party. There is variation among observations between parties: PRC (47), PdCI (35), FdV (44), PDS/DS/PD (62), 
PPI/Mar (43), IdV (19), CCD/UDC (62), FI/PdL (62), AN (47), LN (62). 
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Figure 19: Percentage of supportive votes by party ordered on the GAL/TAN scale (1994-2013)90
 
 
In order to compare the effect of all the independent variables and test the other hypotheses, I ran 
three different Probit models with clustered standard error for parties (see Table 4)91. In Model 1, 
only hypotheses concerning the role of ideology on party support for MOAs are empirically tested. 
In Model 2, hypotheses regarding the impact of presence at the government and law-making 
procedures are also taken into account. In Model 3, the interactive effect of these two variables with 
ideological positions on the left-right axis is analysed.  
 
 
90 The location of the party on the GAL/TAN scale is based on the 2006 CHES Dataset (Hooghe et al. 2010). The choice 
of this particular dataset is the presence of all parties taken into account. Parties changing names are considered as single 
ones PDS/DS/PD, PPI/Mar, CCD/UDC, FI/Pdl to maximize the number of observations per party. There is variation 
among observations between parties: PRC (47), PdCI (35), FdV (44), PDS/DS/PD (62), PPI/Mar (43), IdV (19), 
CCD/UDC (62), FI/PdL (62), AN (47), LN (62). 
91 As robustness checks, I conducted six replications of these models. First, I used a Logit model instead of a Probit model. 
The results of the analysis are almost exactly the same. Secondly, I used random effects for parties. In this replication, 
ideological position loses much of its significance in Model 2 and it is totally non-significant in Model 3. The interaction 
between the content of the vote and the position on the left-right axis also loses much of its significance in Model 3. The 
other findings are substantially confirmed. Third, I replicated the model with both clustered standard error and random 
effects for votes separately. In these replications, there are no substantial differences with respect to the three models 
contained in the chapter. Fourth, in order to corroborate the curvilinear model, I included a further independent variable 
capturing party extremism. Its coefficients are negative and significant in all models. Finally, I ran a multinomial model 
with a dependent variable constructed in the following way: no votes coded as 0, abstentions coded as 1 and yes votes 
coded as 2.  Due to the limited amount of abstentions in the dataset, changes were marginal. No votes were used as base 
outcome. The effects of position on the left-right axis and presence in government were confirmed. For all the replication 
models see the Appendix.  
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Model 1 partially questions the result the findings obtained in the previous chapter regarding the 
impact of ideology on party support for MOAs. First, there is less empirical evidence of a curvilinear 
distribution across the left-right axis. In fact, the squared term Rile x Rile is not significant at any 
level. Secondly, parties with low values in the GAL/TAN scale are significantly less likely to vote in 
favour of MOAs and, conversely, parties with high values are more likely to do so. The effect of this 
independent variable is positive and statistically significant (p<0,10). This is contrast with the result 
obtained in the previous chapter. As noted, the fact that positioning on the left-right axis much 
resemble that on the GAL/TAN scale in the Italian case may provide an explanation for such a result. 
Overall, the contradictory findings suggest that the GAL/TAN dimension is not an accurate predictor 
for party support for military interventions in Italy.  
 
In Model 2, controlling for the other variables, the curvilinear model on the left-right is again 
corroborated. In fact, the squared term is negative and statistically significant (p<0,01). In line with 
the findings of the previous chapter, presence at the government increases the probability of a party 
voting in favour of a military operations. Furthermore, this independent variable confirms to have a 
highly significant (p<0,01) and very strong effect on support for MOAs. To sum up, being member 
of the government constitutes a remarkable incentive for parties to vote in favour of military missions 
outside national borders. As expected, approving a mission through a law decree significantly 
increases (p<0,01) general party support for MOAs in parliament. Therefore, in line with H6 parties 
are more likely to vote in favour of military interventions if approved in such a way.  
 
Model 3 highlights how both presence at the government and law-making procedure have a different 
effect on parties according to their position in the left-right axis. As expected in H7, being member 
of the government has a stronger impact on right-wing parties than left-wing parties. In fact, the 
interaction effect is positive and statistically significant (p< 0,10). In other words, moving from the 
opposition to the government, right-wing parties increase more their extent of support than left-wing 
parties. The distribution of the effect of law-making procedures on support across this ideological 
follows the same pattern. In line with H8, right-wing parties are significantly (p<0,10) more likely to 
vote in favour of MOAs when they are approved through law decrees. Left-wing parties are not as 
sensitive to different law-making procedures instead.   
 
Through the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), it is 
possible to assess the specification of the three models. The values for AIC and BIC consistently 
decrease moving from Model 1 and Model 2. Therefore, as expected, the addition of further 
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independent variables linked to the presence in government and the law-making approval procedure 
considerably improves the specification for the model. While the AIC value slightly diminish from 
Model 2 to Model 3, the BIC value marginally increases. This means that the two interactions model 
does not significantly contribute to the increase of model fit.  
 
Table 4: Probit models with clustered standard error 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
IV DV = Support DV = Support DV = Support 
    
Rile 0.347** 0.583*** 0.349** 
 
(0.172) (0.142) (0.150) 
Rile x Rile -0.025 -0.060*** -0.053** 
 
(0.022) (0.021) (0.023) 
Gal/Tan 0.129* 0.258*** 0.300*** 
 
(0.075) (0.083) (0.091) 
Gov 
 
2.319*** 1.586** 
  
(0.276) (0.626) 
Gov x Rile 
  
0.416* 
   
(0.249) 
Decree 
 
0.798*** 0.239* 
  
(0.157) (0.133) 
Decree x Rile 
  
0.142*** 
   
(0.048) 
Constant -0.830*** -2.772*** -2.160*** 
 
(0.282) (0.339) (0.287) 
    
Observations 483 483 483 
AIC 464,044 306,579 304,624 
BIC 480,764 331,659 338,064 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 20 describes the distribution of probability to vote in favour of MOAs on the left-right axis. 
In a similar way to previous chapter, as the blue line suggests, party support for MOAs in parliament 
follows a curvilinear and bell-shaped distribution on this dimension. Probability to vote in favour of 
MOAs is lower at the extreme-left side of the spectrum, increases towards the centre and then 
decreases towards the right. In other words, during the so-called second republic in Italy, centre-left 
and centre-right parties were more likely to vote in favour of MOAs than extreme-left and extreme-
right parties. The width in the intervals of confidence imposes caution regarding parties with small 
differences with positions on the left-right axis. However, the difference between parties located at 
the centre and those at the extremes of the spectrum is considerable. For instance, parties with values 
close to zero are around 57% likely to vote in favour of MOAs, while those at the centre are almost 
80% likely. Figure 21 instead shows the average marginal effect of position on the left-right axis on 
probability to cast a supportive vote. As in the previous chapter, the blue dots in the figure on the left 
describe the positive or negative effect. When the whiskers of the blue dots overlap the with the red 
line placed on zero in the y-axis, the effect is not significant. It is worth pointing out that the effect is 
again significant (p<0,10) only for extreme values (from 0 to 2 and from 8 to 10) and not for central 
values. As in the correspondent figure of the previous chapter, the graph on the right shows the 
distribution of the variable Rile. The distribution is similar to the one contained in Chapter 2, with a 
higher proportion of values around 1 and 8, reflecting a more consistent presence of extreme left-
wing and right-wing parties respectively. Despite the fact that the effect is not significant in most 
values, the plot provided further evidence in favour of the curvilinear model.  
 
Figure 20: Predictive margins for position on the left-right axis 
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Figure 21: Average marginal effects of position on the left-right axis (left) and distribution of the 
variable Rile (right) 
 
 
Figure 22 shows instead the distribution of party support for MOAs in the Chamber of Deputies on 
the GAL/TAN scale. The blue line describes an increase in the probability of voting in favour from 
the GAL pole to the TAN pole. In other words, in contrast to the expectations, more authoritarian 
parties are more likely to vote in favour of MOAs. The likelihood of supporting military deployments 
increases from 49 to 96 per cent across all the scale. Figure 23 describes instead the average marginal 
effect of position on the GAL/TAN dimension on support for troops deployments. It shows how the 
positive effect is stronger for lower values and then reduces going towards the TAN pole. It has to be 
noted that the effect is always significant (p<0,01). The histogram on the right side of figure 23 reports 
the absolute frequency distribution of the observation for the variable Gal/Tan. As expected, beside 
a gap between values 4 and 5, resemblances with the distribution on the left-right axis are remarkable.  
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Figure 22: Predictive margins for position on the GAL/TAN scale  
 
 
Figure 23: Average marginal effects for position on the GAL/TAN scale (left) and frequency 
distribution of the variable Gal/Tan 
 
 
 
Figure 24 describes the impact of presence in the governing majority on the probability to vote in 
favour of MOAs in parliament. Parties at the opposition are 56% likely to provide parliamentary 
support for military deployments. In other words, they are more likely vote in favour than not. This 
.4
.6
.8
1
Pr
(S
up
po
rt)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Gal_Tan
Predictive Margins with 95% CIs
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
.0
8
.1
Ef
fe
cts
 o
n 
Pr
(S
up
po
rt)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Gal/Tan
average marginal effect of Gal/Tan (90% CIs)
0
10
20
30
40
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Gal/Tan
 96  
 
remarks the generalized degree of consensus on this issue among Italian political elites. However, 
probability to vote in favour of MOAs jumps to 96% for parties being member of the governing 
coalitions. To sum up, parties in government almost always support the mission promoted by their 
own executive. This result underlines the remarkable cohesiveness of governing coalitions on this 
issue.   
 
Figure 24: Predictive margins for presence in government 
 
 
Interestingly, figure 25 shows the magnitude of this effect across parties distributed on the left-right 
axis. The red line describes the probability of voting in favour being at the government, while the 
blue line the probability of voting in favour being at the opposition. The red line is basically flat 
around the 100 per cent of the probability and only slightly bends for parties with low values on the 
left-right axis. The blue line is placed below and resembles the aforementioned curvilinear model. 
Two conclusions can be drawn from this plot. First, as just shown, presence in government has an 
overall consistent and positive effect on party likelihood to vote in favour of MOAs. Second, as 
expected, the effect of being at the government is stronger for extreme-right parties, which have the 
widest gap between the lines. At the opposition, these parties might be critical of MOAs but when 
they come to power, they always vote in favour. The difference is remarkable as these parties becomes 
twice or four times more likely to support MOAs. This pattern is in marked contrast with that of 
extreme left parties. Although their probability to vote in favour of a mission increases going at the 
government, these parties may still oppose it. Differences in secessionist and far right Lega Nord and 
communist parties’ approach to the issue account for this result. While the former had an instrumental 
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opposition to MOAs, dissolving when being into power, the former rooted its criticism in an anti-
militarist and pacifist culture, occasionally defying the governing whip.  
 
Figure 25: predictive margins for presence in government conditioned to their position on the left-
right axis 
 
 
Figure 26 presents the positive and significant effect of law decrees on party support for MOAs. 
Probability of parties to vote in favour of a troop deployment increases from 61 to 77 per cent under 
this law-making procedure. As explained, this may be due to the peculiar nature of the bill that 
approves a decision already taken by the executive. If military troops are already deployed, political 
costs of voting against a military operation are presumed to increase. Furthermore, often concerning 
the re-funding of a number of small military operations, these debates on law decrees have received 
far less media attention in comparison to government’s communications of key troops deployment. 
Therefore, parties feel less constraint by potential electoral costs of voting in favour deriving from a 
pacifist public opinion.  
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Figure 26: Predictive margins for votes through law decree 
 
 
Finally, Figure 27 shows the impact of this effect across the left-right axis. The red line describes 
parliamentary support for law decrees, while the blue line describes parliamentary support for 
resolutions on government’s communication. The red line is constantly above the blue line, albeit the 
confidence intervals often overlap. This means that, as demonstrated by the previous plot, probability 
of voting in favour of MOAs approved through law decrees is generally higher. Moreover, the gap 
between the lines is very small at the extreme-left side of the axis then it widens moving towards the 
centre and reaches the maximum around values between 7 and 8. As said, these values correspond to 
the most extreme right-wing parties in the dataset. This means that, as expected, the effect of law-
making procedures is stronger for right-wing parties than for left-wing parties. However, the gap is 
not as wide as in the case of the impact of presence in the government. In fact, parties increase 
between 6 and 19 per cent their likelihood to vote in favour depending on the law-making procedure. 
Furthermore, as suggested, the confidence intervals overlap between 0 and 3 and again, between 8 
and 10. Nevertheless, this could be interpreted as further evidence of divergency in the approach 
towards military operations between left-wing and right-wing parties. The fact that right-wing parties 
are more likely to vote in favour of MOAs when incentives are stronger and potential audience costs 
are lower may point out to an opportunistic contestation of troops deployments.  
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Figure 27: Predictive margins for law decree conditioned to the position on the left-right axis 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, employing a dataset based on all parliamentary votes occurred at the Chamber of 
Deputies between 1994 and 2013, I re-tested the hypotheses concerning the impact of ideological 
leaning and position in the government on party support for MOAs drafted in the previous chapter. 
Furthermore, I explored the role of different law-making procedures on the probability for parties to 
vote in favour of military operations in Italy. In addition, I assessed how incentives related to presence 
in government and law-making procedures differently affect parties’ extent of supportiveness for 
MOAs, according to their location in the left-right axis.  
 
The results obtained in the previous chapter are substantially confirmed. First, ideological leaning on 
the left-right axis had a significant impact on support for MOAs. In particular, in line with the 
curvilinear model found across various West European countries (Wagner et al. 2017), during the 
“Second Republic” centre-left and centre-right parties in Italy were significantly more likely to vote 
in favour of peace and security operations than extreme-left and extreme-right parties. However, 
parliamentary support was not the same at the two extremes of the axis: while extreme left-wing 
parties such as Partito della Rifondazione Comunista and Partito dei Comunisti Italiani present much 
lower levels of support with respect to centrist parties, the far right Alleanza Nazionale has almost 
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always voted in favour of MOAs and the populist Lega Nord was only slightly more critical92. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that parliamentary support for troop deployments was generally high. 
Most of the parties considered in this period have voted in favour of MOAs more times than those 
ones they voted against. In particular, Democratici di Sinistra (and its successive denominations) and 
Forza Italia (and Popolo delle Libertà in the last year of the time span of this work), the two main 
parties in the centre-left and centre-right coalitions respectively, present remarkable levels of support. 
These findings provide further empirical evidence in favour of an emerging broad and bipartisan 
consensus on MOAs in Italy after the end of the Cold War (Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012). 
Secondly, as found by other cross-national studies (Wagner et al. 2017; 2018), position on the 
GAL/TAN scale is not as satisfactory as a predictor of support for MOAs. While in the previous 
chapter the effect of this dependent variable was negligibly small and not significant, in this chapter 
is positive and statistically significant. This contradiction suggests that positioning on the GAL/TAN 
scale is not a reliable explanatory variable for party support for MOAs in Italy. As also noted by 
Wagner et al. (2018), this depends on its high level of correlation with the left/right axis in West 
European countries. Thirdly, as found by Wagner et al. (2017; 2018) the presence of a party in the 
government is a very strong predictor of party support for MOAs. In Italy parties at the government 
cohesively supported the military operation promoted by the executive in parliament through their 
votes.  
 
Importantly, this chapter has also shown that law-making procedures matter in explaining party 
support for MOAs. Literature on party politics of military interventions has consistently neglected 
the impact of this variable due to the high extent of variation between countries and the lack of 
variation within the same country. The fuzzy and ambiguous set of law-making procedures 
concerning MOAs in Italy allows to assess it. As expected, troops deployment approved or renewed 
through law decrees have garnered a generally higher extent of party support. In other words, this 
law-making procedure produced a series of incentives that increased the propensity of parties to vote 
in favour of troops deployments for peace and security operations. Establishing separate votes for 
(groups) of missions, the newly introduced law-making procedure should bring more contested and 
partisan votes in parliament, decreasing the overall level of support for MOAs in Italy. However, with 
just three occurrences of voting under this new procedure (2017, 2018, 2019), there is not enough 
evidence to provide empirical foundations for this argument. Further research should evaluate the 
impact of this new law-making procedure on party support for troop deployments.  
 
92 For an analysis of the differences in the foreign policy approach of these two far right parties see Tarchi (2007). 
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Finally, this chapter has tested whether incentives deriving from presence in the government and the 
law-making procedure have a different impact on parties’ support for MOAs, according to their 
ideological leaning. As expected, presence at the government and votes through law decrees had a 
stronger impact on (extreme) right parties’ probability to vote in favour of MOAs than on (extreme) 
left-wing parties’ probability to vote in favour. This finding suggests how party contestation of 
military interventions may have both an ideological and instrumental dimension. Strongly pacifist 
parties were not as likely to change their voting behaviour, moving from opposition to government. 
To the contrary, not consider this issue as particularly salient, extreme right-wing parties placed the 
stability of the executive before their disagreement on military operations, dramatically changing 
their voting patterns. Previous studies have already emphasized the deep presence of a pacifist 
ideology among Italian post-Marxist parties such as RC and PdCI (Calossi et al. 2013) and, 
conversely, Lega Nord’s relative lack of interest for military interventions (Verbeek and Zaslove 
2013). In the next chapter, I will further demonstrate divergencies in the approach to military 
deployments among extreme parties, by comparing the behaviour of pacifist left-wing parties Partito 
dei Comunisti Italiani and Federazione dei Verdi and Lega Nord as junior coalition partners during 
Kosovo and Libyan crises respectively. 
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Chapter 4 
Junior coalition partners, Military Operations Abroad and 
government stability: The cases of Kosovo and Libya 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapters, through the quantitative analysis of parliamentary speeches and votes, I have 
empirically demonstrated that, during the so-called “Second Republic”, party support for MOAs 
followed a curvilinear distribution across the left-right axis. In other words, centre-left and centre-
right parties were more in favour of troops deployments outside national borders than extreme left 
and right parties. 
 
As said, between 1994 and 2013, centre-left and centre-right coalitions alternated in power in Italy 
(Bardi 2007; D’Alimonte and Bartolini 2007; Verzichelli and Cotta 2000). Therefore, parties with 
substantially different positions on MOAs found themselves always in government together as 
coalition partners. Looking back at the analysis of parliamentary votes (Figure 18), divergences in 
the centre-left coalition were considerable. While the social democrats (PDS-DS-PD) and the leftist 
Christian democrats (PPI-La Margherita) generally favoured Italy’s participation in peace and 
security operations, the Greens (Federazione dei Verdi) and the two communist parties (Partito della 
Rifondazione Comunista e Partito dei Comunisti Italiani) showed the highest level of contestation 
among all parties taken into account. Positions were not as distant within the centre-right coalition, 
but fundamental disagreements existed anyway. While Berlusconi’s conservative party Forza Italia, 
the rightist Christian democrats Unione di Centro, and the post-fascist Alleanza Nazionale were the 
more consistent supporters of Italian contribution to military interventions, Lega Nord adopted a more 
sceptical position.  
 
Given these markedly divergent points of views and the number of military operations in which 
successive Italian executives had to decide whether participating or not, it is surprising that a 
government never collapsed on this issue93. This chapter aims to explain this outcome (or lack 
 
93 This is more so considered that Italy is often quoted as a paradigmatic case of government instability. During its history 
as a Republic, it scored the highest rate of government change in Western Europe. The average duration of a cabinet is 
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thereof), taking the perspective of extreme coalition partners that are sceptical of military 
interventions. In other words, it addresses the question: why did extreme junior partners remain in 
government despite the decision to participate in a military operation? As underlined in Chapter 1, 
literature on coalition politics has mostly focused on the effects of coalition politics on foreign 
policymaking and foreign policy outcomes rather than the effect of foreign policy decisions on 
cabinets’ stability (Kaarbo and Beasley 2008; Oktay 2014; Oppermann and Brummer 2014). Existing 
empirical evidence suggest that cabinets seldom fall on foreign policy. However, mechanisms to 
explain junior partner’s loyalty to the government in such situations have never been thoroughly 
grasped. Kaarbo (2012) claimed that loyalty towards the coalition government depends on junior 
partner’s generic political calculations related to office-seeking and vote-seeking objectives (Strøm 
1990; Muller and Strøm 1999). Analysing the case of pacifist extreme left parties and military 
operations in Italy, Coticchia and Davidson (2019) underlined, among other factors, the crucial role 
of (the lack of) salience attributed to the issue94.  
 
Extending this work, I decided to qualitatively analyse and compare two cases of disagreements 
within Italian cabinets on relevant MOAs that did not trigger the end of the cabinet: Kosovo (1999) 
and Libya (2011). The multilateral bombing campaign in Kosovo, aimed at stopping the violence 
perpetrated by Serbian armed forces and forcing Slobodan Milosevic to come back on the negotiating 
table, was heavily contested by extreme-left and pacifist parties within the centre-left coalition, 
Partito dei Comunisti Italiani (PdCI) and Federazione dei Verdi (FdV)95. The decision to participate 
in the air strikes against Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, who had brutally repressed public protest 
against him, angered instead the far-right and autonomist Lega Nord (LN), at the time junior partner 
within the centre-right coalition96. In both cases, extreme junior partners stayed in government, 
 
also well below the average (Curini and Pinto 2017; Müller and Strøm 2003). Coalition conflicts have been a prominent 
source of government termination (Damgaard 2008).  
94 To the contrary, studies on government termination have demonstrated that salient economic events such as rising 
inflation and unemployment decrease the cabinet’s likelihood to survive (Saalfeld 2008; Warwick 1994). These elements 
were also crucial in Italy during the Second Republic (Curini and Pinto 2017).  For a review on government termination 
see Laver (2003).  
95 On the NATO’s intervention in Kosovo see Daalder and O’Hanlon (2000); Kuperman (2008). For the Italian military 
participation and the political debate on it see Coticchia (2011); Davidson (2011); Gasparini (2000); Greco (2000); Ignazi 
et al. (2012).  
96 On the intervention in Libya see Colombo and Varvelli (2012); Engelbrekt et al. (2014); Kuperman (2013). For the 
Italian military participation and the political debate on it see Coticchia (2011); Ignazi et al. (2012); Croci and Valigi 
(2013).  
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despite Italy’s substantial involvement in the respective military interventions. In other words, the 
two cases present themselves as similar in terms of mission’s features and outcome for the cabinet’s 
stability. The element of variation consists in the diverging ideological leaning of the two junior 
partners: PdCI and Greens are located at the extreme-left side of the left-right axis, while LN is placed 
at the extreme right. Analysing the reasons underlying the permanence in government of these junior 
partners can potentially shed light on different approaches to contestation of MOAs among extreme 
parties. In particular, salience attributed to foreign and security policy and fear of being blamed as 
irresponsible coalition partner are expected to have a prominent role in shaping party behaviour.  
 
This chapter is structured as follows. First, I sketch out two hypotheses concerning potential 
mechanisms pushing extreme junior partners to remain in government, in spite of a disliked foreign 
policy outcome. Secondly, I outline the research design, highlighting the criteria employed for the 
case selection. Thirdly, I describe the qualitative data collected for the analysis. Fourthly, I analyse 
the empirical material, explaining junior partner’s loyalty to the government. Finally, in the 
conclusions, I discuss my main findings and their implications for the study of the party politics of 
military interventions in Italy and abroad.  
 
Hypotheses 
 
In line with the literature on coalition politics and foreign policy reviewed in Chapter 1, I hypothesize 
two elements underlying junior partner’s decision to stay in government despite a disliked foreign 
policy outcome, and in the specific case, the decision to participate in a MOA: low salience attributed 
to the issue and fear of being blamed by voters for the collapse of the cabinet. These two explanations 
are neither exclusive nor exhaustive: they may verify in conjunction and be complemented by other 
factors. However, they represent useful insights in explaining the phenomenon under investigation.  
 
Salience refers to the importance attributed by a political actor such as parties, individual legislators 
or even voters to a specific policy issue. In particular, parties can consider a policy issue as more or 
less relevant, responding to a series of factors such as the preferences of their own voters or the more 
general electorate, their domestic organization or their position in the party system (Ezrow et al. 2010; 
Kluver and Spoon 2016; Wagner and Meyer 2014). Various studies on coalition politics and foreign 
policy hypothesized salience to have a decisive an impact on junior partner influence in the decision-
making process and the final policy outcome (Coticchia and Davidson 2018; Greene 2019; Kaarbo 
1996; Ozkececi-Taner 2005). In these works, salience has often been conceptualized in relative rather 
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than absolute sense. In other words, junior and senior partner were compared in terms of how much 
importance they attribute to a specific policy issue. Kaarbo (1996, 513) argued that “how salient is 
an issue to both the junior and senior party policy objectives may affect junior party influence”. If the 
junior partner considers a certain foreign policy issue as more salient than the senior partner does, it 
is expected to exercise more influence in the decision-making process than not.  
 
The mechanisms underlying this hypothesis is that in such a situation the junior partner will engage 
in stronger and more consistent efforts to affect the decision-making process if they consider a foreign 
policy issue as salient (Kaarbo 1996). To put it bluntly, higher salience leads to more aggressive 
strategies of influence, including the threat to leave the cabinet. This is also because an extreme junior 
partner perceives that their own voters may punish it at the elections if it does not respond to their 
priorities when in government. To the contrary, in cases in which the salience is lower, a junior partner 
is not presumed to be as committed to influence the foreign policy outcome. With regards to the 
behaviour of extreme-left junior partners in Italy on MOAs, Coticchia and Davidson (2018, 5) 
claimed that “when military operations are a low salience issue relative to other issues for the critical 
radical party, we expect the party to refrain from threatening collapse even when it is opposed to the 
coalition’s policy”. This also depends on the fact that little electoral costs are attached to such policy.  
 
Given this discussion, the salience hypothesis has obvious implications for junior partner’s decision 
to remain in government, in spite of a disliked foreign policy outcome. Low salience attributed to a 
foreign policy issue is presumed to increase extreme junior partner’s likelihood to stay in power. With 
regards to the object of this research, Italian political parties and MOAs, such scenario is even more 
likely. In fact, several studies have demonstrated how security and defence policy has been 
marginalized in the political and public debate, thereby decreasing its salience (Coticchia 2011; 2014; 
Ignazi et al. 2012). 
 
H9: low salience attributed to the MOAs increase junior partner’s propensity to stay in government 
 
In the previous discussion, it is assumed that voters could punish junior partners on the basis of the 
implementation of certain foreign policy, according to its salience. However, voters may highly value 
the stability of the government per se. More durable governments are thought to have more time to 
implement their policies and, consequently, being more effective than less durable governments. 
Instability in government is also perceived negatively with regards to the capacity to produce solid 
economic performance (Alesina et al. 1996). This may lead the median voter to punish a junior partner 
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for making the government collapse due to a disliked foreign policy decision. In bipolar and highly 
ideologically polarized party system, even extreme parties’ voters may prefer stability over a foreign 
policy outcome in line with their views. In fact, the collapse of the cabinet may lead to the rise to 
power of a new cabinet which is very distant from their ideological preferences. As Coticchia and 
Davidson (2018, 5) with respect to the Italian case, “In a bipolar political system (one with alternating 
left/right governments) it is likely to expect a centre-left government collapse to result in a subsequent 
election victory for the centre-right”. In fact, as said, centre-left and centre-right coalition cabinets 
alternated in power during the “Second Republic” (Cotta and Verzichelli 2016; D’Alimonte and 
Bartolini 2007). Therefore, extreme junior partners are expected to be concerned about taking the 
blame for making the government fall and paving the way for the coming to power of the rival 
coalition. This mechanism acts as an incentive for not leaving the cabinet.  
 
H10: fear of being blamed as irresponsible by the electorate increase junior partner’s propensity to 
stay in government 
 
The two mechanisms are presumed to manifest in various ways. The (lack of) salience hypothesis 
(H9) is expected to emerge through scarce interest in the specific foreign policy or inconsistent efforts 
to steer foreign policy towards a different direction. Junior partners showing less commitment in their 
opposition to the specific MOA are presumed to consider the whole issue as not very salient. 
Furthermore, the manner in which junior partner frame their contestation may be revealing about the 
extent salience they attribute to military interventions. Instrumental criticism concerning side effects 
of the foreign policy may also be revealing of a low extent of salience. The blame hypothesis (H10) 
regarding the perception of being labelled as unreliable government partners by voters is supposed to 
emerge by statements justifying their decision not to defect on the basis of such reasoning. It may 
also emerge from the lack of willingness to leave the cabinet, disregarding the issue of conflict with 
the senior partner.   
 
Case selection: military operations in Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011) 
 
With the exception of Coticchia and Davidson (2019), there are no studies on the role of junior 
partners on MOAs in Italy97. Analysing the behaviour of extreme left parties on military operation in 
Albania, Kosovo and Afghanistan, they found that the two aforementioned mechanism are crucial to 
 
97 Verbeek and Zaslove (2015) analysed the Lega Nord’s foreign policy approach. This party was invariably the junior 
coalition partner in the centre-right coalition governments during the Second Republic. 
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explain their reluctance to bring the government down. This chapter aims at extending this research 
by comparing two cases of coalition conflicts on military operations abroad during the so-called 
“Second Republic”: the disagreement between Partito dei Comunisti Italiani (PdCI) and Federazione 
dei Verdi (FdV or Greens) and the rest of the cabinet concerning the operation Allied Force in Kosovo 
(1999) and Lega Nord’s (LN) contestation of Italian government participation in the operation 
Unified Protector in Libya (2011)98. 
 
The choice of these two cases is based on three criteria. First, the two military interventions present 
remarkable similarities in terms of scopes, (partially) chain of command and means. Both Operation 
Allied Force (OAF) and Operation Unified Protector (OUP) had as their official goal the protection 
of civilians from acts of violence committed perpetrated by two authoritarian regimes. In Kosovo, in 
the context of a civil war for the independence of the region, Serbian armed forces were responsible 
for thousands of deliberate killings among the Albanian ethnic minority99. In Libya, militaries 
repressed public protest against the regime in a brutal way and successively engaged in an armed 
conflict against rebels in the country100. Therefore, the so-called doctrine of “Responsibility to 
Protect” (R2P) was employed to justify the use of force in these two interventions101. As Bellamy 
(2009b) argued, the debate over the legitimacy of OAF paved the way for the development of this 
doctrine. OUP is instead widely considered an example of application of R2P in practice (Patrick 
2011). Both interventions were also conducted under the supervision of NATO. However, it must be 
noted that initially, the intervention in Libya was led by a coalition of states including United States, 
France and United Kingdom. Following the approval of a United Nation Security Council Resolution 
1973, on March 18, 2011, various countries deployed their military forces to implement a no-fly zone 
in Libya against the Gaddafi regime, in a mission called “Odyssey Dawn”. A few days later, the 
command of the operation shifted to NATO, taking the name of “Unified Protector”.  Finally, both 
these missions consisted in air strikes. In a little more than three months, over 10000 strikes sorties 
were done for OAF, while in seven months 9700 were done for OUP102. Italy actively participated in 
the bombings in both cases (Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012). According to Coticchia (2011), the 
national contribution to OAF was second only to the American one. In total, 50 Italian warplanes 
 
98 Various studies on Italian foreign policy compared the cases of Kosovo and Libya. See for instance Carati and Locatelli 
(2017); Miranda (2011). 
99 For a description of the massacres committed by the Serbian forces see Roberts (1999). For a critical discussion of the 
moral hazard entailed in the intervention see Kuperman (2008).  
100 For a critical account of the Libyan regime’s acts of violence and the effects of the interventions see Kuperman (2013). 
101 For an overview on the development and the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect see Bellamy (2009a). 
102 For more information on OAF and OUP see the reports of the missions on the NATO website. 
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were involved in the air strikes in Kosovo, for 1300 sorties (Coticchia 2011). Italy’s contribution in 
OUP was significant as well. Italian air forces flied on the Libyan skies for up to 7300 hours in total, 
conducting almost 500 bombing mission. Only United States, United Kingdom and France were more 
involved in the NATO operation in Libya.  
 
Secondly, as suggested, junior coalition partners with completely different ideological leanings 
contested these two interventions. In the case of OAF, the communist Partito dei Comunisti Italiani 
(PdCI) and the Green Federazione dei Verdi (FdV) were strongly against the military intervention 
and, consequently, Italy’s contribution to it. Both these parties shared a broadly pacifist approach to 
foreign and security policy. PdCI also rooted its scepticism towards the intervention in its anti-
American attitude, and, conversely, a close relationship with the Serbian leadership. In the case of 
OUP, the far right and autonomist Lega Nord (LN) heavily criticized the decision to meddle in the 
Libyan civil war. Such criticism was mainly based on the fear that the collapse of the Gaddafi regime 
would have led to an increase in the influx of illegal migrants to Italy.  
 
These parties were junior partners in the two coalitions that alternated in in government in Italy during 
this period. Participation in OAF was in fact promoted by a centre-left cabinet led by Massimo 
D’Alema, a prominent figure inside the senior partner Democratici di Sinistra, and composed by up 
to eight parties in total, bringing together former Christian democrat and communists. Contribution 
to OUP was instead decided by a centre-right coalition government, led by Silvio Berlusconi, and 
composed only of two parties: the conservative Popolo della Libertà (PdL) and Lega Nord indeed103. 
Notably, in both cases, junior partners were pivotal for the survival of the cabinet. Without the 
combined support of both PdCI and FdV, D’Alema centre-left cabinet would have lost its 
parliamentary majority in the Chamber of Deputies. LN could exercise an equally strong hijacking 
power on Berlusconi’s centre-right cabinet. It is also worth noting that none of these junior partners 
held key cabinet portfolios, namely foreign affairs and defence, in both cases. During the Kosovo 
crisis, the liberal Lamberto Dini and the Christian democrat Carlo Scognamiglio were minister of 
foreign affairs and defence respectively. During the Libyan crisis, both the ministers of foreign affairs 
and defence, Franco Frattini and Ignazio La Russa, were affiliated to the senior partner PdL. As noted 
in Chapter 1, in institutional settings in which the model of ministerial government (Laver and 
Shepsle 2004) prevails, holding a relevant portfolio may increase junior partner’s influence on foreign 
policy (Oppermann and Brummer 2014). Given this, the lack of influence should not come as a 
 
103 For a description of the composition of these two cabinets see the Appendix.  
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surprise. At the lower level of undersecretaries, among the three junior partners in the two cases 
considered, only PdCI owned a post at the defence during the Kosovo crisis.  
 
Finally, as already suggested, the cases present similar developments in the conflict within Italian 
coalition governments and an identical outcome for the survival of the two cabinets. In fact, junior 
partners did not eventually defect, making the government collapse. After the end of OAF in Kosovo 
in June 1999, the first centre-left D’Alema government survived for a few more months and, 
eventually, had to resign because of the defection of a couple of small centrist parties, Cristiani 
Democratici Uniti and Unione Democratica per la Repubblica104. Little after the end of OUP, in 
November 2011, the fourth centre-right Berlusconi’s coalition government collapsed in the face of a 
dramatic debt crisis (Jones 2012). To sum up, the coalition conflicts over participation in multilateral 
interventions in Kosovo in 1999 and Libya in 2011 did not provoke the termination of the 
government, as extreme parties decided to contest this policy but remained in the cabinet.  
 
Therefore, this case selection is based on the criteria of most similar cases in terms of dependent 
variable (Seawright and Gerring 2008). In fact, as explained, the two cases present a similar outcome 
in the sense that the junior partner decided not to leave the government. However, at the same time, 
the two cases differ completely in terms of junior partner’s ideological leaning. This element allows 
to see how our hypothesized independent variable – salience attributed to military interventions and 
fear of being blamed as an irresponsible coalition partner – had a varying impact on the decision to 
remain in government, according to the position on the left-right axis of the junior partner involved.  
 
Data and methods  
 
In order to investigate dynamics leading to the permanence at the government, I rely on qualitative 
data such as interviews with relevant policymakers, memoirs of members of the cabinet, relevant 
debates in parliament and newspaper articles. Interviews deserve particular attention as they are an 
original source of data105. In total, I conducted thirteen interviews, seven for the case of Kosovo and 
six for the case of Libya. I tried to interview representatives within the cabinet and the parliament 
belonging to both the senior partners and the junior partners to better triangulate the answers. For 
example, in the case of Kosovo, I interviewed three representatives of PdCI, further three of the greens 
 
104 “Finisce il D’Alema I”, La Repubblica, 19/12/1999. 
105 For an overview of how to conduct interviews in social science see Della Porta (2014). Aberbach and Rockman (2002) 
also provide insights about the use of elite interviews in political science.   
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and one for Democratici di Sinistra, the senior partner. Instead in the case of Libya, I interviewed 
three representatives of LN and three for Forza Italia, the senior partner106. Interviews with junior 
partners’ policymakers were useful to uncover the beliefs and perceptions within the parties. In fact, 
to some extent, both the hypotheses are linked to perceptions about the salience of the issue and the 
potential electoral costs deriving from leaving the government. Interviews with senior partner’s 
policymakers were employed also as a mean to triangulate and assess if they shared the same 
impressions. Newspaper articles and parliamentary debates complemented the interviews, providing 
further empirical material for the reconstruction of the events and the analysis. Newspaper articles 
were retrieved through the platform Lexis Nexis. Newspaper articles come from the three most-read 
Italian newspapers: La Repubblica, La Stampa e Il Corriere della Sera. Parliamentary debates were 
retrieved from the websites of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.  
 
Empirical findings 
 
Through the employment of interviews, reports of the parliamentary debates and other sources, it is 
possible to provide an explanation of why junior coalition partners in these two cases stayed in the 
coalition government, despite the decision to participate in military interventions. As noted, two 
dynamics are expected to emerge, providing incentives for junior partners not to defect: low salience 
with respect to other issues (H9) and fear of being blamed as responsible by voters for the end of the 
government and the return to power of a more ideologically distant cabinet (H10).  
 
Kosovo  
 
Participation in MOAs proved a contentious issue within the centre-left coalition even before the 
beginning of the Kosovo began. In fact, only a couple of years before, on April 9, 1997 the communist 
party Partito della Rifondazione Comunista (PRC), providing essential external support for the 
survival of  the centre-left cabinet, led at the time by Romano Prodi, voted against Operation Alba, a 
mission aimed at restoring security and holding free elections in the near Albania. The mission was 
approved only thanks to the support of the centre-right opposition parties with the exception of Lega 
Nord107. However, a couple of days later, PRC returned to the ranks, guaranteeing its votes for the 
cabinet in a confidence vote. This event is relevant for the explanation of why extreme left and pacifist 
 
106 The interviewees preferred to stay anonymous. For this reason, I referred to them by party affiliation in the text and 
number in the notes. For an overview of all the interviews see the Appendix.  
107 Resoconto Stenografico n.177, Camera dei Deputati, 9/4/1997. 
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parties did not leave the cabinet despite the decision to participate in the air strikes in Kosovo in 1999 
for two reasons. First, it shows the high extent of salience attributed by communists to the issue. 
Second, it highlights the emergence of a bipartisan consensus and cooperation between the main 
centre-left and centre-right parties, fostering extreme-left parties to remain to be able of shifting Italy 
towards a more dovish position.  
 
The split within PRC provoking the collapse of the Prodi cabinet and the formation of a new centre-
left cabinet is also a crucial event to understand why junior coalition partners stayed in the 
government despite the decision to contribute to the intervention in Kosovo. In Autumn 1998, a rift 
within PRC opened between the two main exponents of the party, secretary Fausto Bertinotti and 
president Armando Cossutta. Disagreeing with the budgetary law proposed by the executive, 
Bertinotti wanted to withdraw the party’s parliamentary support. Cossutta was instead strongly 
against such move. On October 9, this division resulted in a crucial parliamentary defeat for the 
centre-left cabinet, which definitively terminated108. Cossutta resigned as PRC president and with his 
followers founded a new party called Partito dei Comunisti Italiani (PdCI). A few days later, the 
newly born PdCI joined a new centre-left government led by Massimo D’Alema, together with a 
number of other small parties, including the green Federazione dei Verdi (FdV). Taking part in the 
new cabinet, PdCI and FdV demonstrated to highly value permanence in power of a centre-left 
cabinet in a context of a bipolar competition against Berlusconi’s centre-right. Therefore, these parties 
were highly motivated to act as responsible junior partners. The communists felt this moral obligation 
more deeply as they had split from the rest of PRC in order to keep on supporting the government. 
“The government had been in power not for long and we made a split from PRC to form it. Therefore, 
the willingness to look as responsible actors prevailed”109, a PdCI MP adimtted. “I never had the 
feeling that they would leave the government. Not because they cared about the offices. But due to a 
matter of credibility and political culture”110, a DS MP said. This does not mean that the Greens were 
not concerned about the stability of the government per se. “Leaving the government would have led 
to new elections that the centre-left would have risked losing”, the same MP continued111. 
 
It is worth pointing out how these two parties were both in principle against the NATO military 
intervention in Kosovo and heavily contested Italian contribution to it, thereby demonstrating to 
 
108 “E Prodi scopre di aver perso soltanto all’ultimo voto”, La Repubblica, 10/10/1998. 
109 Interviewee 2.  
110 Interviewee 7.  
111 Interviewee 6.  
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attach a high extent of salience to the issue. Junior partners’ contestation started even before OAF 
had begun. In fact, both PdCI and FdV immediately criticized the Prodi government decision to sign 
the NATO activation order on October 12, 1998, supporting the use of force to solve the crisis and 
granting the use of Italian military bases to the allies112. Cossutta defined it as “a mistake”113. In the 
following months, as the situation in the area significantly worsened114, the hypothesis of a NATO 
military intervention to protect the civilians became increasingly concrete, further exposing frictions 
in the new centre-left cabinet. In fact, while Prime Minister D’Alema reaffirmed Italy’s loyalty to 
NATO115, Cossutta claimed that its party “was against the use of Italian military bases and a military 
intervention in Kosovo”116. At the eve of the intervention, FdV leader and senator Luigi Manconi 
argued that divergencies existed within the cabinet and that its party disagreed with the prevailing 
“blind obedience towards the Atlantic alliance”117. Predictably, the beginning of the air strikes on 24 
March 1999 and the Italian decision to provide a substantial contribution further augmented junior 
partners’ extent of dissent. A few days later, Cossutta and Manconi released a joint statement asking 
the executive to “publicly condemn” the bombing campaign118. Furthermore, Oliviero Diliberto, a 
key PdCI exponent and Minister of Justice in the cabinet, viewed in the intervention an American 
attack against the acceleration in the European integration process119. Notably, while PdCI cohesively 
opposed the NATO operation, FdV was more divided. In fact, following a humanitarian approach to 
foreign policy and the interventionist stance of its German counterpart, a fraction of the party 
supported the Operation Allied Force as it aimed to protect the lives of civilians in Kosovo. “Some 
of the party activists were not against the NATO intervention”120, a Green MP affirmed. “Within the 
party, some argued that when a humanitarian disaster occurs, just watching is not the right thing to 
do”, another one added121. Lack of cohesion on the issue further decreased this party’s propensity to 
defect.  
 
 
112 “L’Italia concede l’uso delle basi Nato”, La Repubblica, 12/10/1998. 
113 “Dal Governo sì all’uso delle basi. Cossutta e Verdi non ci stanno”, La Repubblica, 13/10/1998. 
114 “Kosovo, esecuzione di massa”, La Repubblica, 17/1/1999. 
115 “D’Alema: L’Italia a fianco della NATO”, La Repubblica, 19/1/1999. 
116 “Diciamo no alle bombe: Cossutta frena D’Alema”, La Repubblica, 20/1/1999. 
117 “Voglio fermare gli aerei, non l’azione di governo”, La Repubblica, 24/3/1999. 
118 “Cossutta: subito tregua. D’Alema: fedeli alla NATO”, La Repubblica, 1/4/1999. 
119 “Clinton ha voluto le bombe per fermare l’Europa”, La Repubblica, 6/4/1999. 
120 Interviewee 6. 
121 Interviewee 5.  
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As a further evidence of the high extent of salience attributed to this issue, during three-months of air 
strikes, PdCI and FdV were sincerely determined to steer the position of Italy towards a dovish 
direction. “Our goal was to push the Italian government to find a negotiated peace to the conflict and 
not let it end with a military victory. This what we lobbied for122”, a PdCI MP said. “We insisted that 
the Italian government had to work for a restart of negotiations between the two parties”, another 
PdCI MP confirmed123. “We decided to stay in the government and try to make an effort to push the 
government to give priority to a diplomatic solution within the international community” a Green MP 
stated124. Rumours regarding a possible “war cabinet” between the centre-left and centre-right further 
encouraged junior partners not to defect125. They were afraid that such development would have 
pushed Italy towards a more hawkish position as centre-right parties were even ready to support a 
ground invasion126. “If we had left, a new government supported by centre-right parties would have 
formed. We all thought that a war cabinet would have followed”127, a PdCI MP said. “Cossutta was 
in two minds between the belief that a new government with the centre-right could have formed and 
consistency with its ideological beliefs” the then Minister of Defence Scognamiglio wrote in his 
memoirs128. “Within the party several positions coexisted about whether to stay in the government. 
In my opinion, the strongest argument for staying was that that the fall of the government would 
provoke a shift towards an even more aggressive stance”, a green MP said129.  
 
In order to steer the position of the cabinet towards a more dovish direction, thereby demonstrating 
to attach salience to the opposition to intervention, these parties employed two instruments. First, 
they made use of parliament’s monitoring and scrutinizing powers. For example, right after the 
beginning of the mission, PdCI and FdV called for a parliamentary debate on the issue130. The more 
pacifist positions in the cabinet strongly affected the tone of Prime Minister’s speech and the wording 
of the governing parties’ common resolution. On April 26, referring before the Chamber of Deputies, 
D’Alema emphasized that the military forces’ duties would be restricted to “the integrated defence” 
(Camera dei Deputati 1999, 9), meaning that Italian jets would not target Serbian cities. The 
 
122 Interviewee 1.  
123 Interviewee 3 
124 Interviewee 4.  
125 “Governo per la guerra? D’Alema non lo esclude”, La Repubblica, 22/4/1999. 
126 “Troppi dubbi sul ruolo USA: dal governo altolà a Dini”, La Repubblica, 22/4/1999. 
127 Interviewee 1.  
128 Scognamiglio (2002, 128). 
129 Interviewee 5.  
130 “D’Alema: non temo la crisi, l’Italia farà la sua parte”, La Repubblica, 24/1/1999  
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resolution “committed the executive to push NATO allies to stop the bombings and restart the 
diplomatic activities”131. On April 13, the Parliament debated the issue once again while also 
approving the participation of Italy in the humanitarian mission Allied Harbour, aimed at providing 
aid and shelter to the refugees from Kosovo. Partly thanks to the efforts of PdCI and FdV, the shared 
motion explicitly denied any intervention on the ground132. In the last key parliamentary debate, on 
May 19, under the pressure of the most pacifist parties, D’Alema indicated a road map for the 
suspension of the bombings133. Furthermore, junior partners extensively employed parliamentary 
questions to monitor the cabinet on the issue. For example, on May 4, Tullio Grimaldi, a PdCI MP, 
urged the executive to rule out that “the presence of Italian troops on the ground means a future 
deployment in an armed attack”134. With a marked environmentalist connotation, the greens also used 
this instrument. In particular, they repeatedly expressed concerns about the environmental damage of 
bombs discharged by warplanes on the Mediterranean Sea. They also once called the government to 
“commit for a suspension of the bombings”135 
 
Secondly, manifesting salience for the issue, junior partners increased their pressure on the 
government through threats and symbolic actions. For instance, PdCI threatened to withdraw its 
minister if the Italian government did not insist for a ceasefire in the region during Easter136. In 
addition, both parties engaged in autonomous diplomatic missions to talk with the parties involved in 
the conflict. Cossutta’s travel in the beginning of April received a lot of media attention. Using its 
contacts with other communist countries embarked in a diplomatic mission, the PdCI leader visited 
first Moscow and then Belgrade, concluding that “Milosevic was ready for a compromise”137. “We 
were in favour of the peace. We suggested that the government should keep an open channel with 
Milosevic. Cossutta’s travel to convince Milosevic to stop its actions was also very symbolic in this 
sense”, a PdCI MP argued138. A few FdV exponents also went to the area to mediate as well. “Other 
members of the parliamentary group and I went to Serbia and Albania to convince the two parties in 
conflict”, a Green MP stated139. 
 
131 Resoconto Stenografico n.513, Camera dei Deputati, 26/3/1999. 
132 Resoconto Stenografico n.518, Camera dei Deputati, 13/4/1999. 
133 Resoconto Stenografico n. 537, Camera dei Deputati, 19/5/1999. 
134 Resoconto Stenografico n.531, Camera dei Deputati, 4/5/1999. 
135 Resoconto Stenografico n.533, Camera dei Deputati, 6/5/1999. 
136 “Dimissioni senza crisi. Cossutta ritira i ministri”, La Repubblica, 2/4/1999 
137“Cossutta: Milosevic pronto a trattare”, La Repubblica, 10/4/1999  
138 Interviewee 2.  
139 Interviewee 4. 
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Libya  
 
The events unfolding in Italian politics in the second half of 2010 are extremely relevant to analyse 
Lega Nord’s decision to remain in the cabinet. At July 30, the tension between Silvio Berlusconi and 
Gianfranco Fini, the leaders of the two parties that merged to form Popolo della Libertà, the senior 
coalition partner, erupted in the departure of the latter, who established its own parliamentary group, 
called Futuro e Libertà (Fli)140. Consequently, the centre-right cabinet, led by Berlusconi, lost its 
parliamentary majority and had to rely on Fli’s support in order to survive. Despite passing a key 
confidence vote at the end of September141, the collapse of the government seemed very near. LN 
was particularly pessimistic concerning the capacity of such a cabinet to approve relevant bill such 
as the one concerning the devolution of more autonomy to Italian regions and started to call for new 
elections. On October 17, LN’s picturesque leader, Umberto Bossi, said that “if bills sometimes fail 
to pass, we have to go to ballots”142. Following the withdrawal from the cabinet of five ministers 
affiliated to Fli in November143, Bossi added that “If you cannot govern, you have to go to polls. And 
you cannot govern with a margin of only one vote in parliament”144. A senior partner MP confirmed 
that LN was not very concerned about the termination of the cabinet. “Lega Nord had already asked 
to go to new elections in the end of 2010, when Fini decided to defect from the government”, he said. 
This can be interpreted as an evidence that they did not care much about the stability of the cabinet. 
At a point, Berlusconi even suggested that LN was ready to take the responsibility to make the 
government collapse145. Therefore, it seems that they did not fear to take the blame from their voters 
for bringing the government down in a situation in which they could not deliver on their key policies.  
 
The Libyan crisis, prompted by brutal repression of public protest by the Gaddafi regime in February 
2011, presented as a significantly thorny issue for the Italian government. Only a couple of years 
before, culminating a long strategy of rapprochement with the former colony, Berlusconi had signed 
a treaty of friendship with Libya. The treaty with Gaddafi concerned Italian investments in the 
energetic sector and measures to contain the influx of illegal migrants from Libyan coasts to Italy. 
Given this, Berlusconi’s reaction to the crisis was extremely cautious”146. However, as attacks against 
 
140 “Fini: Berlusconi illiberale. Alla Camera nasce Futuro e Libertà”, La Repubblica, 30/7/2010. 
141 “Il cavaliere non vuole farsi sfibrare. Ormai le elezioni sono inevitabili”, La Repubblica, 30/9/2010. 
142 “Bossi rilancia sul voto. Sono scettico sul vertice a tre”, La Repubblica, 17/10/2010. 
143 “Via i finiani dal governo. È crisi”, La Repubblica, 16/11/2010. 
144 “Bossi già punta a tornare al voto”, La Repubblica, 13/12/2010. 
145 “Il cavaliere e il diktat di Bossi: O si vota o staccherà lui la spina”, La Repubblica, 26/11/2010. 
146 “Libia: la repressione fa più di cento morti. Berlusconi: “Non disturbo Gheddafi”, La Repubblica, 19/2/2011. 
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civilians intensified and international pressure mounted, the Italian government was forced to take a 
more critical position, adhering to sanctions against the regime. Notwithstanding Italy’s diplomatic 
efforts, a Western military intervention in Libya became more likely day after day. As much as 
Berlusconi, LN disliked such prospect. On March 8, Roberto Maroni, prominent LN exponent and 
Minister of Home Affairs, warned about “not leaving the country in the hand of terrorists like 
Afghanistan” and asked for help from other European countries to share the burden of migrants 
according to a quota system147. It is worth noting how the opposition to the possible intervention in 
Libya was coupled with concerns regarding the increase in illegal immigration towards Italy. 
Therefore, LN attributed salience to the issue as it was linked to another key issue in their agenda, 
i.e. border controls. The interviews make this contradiction emerge clearly. On the one hand, an 
isolationist foreign policy approach comes up. “If you send a bomb, then it comes back at you. The 
terrorism that we experience is caused by our own past interventions. I would like to see no military 
interventions at all. Unless they occur under well-defined circumstances”, a LN MP stated148. “It is 
evident that military interventions are an enormous waste of human and economic resources”, another 
one added149. On the other hand, another MP claimed that “We had the issue of migrants and it was 
important to solve it”150. “They were concerned about the consequences of the interventions. They 
thought that Gaddafi would open the tap of migrants”, a senior partner exponent said.151 
 
Completing its half-hearted turnaround, Italy decided to support the no fly-zone on Libya and 
provided the use of its strategic military bases for the military operation. A rift emerged within the 
cabinet as LN openly criticized the mission and Italian government’s position. Three days later, Bossi 
defined the intervention as an “Anglo-French plot to steal the oil and gas from Italy and let our country 
be invaded by millions of migrants, escaping from the war”152. It is evident that condemnation for the 
military operation went hand in hand with the issue of migration and the competition for the control 
of energetic resources in Libya. The cabinet’s decision to actively participate in a new NATO-led 
operation called “Unified Protector” on April 25 further raised the tone of LN’s contestation. Bossi 
argued that “Italy was going to be invaded by millions of migrants”153 and pointed out also that the 
 
147 “Obama e la NATO verso opzione militare. Al Jazeera: Gheddafi ha offerto dimissioni”, La Repubblica, 7/3/2011. 
148 Interviewee 12.  
149 Interviewee 13. 
150 Interviewee 11.  
151 Interviewee 10.  
152“Bossi”, La Repubblica, 20/3/2011. 
153 “Berlusconi, colpiremo solo obbiettivi militari. L’ira di Bossi: Siamo una colonia francese”, La Repubblica, 
26/4/2011. 
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Italian contribution was too expensive and that it would have led to an increase in taxes. Salience was 
again placed on the domestic consequences of the intervention, rather than the intervention itself. The 
limited relevance attributed to opposition to intervention in Libya could also be inferred by the fact 
that, after been given a hypothetical date of the end of Italian contribution in May, LN stopped 
contesting it. However, the air strikes continued until the end of October, when Gaddafi was killed 
by rebels on the ground. A LN MP summed very well the lack of salience for such issues: “The party 
was absent in foreign policy. Our leader rarely spoke about it”154.   
 
LN instead made considerable efforts to steer the government’s decision towards a more dovish 
direction, through the use of parliamentary instruments, threats and symbolic cations. On March 19, 
the junior partner deserted the meeting of the parliament’s foreign affairs committee in which Franco 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Frattini announced the decision to concede the military bases to the 
allies155. A LN interviewee (n.12) confirmed that it represented a sign of protest that would not 
question the stability of the cabinet anyway. Moreover, right after the decision to implement a no-fly 
zone, LN demanded a parliamentary debate on Italy’s participation in the multilateral intervention 
against Gaddafi. The government conceded it on March 24. The resolution drafted by the coalition 
parties was strongly influenced by LN’s demands as it advocated sea patrolling against human 
trafficking in the Mediterranean Sea and the concept of burden sharing among European countries on 
the issue of migration156. Furthermore, on May 3, the junior partner presented its own motion in 
Parliament on the intervention in Libya. In the document, other than stressing their concerns regarding 
the costs of the air strikes and the potential increase in the migration flows, they asked the government 
to communicate a precise date in Italy’s involvement in the conflict would end157. Bossi said that 
Berlusconi and his party had to sign it “if he wanted the government to stay in power”158. On May 3, 
the motion passed in parliament thanks to the votes of both the junior and the senior partners.  
 
However, such efforts seemed more directed to appease their own voters rather than based on a 
genuine interest for the issue. “The absence in the vote in the committees was a strategy to please 
their electorate”, a PdL representative argued159. Another PdL exponent had the same impression, 
 
154 Interviewee 11.  
155 “Frattini: ‘Daremo le basi, possibili nostri raid’. Parlamento: ok all’impegno. Lega assente”, La Repubblica, 
18/3/2011.  
156 Resoconto Stenografico n.452, Camera dei Deputati, 24/3/2011. 
157 “Ecco le sei condizioni della Lega: Data certa per fine intervento”, La Repubblica, 19/4/2011. 
158 “Da Bossi ultimatum a Berlusconi: se non vota la mozione salta il governo”, La Repubblica, 1/5/2011. 
159 Interviewee 8.  
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labelling LN’s opposition as “propaganda”160. “The resolutions in parliament were balancing acts not 
to let the government fall. Because we did not want this to happen”161, a LN MP admitted. Moreover, 
in contrast to extreme junior partners’ role in Kosovo, they did not monitor and scrutinize the conduct 
of the operation by formulating parliamentary questions. In fact, no LN MP used this instrument to 
check how the operation was conducted.  
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
In the previous chapters, I empirically demonstrated that extreme parties, at both sides of the left-
right axis, were considerably less supportive of MOAs than centrist parties. However, during the 
“Second Republic”, centre-left and centre-right coalitions alternated in power with extreme parties 
always involved as junior partners. Considering such a divergence, the fact that a cabinet never fell 
due to a disagreement on MOAs among coalition partners is rather puzzling. In this chapter, I 
explained this outcome from the point of view of junior partner, examining the behaviour of extreme 
left parties, Partito dei Comunisti Italiani and Federazione dei Verdi, on Operation Allied Force in 
Kosovo and of the far-right and autonomist Lega Nord concerning Operation Unified Protector in 
Libya. In both cases, junior partners heavily contested Italian involvement in military interventions. 
Nevertheless, they decided to remain in the government. Through the use of interviews, parliamentary 
reports, key policymakers’ memoirs and newspaper articles, I investigated the reasons underlying 
such decisions.  
 
In line with Coticchia and Davidson (2018), I argue that two main elements convinced these extreme 
parties not to leave the cabinet: fear of being labelled as irresponsible coalition partners by their own 
voters and lack of salience attributed to military interventions. On the one hand, as expected (H9), 
not attributing salience to security and defence policy issues, junior partners are less incentivized to 
renounce to the advantages of staying in government, both in terms of office and policies. Various 
studies have highlighted the crucial role of salience in determining junior partner’s influence in 
shaping foreign policy outcomes (Coticchia and Davidson 2018; Greene 2019; Kaarbo and Lantis 
2003; Ozkececi-Taner 2005). Notwithstanding Italy’s growing involvement in multilateral peace and 
security operation since the end of the Cold War, security and defence policy issues remained at the 
margins of the political and public debate (Coticchia 2011; 2014; Ignazi et al. 2012). This decreased 
junior partners’ incentives to leave the government in a conflict over MOAs. On the other hand, as 
 
160 Interviewee 9.  
161 Interviewee 12.  
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hypothesized (H10), perceiving that they would be blamed by their own electorate for the collapse of 
the government, junior partners have less incentives to defect, even in face of a disliked decision on 
foreign policy. This is more the case when the political system is characterized by strong ideological 
polarization and bipolar competition, with two rival coalitions facing each other. In such situations, 
the extreme parties’ voters may highly value government’s stability over a foreign policy decision in 
line with their preferences. As said, in Italy, during the “Second Republic”, centre-left and centre-
right coalition constantly faced each other in a strongly polarized competition. 
 
Interestingly, these factors played out differently according to the ideological connotation of the 
junior partner involved in the decision-making process. In the case of Kosovo, as expected, the 
communist PdCI and the greens were particularly concerned of being blamed as irresponsible by their 
own voters for paving the way for the centre-right’s return to power. In particular, this mechanism 
was even more decisive in explaining PdCI’s permanence as the survival of a centre-left government 
constituted its own raison d’être. In contrast, both parties considered Italian participation in NATO-
led bombing campaign as a highly salient issue as demonstrated by symbolic actions, repeated efforts 
to monitor the cabinet in the implementation of the operation and lacerating internal debates. The 
vigorous attempts to moderate the government’s position could also be interpreted as a demonstration 
of the salience attributed to this issue. In the case of Libya, the far right and autonomist Lega Nord 
certainly did not regard the participation in the intervention as a salient issue per se as it was 
concerned by rather its domestic effects on immigration and taxation. Confirming the hypothesis, this 
variable was the main driver behind the decision to remain in the government, with little evidence for 
other mechanisms. For instance, fear of being labelled as an irresponsible coalition partner was totally 
absent as evidence suggests that LN threatened to make the government collapse at a previous stage. 
Table 5 resumes the empirical findings in the two cases. 
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Table 5: Summary of the empirical findings  
 PdCI and FdV (Operation 
Allied Force, Kosovo 1999) 
LN (Operation Unified 
Protector, Libya 2011) 
Salience attributed to 
military interventions  
High  Low 
Fear of being blamed as 
irresponsible coalition 
partner 
High (especially for PdCI) Low 
Other factors  Internal divisions within FdV  None 
 
 
In Chapter 3, I found that incentives deriving from position in government and law-making 
procedures had a stronger impact on extreme right parties’ probability to vote in favour of MOAs 
than extreme left-wing parties. I explained this finding by suggesting that contestation of MOAs was 
driven by different drivers among extreme parties. On the one hand, deeply entrenched pacifism and 
antimilitarism underpin extreme-left parties’ opposition to Italy’s participation in MOAs (Calossi et 
al. 2013). On the other hand, beside an isolationist approach to foreign policy, political opportunism 
is at the roots of contestation by the far right and autonomist LN (Tarchi 2007; Verbeek and Zaslove 
2015). The findings of this chapter strengthen this argument, highlighting how lack of salience was 
crucial to explain LN’s decision to remain in government notwithstanding Italy’s participation in the 
NATO-led Operation Unified Protector. However, the fact that PdCI and Greens perceived the 
electoral costs of being blamed as an irresponsible coalition partner as higher than reneging on their 
own antimilitarist tradition further points out the primacy of domestic politics over security and 
defence policy among Italian parties.  
 
In broader terms, this chapter contains implications for the comparative research agenda on the impact 
of coalition politics and foreign policy, by posing an innovative research puzzle: “why do junior 
partners stay in the government in spite of an undesired foreign policy outcome?”. Addressing this 
question is extremely relevant to explore junior partner’s patterns of influence. In fact, a credible 
threat of leaving the government increases junior partner’s hijacking power on the senior partner, 
and, by the same token, its impact on foreign policy outcomes (Kaarbo 1996). Furthermore, it 
provides interesting insights concerning the impact of coalition conflicts on governments termination, 
in Italy and abroad. Literature on government termination has mostly quantitatively identified 
variables making a cabinet more likely to collapse (Laver 2003). Such studies may be complemented 
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by an increasing number of qualitative works investigating reason underlying junior partners’ 
permanence in the cabinet. Saalfeld (2008, 362) argued that “a considerable proportion of cabinets 
get terminated as the result of discretionary decisions made by the relevant actors”. Exploring reasons 
underlying junior partner’s decision is therefore relevant to explain why cabinets fall.  
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Conclusions 
 
 
Main findings 
 
In this dissertation, through different data and methodologies, I explored how Italian parties behaved 
on Military Operations Abroad (MOA) during the so-called “Second Republic”162. I scrutinized their 
rhetoric, voting patterns and behaviour as coalition partners. The key question I addressed in this 
dissertation is: “Why did parties support MOAs in Italy?”. In Chapter 2 and 3, through a quantitative 
analysis of parliamentary speeches and votes respectively, I identified a number of factors explaining 
party support for MOAs. In these chapter, I found strong support for the presence of a centrist and 
bipartisan consensus on this issue, between centre-left and centre-right parties. In the fourth and last 
empirical chapter, qualitatively examining the cases of Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011), I 
demonstrated how extreme parties as junior coalition partners may also support controversial troop 
deployments because of the lack of salience attributed to the issue or the unwillingness to undermine 
the stability of the cabinet.  
 
In the following paragraphs, I will resume the main findings of this doctoral thesis, chapter by chapter. 
In Chapter 2, extracting a measure of support from a quantitative analysis of parliamentary debates 
on the six most relevant Italian MOAs and using it as a dependent variable in regression models, I 
highlighted a number of factors driving party support. I demonstrated that position on the left-right 
axis had a significant impact on this variable. The extent of support for MOAs on this dimension 
followed a curvilinear distribution. In other words, it was smaller at the extremes and higher at the 
centre. This meant that in Italy centrist and moderate parties viewed troops deployment in a 
considerably more positive way than extreme (left and right) and radical parties. Moreover, I showed 
that presence of the party at the government was a powerful explanatory factor. Predictably, 
considering that executives are in charge of the decision to deploy troops abroad, those parties who 
were member of the cabinet tended to be significantly more supportive than those who were at the 
opposition. Finally, I suggested that specific features of the operation had a different impact on the 
extent of supportiveness according to party positioning on the left-right axis. In particular, MOAs 
legitimized by the UN through a Security Council resolution received significantly more support from 
left-wing parties than from right-wing counterparts.  
 
162 Not all parties were considered in this dissertation. For the selection criteria see Chapter 2. 
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In Chapter 3, through a quantitative analysis of all parliamentary votes issued in the “Second 
Republic” with Probit models163, I confirmed these findings, found new drivers of party support for 
MOAs and provided a more accurate picture of party contestation on this issue. The hypothesis of a 
bell-shaped distribution of support across the left-right axis was reinforced, as centrist parties were 
discovered to be more likely to vote in favour of MOAs than extreme parties. However, a descriptive 
analysis of supporting votes (yes and abstention) suggested that contestation is more pronounced at 
the extreme-left side of the spectrum than at the extreme right one. In fact, communist parties, 
Rifondazione Comunista and Partito dei Comunisti Italiani and the green Federazione dei Verdi were 
the ones that opposed MOAs in the most consistent way. Communists voting against troop 
deployments in the majority of cases. To the contrary, at the opposite side of the spectrum, the far-
right Alleanza Nazionale was a very solid supporter of participation in military interventions, while 
the autonomist and populist Lega Nord showed only a slightly lower extent of support. Notably, 
support for MOAs was slightly higher among main parties in the centre-right coalition, such as Forza 
Italia-Popolo delle Libertà and Unione di Centro, than in the centre-left coalition, PDS-DS-PD and 
Popolari-La Margherita. In line with the results of the previous chapter, presence at the government 
significantly increased propensity to vote in favour of MOAs. This variable was also found to have a 
varying effect according to the position in government: minimum for centrist parties and maximum 
for extreme-right parties. This could be explained with Lega Nord instrumental changes of behaviour 
according to whether it was at the government or not. Furthermore, in this chapter, the impact of law-
making procedures on party support was tested. MOAs approved and/or funded through law decrees 
drew significantly more consensus than those voted through resolution on government 
representatives’ communications to the Chamber of Deputies. The peculiar voting procedure, the 
presence of smaller and less salient troop deployments, and the ex post nature of the vote contributed 
to create incentives for parties to be more supportive in law decrees. Again, such variable had a 
stronger effect on right-wing parties than on left-wing parties. Finally, taking into account votes on 
all the MOAs occurred in this period and not just the most relevant ones, this chapter gave a more 
comprehensive picture of party contestation on MOAs. Supporting votes were on average over 
seventy percent of the total, demonstrating a widespread consensus on the issue. However, it has to 
be noted that party contestation over troop deployments in Italy is slightly higher than in other 
Western countries (Ostermann et al. 2019) and that the extent of consensus in Italian parliament was 
considerable on bills covering all issues during the “Second Republic” (Giuliani 2008; Pedrazzani 
2017). 
 
163 Both the debates and votes took place at the Chamber of Deputies, the lower chamber in Italian parliament. For the 
reasons why debates and votes occurred as the senate on this issue see Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.  
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Given the significantly different extent of party support between centrist and extreme parties, it might 
look surprising that an intra-coalition conflict on this issue never produced the collapse of a 
government. In chapter 4, analysing the cases of Italy’s participation in Operation Allied Force (OAF) 
(Kosovo, 1999) and Operation Unified Protector (OUP) (Libya, 2011), I identified two potential 
mechanisms leading extreme junior partners not to defect, while opposing the troop deployment: 1) 
lack of salience attributed to the opposition to the specific mission and, more generally, security and 
defence policy, and 2) fear of being blamed and punished in the elections by their own voters for 
making the government collapse. While the second mechanism proved crucial to explain extreme 
left-wing parties’ decision to stay despite Italy’s active participation in OAF, the first one was instead 
fundamental to make sense of Lega Nord’s permanence in the last Berlusconi’s government, that 
consented to the contribution to OUP. Together with the findings on the varying impact of the 
presence of the government, this provides evidence in favour of a diverging approach to contestation 
to MOAs among extreme parties: based on instinctive pacifism and anti-militarism for the extreme 
left and more instrumental for LN.  
 
To sum up, these are the main findings of this dissertation:  
• Considerably high extent of party support for MOAs  
• Bipartisan and centrist consensus for MOAs between the main centre-left and centre-right 
parties 
• Higher extent of contestation by extreme parties, more pronounced on the left than on the 
right side of the axis 
• Presence at the government strongly increased party support for MOAs, especially for 
extreme right-wing parties 
• International legitimation for the specific MOA increased left-wing parties’ extent of support  
• Law-making procedure increased the overall extent of party support and especially that of 
right-wing parties 
• Diverging type of contestation among extreme parties, more instrumental for Lega Nord, more 
“ideological” for extreme left parties 
• Lack of salience and fear of being blamed by voters are explanatory mechanism for extreme 
junior partner’s decisions to stay in government in spite of the approval of MOAs 
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Implications for the debate on the party politics of foreign policy 
 
As suggested in Chapter 1, for decades IR and FPA have consistently underestimated the relevance 
of political parties in explaining states’ foreign policy. This neglect is regrettable. In fact, as Rathbun 
(2004) argued, on the basis on their own conceptions of national interest, parties articulate distinct 
views of how the state should conduct its external relations. Since parties are crucial components of 
executives in democracies and non-democracies alike, these ideas are bound to transform into 
concrete behaviour. Following such reasoning, in the last years, a number of articles and books 
emphasized the importance of investigating the impact of parties in shaping states’ foreign and 
security policy (Auerswald and Saideman 2014; Hofmann 2013; Mello 2014; Rathbun 2004; Schuster 
and Maier 2006). In other words, answering to Schuster and Maier’s (2006, 229) rhetorical question, 
these studies demonstrated that “parties do matter”. This doctoral thesis took such argument as a point 
of departure to analyse how Italian parties positioned themselves and interacted on the issue of 
MOAs, during the so-called “Second Republic” (1994-2013). In this sense, among the various 
findings highlighted in the previous section, it is worth emphasizing the presence of a solid bipartisan 
consensus on this issue among centre-right and centre-left parties. As Coticchia (2011) claimed, 
together with other external and domestic variables, such widespread consensus was a key to 
understand Italy’s extraordinary commitment to peace and security operations after the end of the 
Cold War. Therefore, this dissertation points out that political parties do have an impact on foreign 
policy and, consequently, should be considered as crucial domestic variables in IR and FPA 
scholarship.  
 
Given that for granted, this dissertation brings four major contributions to the academic debate on the 
party politics of military interventions (Wagner et al. 2017; 2018) and foreign policy in general. First, 
it sheds further doubts on the much theorized and empirically tested divide between dovish left-wing 
party and hawkish right-wing parties (Koch and Sullivan 2010; Palmer et al. 2004; Schuster and 
Maier 2006) as far as contemporary peace and security operations are concerned. Such distinction 
could have been valid during the Cold War when military interventions were not always strictly 
justified under humanitarian principles and the cleavage between capital and labour over the 
expansion of the welfare state (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) still fundamentally structured the division 
between left and right. To the contrary, after the end of the Cold War, the increasing number of troops 
deployment aimed at protecting and saving foreign people (see for instance the concept of R2P) 
combined with a growing consensus between mainstream parties on supranationalism (Hooghe and 
Marks 2018) have eroded the validity of this neat distinction between left and right. Currently, in 
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Western democracies, as demonstrated by Wagner et al. (2017), support for troops deployments is 
more likely to structure in a curvilinear rather than linear way on the left-right axis. While mainstream 
and establishment centrist parties (on the left and the right) tend to provide support for peace and 
security operations, challenger and niche extreme parties tend to contest them. Besides that, this new 
divide is also based on incentives related to the party competition, with challenger parties that are 
pushed to take more radical positions that resonate with the median voter in order to distinguish 
themselves and gain votes (Hobolt and De Vries 2015). This dissertation provided evidence of such 
conflict between “hawkish” centrist parties and “dovish” extreme parties in Italy with regards to 
MOAs. Future studies should conduct further tests of the emerging curvilinear model of support on 
peace and security operations in other countries as well. adopting a comparative perspective. The 
current state of the art could also benefit from innovative theoretical explanations of the causal 
mechanisms underlying such divide. 
 
Secondly, and relatedly, this dissertation points to the importance of disaggregating the category of 
peace and security operations in order to better describe party contestation. Wagner et al. (2018, 21) 
claimed that “disaggregating deployments in terms of purpose, justification under international law, 
risks for troops, international organization in charge etc. is a promising way to gain additional insights 
into patterns and drivers of contestation of military missions”. Böller and Müller (2018) showed the 
validity of this intuition, observing that after 9/11 US Congress’ assertiveness augmented for 
operations that are not perceived as serving national interests, also due to Republican party’s 
opposition. The fact that MOAs covered by a specific UNSC Resolution drew more support from the 
left-wing parties than from right-wing parties in Italy confirm the importance of unpacking troops 
deployments. Such findings could be explained through Rathbun’s (2004) contraposition between 
leftist inclusive and rightist excluding conceptions of national interests, that was explained in Chapter 
1 and 2. Future works investigating party contestation on peace and security operations across 
democratic countries should make further efforts in this direction. Again, the interaction between 
these two independent variables should be accompanied with sound and thoughtful theoretical 
accounts.  
 
Thirdly, this doctoral thesis is a call for more single-country studies. As underlined in Chapter 1, the 
majority of the studies investigating the role of parties in foreign policy are comparative, 
encompassing various countries in the analysis. While not denying the benefits of comparing different 
countries, especially in terms of external validity of the results, I would like to point out that the 
exclusive focus on one country enables the researcher to control for a number of important intervening 
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variables such as type of government, party system and the national culture of foreign policy. All 
these factors may significantly constrain how parties position themselves on foreign policy. For 
instance, Rathbun (2006) acknowledged that a past history of military victories pushed left-wing 
parties in Britain to be more interventionist in the Balkans. Lagassé and Saideman (2017) found that 
Canada’s “winner takes all” electoral law deeply affected legislative oversight on the operation in 
Afghanistan. The crux of the matter could be resumed as follows: comparison is an asset, but a 
multitude of intervening variables are a problem. Furthermore, keeping constant these variables 
allows to better focus on changes over time and across foreign policy events. Overall, a single-country 
and cross time analysis constitutes a promising research strategy to investigate the impact of parties 
on foreign and security policy.  
 
Fourthly, this doctoral thesis encourages the research agenda on party politics of foreign policy to 
keep on employing a pluralistic and eclectic methodological perspective. The current use of a 
plurality of data and methodologies across studies on parties is worth praising.  Various quantitative 
studies have been published on the impact of coalition politics and foreign policy (Beasley and 
Kaarbo 2014; Clare 2010; Kaarbo and Beasley 2008; Oktay 2014) and on the effect of partisanship 
on foreign policy (Milner and Judkins 2004; Palmer et al. 2004; Thérien and Nöel 2000; Wagner et 
al. 2017; 2018). Single and small-n qualitative works have abounded in all the three segments of 
literature reviewed in Chapter 1: partisanship and foreign policy (Bjereld and Demker 2000; Hofmann 
2017; Rathbun 2004), coalition politics and foreign policy (Ozkececi-Taner 2005; Oppermann and 
Brummer 2014), parliamentary war powers (Kesgin and Kaarbo 2010; Wagner and Raunio 2017). 
Interestingly, Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) also turned out to be a useful methodological 
tool to test the impact of partisanship and legislative-executive relations on states’ participation in 
peace and security operation (Haesebrouck 2017; 2018; Mello 2014; Wagner 2018). However, 
techniques of automated test analysis have never been employed before. Chapter 2 has demonstrated 
the potential of the algorithm Wordfish (Slapin and Proksch 2008) in measuring party support for 
military operations. Wordscores is another possible technique to achieve the same result (Laver et al. 
2003). Moreover, topic modelling methods may be used to analyse how parties speak about foreign 
policy and how their rhetoric change over time. To sum up, automated content analysis methods have 
the potential to provide new ground for the study of party politics of foreign policy.  
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Implications for the debate on Italian politics and foreign policy  
 
This dissertation has also three important implications for the more circumscribed but nonetheless 
interesting debate on Italian politics and foreign policy during the Second Republic (1994-2013). The 
first regards the issue of change in Italy’s foreign policy in this period. Notably, such debate also 
intertwines with the one on the degree of polarization in the Second Republic’s party system (Bardi 
2007; Morlino 1996). As said, while some scholars highlighted variation in the approaches of centre-
left and centre-right cabinets (Andreatta 2008; Carbone 2007), other ones stressed similarities (Croci 
2003; Walston 2004). The findings contained in this doctoral thesis could be interpreted as evidences 
in favour of both these arguments. On the one hand, left-wing parties’ preference for MOAs with a 
solid multilateral legitimacy could be read as a confirm of a different approach between the two 
coalitions. In fact, advocates of the “change argument” juxtaposed centre-left’s multilateralism and 
Europeanism to centre-right’s bilateralism and Atlanticism. On the other hand, it is worth pointing 
out that the bipartisan and generally widespread consensus on troops deployments across parties give 
credit to scholars supporting the claim of continuity in Italian foreign and security policy during the 
“Second Republic”. In fact, this element was already employed to highlight similarities in the foreign 
policies of the two coalitions in government (Croci 2003; Croci and Valigi 2014). Therefore, this 
doctoral dissertation does not contribute to settle this controversial debate. Rather, it underlines how 
much it is grounded on interpretations of facts through the lenses of different theoretical expectations. 
 
Secondly, and more conclusively, this thesis emphasizes the continuing primacy of domestic politics 
over foreign policy in Italy. Various studies demonstrated that domestic dynamics fundamentally 
shaped Italy’s external behaviour before and after the Cold War (Brighi 2013; Panebianco 1977). A 
couple of empirical findings in this dissertation show that political parties gave priority to 
consideration related to competition for office and votes in their positioning and interactions on 
MOAs. First, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 identified in presence at the government the most powerful 
independent variable to explain party support for MOAs. While government parties are more exposed 
to international pressures to participate in peace and security interventions (Wagner et al. 2018), the 
relationship between executive and legislative in parliamentary systems probably better accounts for 
this result. When a military operation is discussed in parliament, government parties are incentivized 
to support it as they already agreed on that. If not, the prospect of leaving office discourage them to 
do otherwise anyway. To the contrary, opposition parties are pushed to oppose MOAs by the 
necessity to distinguish themselves and question the stability of the cabinet (Williams 2014). Second, 
Chapter 4 demonstrated how extreme left-parties placed the fear of being blamed by their own voters 
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as responsible for the collapse of a leftist government and the return in power of the centre-right 
before their deep opposition to the participation in the Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. This is 
another evidence of how parties’ behaviour on this issue was more driven by concerns related to 
domestic politics than international policy. Paraphrasing the famous Senator Vandenberg’s quotation, 
“politics does not seem to stop at the water’s edge in Italy”. 
 
Thirdly, through its findings, this thesis complements the existing studies on parties and MOAs in 
Italy (Calossi and Coticchia 2009; Coticchia 2011; 2014; 2015; Coticchia and Davidson 2018; 
Coticchia and Giacomello 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012). Above all, it provides the first comprehensive 
quantitative test of the emerging bipartisan consensus on troops deployments in the “Second 
Republic”. A few works indicated how the main centre-left and centre-right parties in Italy converged 
on this issue, on the basis of a shared humanitarian narrative to justify the use of military force 
(Calossi and Coticchia 2009; Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012). Through different datasets and 
measures of support, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 quantitatively confirmed this finding. Moreover, 
Chapter 4 extended the work of Coticchia and Davidson (2018), by comparing the behaviour of 
extreme-left wing parties and the far-right Lega Nord as junior coalition partner. The salience and 
blame hypotheses were confirmed. However, while the blame hypothesis was more fruitful to explain 
PdCI and FdV’s willingness to remain in power, the (lack of) salience hypothesis was a more 
convincing mechanism to make sense of LN’s decision not to defect. In addition, the words 
discriminating between pro and anti-MOAs attitudes in the validation process in Chapter 2 reflected 
familiar patterns of contestations. For instance, they underlined that the international legitimacy of 
the operation was one of the most contentious issue in the political debate around operation Antica 
Babilonia in Iraq (Calossi and Coticchia 2009; Coticchia 2011).  
 
This does not mean that research on party politics around troops deployment in Italy during the 
Second Republic has exhausted its potential research questions and findings. For instance, a still 
rather unexplored puzzle is the extent of influence of junior coalition partner on operational caveats 
of the mission. Did this party contestation affect the operational dimension of the mission? If so, to 
what extent? Other potential research questions concern parliamentary oversight of the troop 
deployments. As noted, in some cases member of government gave their communications before the 
parliament before the beginning of the operation, in other ones afterwards. How to explain this 
variation in legislative-executive relationship? Did disagreements within coalition partners played a 
role? In this sense, data regarding the number of parliamentary questions have not been collected yet. 
Which factors explain their variation across missions? Finally, in Chapter 3, I showed how various 
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changes to the law-making procedures for the approval of MOAs were made across the years, 
attempting to rebalance legislative-executive relations. Which parties favoured such development and 
which ones instead oppose it? Future studies should address these questions to provide an even more 
complete description of this phenomenon.  
 
Beyond the Second Republic: the future of the party politics MOAs in Italy 
 
As explained in the Introduction and in Chapter 1, the end of the time span considered in this doctoral 
thesis was not randomly chosen. A couple of events would make particularly troublesome to extend 
it after 2013. First, reflecting a general trend among Western countries, the Italian involvement in 
peace and security operations outside national borders seemed to have slightly waned over the years. 
As showed, the number of personnel civil and military personnel deployed in other countries peace 
decreased from 2005 to 2005 and then stabilized until the present day (Senato della 
Repubblica/Camera dei Deputati 2017). After reaching a maximum of 1,5 billion of euros in 2010, 
funds committed per year to MOAs were reduced to stagnate around one billion (Senato della 
Repubblica/Camera dei Deputati 2017). The financial constraint linked to 2011 debt crisis and the 
disastrous legacy of the Operation Unified Protector in Libya, currently considered by a considerable 
part of the political elite as a mistake164, are arguably the main driving factors underlying such 
development. In summer 2014, the Italian government’s decision not to give a contribution to the air 
strikes against the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, as part of the operation Inherent 
Resolve, may be interpreted as an evidence of a disillusion concerning military interventions 
(Coticchia and Davidson 2019). Against this background, as suggested by the latest Minister of 
Defence’s White Paper (2015), Italian security and defence policy underwent a re-direction towards 
the Mediterranean and the North African (MENA) region. In fact, in the last years, military forces 
were deployed in a number of operations such as the EU-led EUNAVFOR Med-Sophia that aimed at 
tackling human trafficking and illegal immigration (Ceccorulli and Coticchia 2017). However, it has 
to be pointed out that Italy is still involved in a number of operations across the world with over five 
thousand soldiers deployed in total. It is also the largest contributor to UN peacekeeping operation 
countries. To sum up, Italian security and defence policy has been affected by a forced budget 
reduction and redirection but is still very active.  
 
 
164 In 2018, Berlusconi blamed former President of the Republic Giorgio Napolitano for the decision to participate in 
the air strikes in Libya (Il Giornale 2018) 
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Secondly, as said, the 2013 elections marked the beginning of a radical transformation in the party 
system, with the emergence of the populist Movimento Cinque Stelle (M5S) as the most voted party 
in the Chamber of Deputies and the formation of a government composed between the social 
democrat PD and Berlusconi’s PdL (D’Alimonte 2013). While sharing a significant decrease in terms 
of popularity among the electorate, the two main rivals of the Second Republic experienced two 
profoundly different trajectories. While PD stayed in power, although with a change of Prime 
Ministers, from Enrico Letta to Matteo Renzi, and finally to Paolo Gentiloni, PdL split among those 
who remained loyal to the government who formed a new party (Nuovo Centrodestra)  and those 
that, following Berlusconi, wanted to return to the opposition. Five years later, at 2018 elections, the 
existing party system was definitively shaken upside down (Bull and Pasquino 2018; Chiaramonte et 
al. 2018). M5S further increased its vote share and formed a coalition government with Lega Nord, 
that, meanwhile, under the leadership of Matteo Salvini, had become a stereotypical far-right party 
(Albertazzi et al. 2018; Passarelli and Tuorto 2018). However, this full populist cabinet lasted a little 
more than a year, being replaced by a coalition between Movimento 5 Stelle and Partito Democratico. 
From this brief description of the latest development in Italian politics, it could be easily inferred that 
the party system characterizing the Second Republic is dead and gone. Considering the volatility in 
Italian electorate’s preferences and the continuous alterations in the party system supply, it is instead 
almost impossible to predict how the new party system will structure.  
 
In addition, as described in Chapter 3, at the end of 2016, the parliament has finally passed a new 
comprehensive law (Legge Quadro) to specifically regulate the approval and (re)funding of troops 
deployment in international peace and security operations (Ronzitti 2017). According to this law, at 
the beginning of each year, the executive must provide the legislative with extensive and detailed 
information regarding all the existing MOAs to be re-funded and the new ones to be initiated. 
Parliament is then asked to vote on these missions, singularly or by small groups, as requested by 
opposition parties. Therefore, in theory, this law should increase parliamentary oversight of troops 
deployment, by guaranteeing more transparency and avoiding ex-post legitimations. At the moment, 
we have seen three applications of this new procedure. While in 2017 and 2018 the timeline was 
respected, in 2019 a long delay marked the approval process of MOAs, provoking considerable issues 
for the personnel on the ground165.  
 
 
165 For an overview of the MOAs approved in these years see the parliamentary reports (Senato della Repubblica 2017; 
Senato della Repubblica/Camera dei Deputati 2018; 2019). 
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Predicting how all these changes will affect the party politics of military intervention requires a crystal 
ball. However, there are two reasons to believe that contestation on this issue among Italian parties 
will increase in the future. First, by its system of vote, this new law has augmented the incentives for 
opposition parties to vote against MOAs promoted by the government. Opposition parties now can 
vote against missions in a selective way, without negative implications on missions they support. 
Secondly, and more generally, the increasing focus on operations related to immigration from the 
Mediterranean combined with a growing polarization between liberal and nationalist parties is likely 
to radically alter the debate on troops deployments. While liberal parties may favour operations 
oriented at rescuing migrants, nationalist parties may view more positively those focused on border 
patrolling. Such division may produce far-reaching repercussions on the continuity of Italy’s foreign 
policy in the next years. To sum up, it seems likely that party politics will have an even stronger role 
in Italy’s foreign and security policy in the near future.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Chapter 1  
 
Table A1: Composition of Italy’s cabinets during the “Second Republic” (footnote 18). 
Date of 
assignment 
Name Coalition Parties  
11/05/94 Berlusconi I Centre-right LN, AN, FI, CCD, UdC 
17/01/95 Dini Technocratic  Technocratic  
18/05/96 Prodi I Centre-left PDS, PPI, RI, FdV 
21/10/98 D'Alema I Centre-left DS, PPI, UDR, PdCI, FdV, RI, SDI 
21/12/99 D'Alema II Centre-left DS, PPI, UDEUR, PdCI, FdV, RI, Dem,  
28/04/00 Amato II Centre-left DS, PPI, Dem, UDEUR, PdCI, FdV, RI, SDI, Dem 
11/06/01 Berlusconi 
II 
Centre-right FI, AN, CCD, CDU, LN 
28/05/05 Berlusconi 
III 
Centre-right FI, AN, UDC, LN, NPSI, PRI 
17/05/06 Prodi II Centre-left DS, Mar, PRC, RI, PdCI, IdV, FdV, UDEUR,  
08/05/08 Berlusconi 
IV 
Centre-right LN, FI, MpA 
16/11/11 Monti Technocratic  Technocratic  
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Table A2: overview of all the MOAs in which Italian troops were involved during the so-called 
“Second Republic” (Alphabetic order). The years of the beginning and the end refer to the beginning 
and the end of Italy’s contribution to the mission that, for multilateral operations, may diverge from 
the dates in which the operation started and terminated (Footnote 28).  
 
Mission Beginning  End Institutional 
Framework 
Region 
28esimo gruppo navale 1997 2008 Other (Bilateral) Balkans 
Active Endeavour-Sea 
Guardian 
2001 Ongoing NATO Other (Europe) 
Alba 1997 1997 Other (Minilateral) Balkans 
Albit 2000 2000 Other (Bilateral) Balkans 
Allied Force 1999 1999 NATO Balkans 
Allied Harbour 1999 1999 NATO Balkans 
Allied Harmony 2002 2003 NATO Balkans 
Althea 2005 Ongoing EU Balkans 
Antica Babilonia  2003 2006 Other (Minilateral) Middle East 
Cyrene 2011 2012 Other (Bilateral) Africa 
DIE Albania 1997 2012 Other (Bilateral) Balkans 
Enduring Freedom  2001 2006 Other (Minilateral) Asia 
EU AMIS II Sudan 2002 2007 EU Africa 
EU Concordia/Proxima 
Fyrom 
2003 2005 EU Balkans 
EUBAM Libya  2013 2015 EU Africa 
EUBAM Rafah 2006 Ongoing EU Middle East 
EUCAP Nestor 2011 Ongoing EU Africa 
EUCAP Sahel 2012 Ongoing EU Africa 
EUFOR Chad 2008 2008 EU Africa 
EUFOR RDC 2006 2006 EU Africa 
EULEX Kosovo 2010 Ongoing EU Balkans 
EUMM Bosnia 2001 2006 EU Balkans 
EUMM Georgia  2008 2015 EU Other (Europe) 
EUPM Bosnia 2003 2009 EU Balkans 
EUPOL Afghanistan  2007 2012 EU Asia 
EUPOL Kinshasa 2005 2010 EU Africa 
EUSEC RDC 2007 2008 EU Africa 
EUTM Mali 2013 Ongoing EU Africa 
EUTM Somalia 2010 Ongoing EU Africa 
ISAF-Resolute support 2001 Ongoing NATO Asia 
Joint Forge 1998 2004 NATO Balkans 
Kfor - Joint Enterprise 1999 Ongoing NATO Balkans 
MFO  1981 Ongoing Other (Minilateral) Africa 
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MIATTM/MIACCD 
Malta 
1973 Ongoing Other (Bilateral) Other (Europe) 
MINURSO 1991 Ongoing UN Africa 
MINUSMA 2013 Ongoing UN Africa 
NATO HQ Sarajevo 2005 Ongoing NATO Balkans 
NATO HQ Skopje 2003 Ongoing NATO Balkans 
NATO HQ Tirana 2003 Ongoing NATO Balkans 
NTM Iraq 2005 2010 NATO Middle East 
Ocean Shield/Atalanta 2008 Ongoing EU Asia 
Support to EAU 2010 Ongoing Other (Bilateral) Asia 
TIPH 1995 2019 Other (Minilateral) Middle East 
UNAMID 2008 2013 UN Africa 
UNFICYP 1974 Ongoing UN Other (Europe) 
Unified Protector 2011 2011 NATO Africa 
UNIFIL 1978 Ongoing UN Middle East 
UNIKOM 1991 2003 UN Middle East 
UNMEE 2000 2008 UN Africa 
UNMIBH 1995 2002 UN Balkans 
UNMIK 1999 2008 UN Balkans 
UNMIS/UNMISS 2005 2005 UN Africa 
UNMOGIP 1972 Ongoing UN Asia 
UNOWA 2005 2005 UN Africa 
UNSMIS 2012 2012 UN Middle East 
UNTSO 1957 2006 UN Middle East 
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Chapter 2 
 
Table A3: Distribution of debates, missions and parties (footnote 55). 
Dates of the debates Missions Parties  
02/04/97 Alba (Albania) AN, CCD-CDU, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, PDS/DS, 
PPI, PRC 
26/03/99 Allied Force/Allied Harbour 
(Kosovo) 
AN, CCD-CDU, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, 
PPI-Dem, PdCI, PRC 
13/04/99 Allied Force/Allied Harbour 
(Kosovo) 
AN, CCD-CDU, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, 
PPI-Dem, PdCI, PRC 
19/05/99 Allied Force/Allied Harbour 
(Kosovo) 
AN, CCD-CDU, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, 
PPI-Dem, PdCI, PRC 
09/10/01 Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, 
PRC, UDC 
07/11/01 Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, 
PRC, UDC 
03/10/02 Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, 
PRC, UDC 
19/03/03 Iraqi Freedom (Iraq) AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, 
PRC, UDC 
15/04/03 Iraqi Freedom (Iraq) AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, 
PRC, UDC 
20/05/04 Iraqi Freedom (Iraq) AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, 
PRC, UDC 
26/09/06 UNIFIL (Lebanon) AN, PDS/DS, IdV, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, 
PdCI, PRC, UDC 
24/03/11 Unified Protector (Libya) IdV, LN, PD, FI/PdL, UDC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 167  
 
Table A4: Correlation between the two measures of party support obtained through Wordfish. 
Support_Gov is extracted including the texts containing speeches made by government 
representatives. Support_Nogov is extracted without these texts. Observations: 104. ***: p<0,01 
(footnote 58).  
 
 
Support_gov Support_nogov 
Support_gov 1,00 
 
Support_nogov 0,7166*** 1,00 
 
Figure A1: Scatterplot of the correlation between Support_Gov and Support_Nogov. (footnote 58). 
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Figure A2: “Eiffel Tower” for the debate on the Operation Antica Babilonia, 15/4/2003. Words 
expected to occur frequently – “guerra” (“war”), “pace” (“peace”), “umanitaria” 
(“humanitarian”), “sicurezza” (“security”), “democrazia” (“democracy”) – are coloured in red. 
(footnote: 59) 
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Table A5: Replication of Model 1 and Model 2 with positions extracted not including the texts 
containing the speeches made by government representatives as dependent variable 
(Support_Nogov) (footnote 67).  
   
 
Model 1 Model 2 
IV DV: Support_nogov DV: Support_nogov 
   
Rile 0.377** 0.250 
 
(0.138) (0.175) 
Rile x Rile -0.036* -0.033* 
 
(0.019) (0.017) 
Gal/Tan 0.062 0.083 
 
(0.075) (0.076) 
Gov 
 
0.848*** 
  
(0.240) 
UN 
 
0.048 
  
(0.234) 
UN x Rile 
 
-0.024 
  
(0.051) 
Interest 
 
-0.634 
  
(0.610) 
Interest x Rile 
 
0.133 
  
(0.101) 
Constant -1.079*** -1.037** 
 
(0.244) (0.354) 
   
Observations 104 104 
R-squared 0.109 0.257 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A6: Replication of Model 1 and Model 2 with random effect for parties and the position 
extracted including the texts containing speeches made by government representatives as a dependent 
variable (Support_gov) (footnote 67). 
   
 
Model 1  Model 2  
IV DV: Support_gov DV: Support_gov 
   
Rile 0.515*** 0.575*** 
 
(0.159) (0.152) 
Rile x Rile -0.048*** -0.046*** 
 
(0.017) (0.015) 
Gal/Tan -0.010 -0.039 
 
(0.069) (0.062) 
Gov 
 
0.960*** 
  
(0.150) 
UN 
 
0.531* 
  
(0.291) 
UN x Rile 
 
-0.126** 
  
(0.054) 
Interest 
 
0.307 
  
(0.358) 
Interest x Rile 
 
-0.068 
  
(0.068) 
Constant -1.188*** -1.769*** 
 
(0.325) (0.351) 
   
Observations 104 104 
Number of party_cat 13 13 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A7: replication of Model 1 and Model 2 with random effects for debates and the position 
extracted including the texts containing speeches made by government representatives as a dependent 
variable (Support_gov) (footnote 67). 
 
   
 
Model 1 Model 2  
IV DV: Support_gov DV: Support_gov 
   
Rile 0.515*** 0.602*** 
 
(0.159) (0.143) 
Rile x Rile -0.048*** -0.049*** 
 
(0.017) (0.014) 
Gal/Tan -0.010 -0.037 
 
(0.069) (0.056) 
Gov 
 
0.958*** 
  
(0.152) 
UN 
 
0.544* 
  
(0.296) 
UN x Rile 
 
-0.129** 
  
(0.055) 
Interest 
 
0.330 
  
(0.361) 
Interest x Rile 
 
-0.070 
  
(0.069) 
Constant -1.188*** -1.833*** 
 
(0.325) (0.332) 
   
Observations 104 104 
Number of deb_cat 12 12 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A8: replication of Model 1 and Model 2 only on debates in which the centre-right was in 
government and the position extracted including the texts containing speeches made by government 
representatives as a dependent variable (Support_gov) (footnote 67). 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
IV DV: Support_gov DV: Support_gov 
   
Rile 1.034*** 0.969*** 
 (0.221) (0.254) 
Rile x Rile -0.060** -0.054** 
 (0.023) (0.020) 
Gal/Tan -0.214*** -0.220*** 
 (0.062) (0.069) 
Gov  0.501 
  (0.357) 
UN  0.485** 
  (0.184) 
UN x Rile  -0.112*** 
  (0.031) 
Interest  0.719 
  (0.745) 
Interest x Rile  -0.173 
  (0.147) 
Constant -2.340*** -2.311*** 
 (0.345) (0.358) 
   
Observations 59 59 
R-squared 0.444 0.523 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table A9: replication of Model 1 and Model 2 only on debates in which the centre-left was in 
government and the position extracted including the texts containing speeches made by government 
representatives as a dependent variable (Support_gov) (footnote 67). 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
IV DV: Support_gov DV: Support_gov 
   
Rile 0.701*** 0.308 
 (0.178) (0.296) 
Rile x Rile -0.093*** -0.062** 
 (0.027) (0.027) 
Gal/Tan -0.000 0.105 
 (0.085) (0.082) 
Gov  0.887** 
  (0.383) 
UN  -0.089 
  (0.462) 
UN x Rile  -0.009 
  (0.082) 
Interest  -1.080 
  (0.605) 
Interest x Rile  0.200 
  (0.130) 
Constant -0.801** -0.645 
 (0.268) (0.672) 
   
Observations 45 45 
R-squared 0.473 0.634 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table A10: replication of Model 1 and Model 2 with the addition of the variable measuring for party 
extremism (Extreme) and the position extracted including the texts containing speeches made by 
government representatives as a dependent variable (Support_gov) (footnote 67). 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
IV DV:Support_gov DV: Support_gov 
   
Rile 0.033 0.109 
 (0.088) (0.099) 
Gov  0.958*** 
  (0.163) 
Gal/Tan -0.010 -0.037 
 (0.071) (0.061) 
Extreme -0.048** -0.049*** 
 (0.017) (0.015) 
UN  0.544* 
  (0.270) 
UN x Rile  -0.129** 
  (0.050) 
1.Interest  0.330 
  (0.372) 
0b.Interest#co.Rile  0.000 
  (0.000) 
1.Interest#c.Rile  -0.070 
  (0.079) 
Constant 0.017 -0.601* 
 (0.305) (0.277) 
   
Observations 104 104 
R-squared 0.108 0.493 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
 
 
 175  
 
Chapter 3 
 
Table A11: summary of all the votes and parties included in the dataset (footnote 85). 
Date  Cabinet  Parties Mission Act  
29/09/94 Berlusconi 
I 
AN, PDS/DS CCD-CDU, FI/PdL, LN, 
PPI-Dem, PRC 
Multiple Decree 
16/05/95 Dini AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FI/PdL, 
LN, PPI-Dem, PRC 
UNMIBH Decree 
11/07/95 Dini AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FI/PdL, 
LN, PPI-Dem, PRC 
UNOSOM Decree 
02/08/96 Prodi I AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, 
FI/PdL, LN, PPI-Dem, PRC 
UNMIBH Decree 
18/03/97 Prodi I AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, 
FI/PdL, LN, PPI-Dem, PRC 
Multiple Decree 
09/04/97 Prodi I AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, 
FI/PdL, LN, PPI-Dem, PRC 
Alba Resolution 
17/06/97 Prodi I AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, 
FI/PdL, LN, PPI-Dem, PRC 
Alba Decree 
01/07/97 Prodi I AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, 
FI/PdL, LN, PPI-Dem, PRC 
UNMIBH Decree 
30/07/97 Prodi I AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, 
FI/PdL, LN, PPI-Dem, PRC 
Alba Decree 
04/12/97 Prodi I AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, 
FI/PdL, LN, PPI-Dem, PRC 
Alba Decree 
10/03/98 Prodi I AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, 
FI/PdL, LN, PPI, PRC 
Joint Forge Decree 
30/07/98 Prodi I AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, 
FI/PdL, LN, PPI-Dem, PRC 
Multiple Decree 
02/03/99 D'Alema I AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, 
FI/PdL, LN, PdCI, PPI-Dem, PRC 
Multiple Decree 
26/03/99 D'Alema I AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, 
FI/PdL, LN, PdCI, PPI-Dem, PRC 
Allied Force/Allied 
Harbour 
Resolution 
13/04/99 D'Alema I AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, 
FI/PdL, LN, PdCI, PPI-Dem, PRC 
Allied Force/Allied 
Harbour 
Resolution 
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19/05/99 D'Alema I AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, 
FI/PdL, LN, PdCI, PPI-Dem, PRC 
Allied Force/Allied 
Harbour 
Resolution 
16/06/99 D'Alema I AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, 
FI/PdL, LN, PdCI, PPI-Dem, PRC 
Multiple Decree 
13/07/99 D'Alema I AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, 
FI/PdL, LN, PdCI, PPI-Dem, PRC 
Multiple Decree 
25/11/99 D'Alema I AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, 
FI/PdL, LN, PdCI, PPI-Dem, PRC 
Multiple Decree 
06/03/00 D'Alema II AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, 
FI/PdL, LN, PdCI, PPI-Dem, PRC 
Multiple Decree 
26/07/00 Amato II AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, 
FI/PdL, LN, PdCI, PPI-Dem, PRC 
Multiple Decree 
07/02/01 Amato II AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, 
FI/PdL, LN, PdCI, PPI-Dem, PRC 
Multiple Decree 
02/08/01 Berlusconi 
II 
AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, 
PdCI, PRC, UDC 
Multiple Decree 
09/10/01 Berlusconi 
II 
AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, 
PdCI, PRC, UDC 
Enduring Freedom Resolution 
17/10/01 Berlusconi 
II 
AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, 
PdCI, PRC, UDC 
Allied Harmony Decree 
07/11/01 Berlusconi 
II 
AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, 
PdCI, PRC, UDC 
Enduring Freedom Resolution 
29/01/02 Berlusconi 
II 
AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, 
PdCI, PRC, UDC 
Enduring Freedom Decree 
14/02/02 Berlusconi 
II 
AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, 
PdCI, PRC, UDC 
Multiple Decree 
04/06/02 Berlusconi 
II 
AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, 
PdCI, PRC, UDC 
Multiple Decree 
03/10/02 Berlusconi 
II 
AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, 
PdCI, PRC, UDC 
Enduring Freedom Resolution 
20/02/03 Berlusconi 
II 
AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, 
PdCI, PRC, UDC 
Multiple Decree 
19/03/03 Berlusconi 
II 
AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, 
PdCI, PRC, UDC 
Iraqi Freedom Resolution 
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15/04/03 Berlusconi 
II 
AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, 
PdCI, PRC, UDC 
Iraqi Freedom Resolution 
24/07/03 Berlusconi 
II 
AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, 
PdCI, PRC, UDC 
Iraqi Freedom Decree 
10/03/04 Berlusconi 
II 
AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, 
PdCI, PRC, UDC 
Multiple Decree 
20/05/04 Berlusconi 
II 
AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, 
PdCI, PRC, UDC 
Iraqi Freedom Resolution 
13/07/04 Berlusconi 
II 
AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, 
PdCI, PRC, UDC 
Multiple Decree 
14/07/04 Berlusconi 
II 
AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, 
PdCI, PRC, UDC 
Multiple Decree 
27/10/04 Berlusconi 
II 
AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, 
PdCI, PRC, UDC 
Iraqi Freedom Resolution 
15/03/05 Berlusconi 
II 
AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, 
PdCI, PRC, UDC 
Iraqi Freedom Decree 
16/03/05 Berlusconi 
II 
AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, 
PdCI, PRC, UDC 
Multiple Decree 
12/07/05 Berlusconi 
III 
AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, 
PdCI, PRC, UDC 
Multiple Decree 
21/07/05 Berlusconi 
III 
AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, 
PdCI, PRC, UDC 
Iraqi Freedom Decree 
19/07/06 Prodi II AN, FI/PdL, FdV, IdV, LN, PD, PdCI, 
PRC, UDC 
Multiple Decree 
26/09/06 Prodi II AN, FI/PdL, FdV, IdV, LN, PD, PdCI, 
PRC, UDC 
UNIFIL Decree 
08/03/07 Prodi II AN, FI/PdL, FdV, IdV, LN, PD, PdCI, 
PRC, UDC 
Multiple Decree 
21/02/08 Prodi II AN, FI/PdL, FdV, IdV, LN, PD, PdCI, 
PRC, UDC 
Multiple Decree 
19/11/08 Berlusconi 
IV 
IdV, LN, PD, FI/PdL, UDC EUMM Georgia Decree 
21/01/09 Berlusconi 
IV 
IdV, LN, PD, FI/PdL, UDC Multiple Decree 
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17/12/09 Berlusconi 
IV 
IdV, LN, PD, FI/PdL, UDC Multiple Decree 
20/01/10 Berlusconi 
IV 
IdV, LN, PD, FI/PdL, UDC ISAF Resolution 
03/03/10 Berlusconi 
IV 
IdV, LN, PD, FI/PdL, UDC Multiple Decree 
21/07/10 Berlusconi 
IV 
IdV, LN, PD, FI/PdL, UDC Multiple Decree 
28/07/09 Berlusconi 
IV 
IdV, LN, PD, FI/PdL, UDC Multiple Decree 
25/01/11 Berlusconi 
IV 
IdV, LN, PD, FI/PdL, UDC Multiple Decree 
15/02/11 Berlusconi 
IV 
IdV, LN, PD, FI/PdL, UDC ISAF Resolution 
24/03/11 Berlusconi 
IV 
IdV, LN, PD, FI/PdL, UDC Unified Protector Resolution 
04/05/11 Berlusconi 
IV 
IdV, LN, PD, FI/PdL, UDC Unified Protector  Resolution 
02/08/11 Berlusconi 
IV 
IdV, LN, PD, FI/PdL, UDC Unified Protector Decree 
01/02/12 Monti IdV, LN, PD, FI/PdL, UDC Multiple Decree 
04/07/12 Monti IdV, LN, PD, FI/PdL, UDC UNSMIS Decree 
22/01/13 Monti IdV, LN, PD, FI/PdL, UDC Multiple  Decree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 179  
 
Table A12: Replication of logit models with clustered standard error for parties (footnote 91). 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
IV DV: Support DV: Support DV: Support 
    
Rile 0.549* 1.026*** 0.593** 
 (0.303) (0.268) (0.277) 
Rile x Rile -0.037 -0.106*** -0.089** 
 (0.043) (0.038) (0.042) 
Gal/Tan 0.205 0.436*** 0.497*** 
 (0.132) (0.163) (0.164) 
Gov  4.150*** 2.518** 
  (0.600) (1.114) 
Gov x Rile   0.917** 
   (0.448) 
Decree  1.396*** 0.405* 
  (0.286) (0.246) 
Decree x Rile   0.235*** 
   (0.090) 
Constant -1.333*** -4.812*** -3.611*** 
 (0.508) (0.630) (0.542) 
    
Observations 483 483 483 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Table A13: Replication of the probit models with random effect for parties (footnote 91). 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
IV DV = Support DV = Support DV = Support 
    
Rile 0.074 0.402* 0.081 
 
(0.211) (0.229) (0.267) 
Rile x Rile 0.001 -0.048* -0.040 
 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.027) 
Gal/Tan 0.217* 0.339*** 0.422*** 
 
(0.111) (0.123) (0.137) 
Gov 
 
2.395*** 1.406** 
  
(0.277) (0.548) 
Gov x Rile 
  
0.599* 
   
(0.353) 
Decree 
 
0.873*** 0.261 
  
(0.202) (0.411) 
Decree x Rile 
  
0.163* 
   
(0.089) 
Constant -0.627 -2.626*** -1.872*** 
 
(0.470) (0.536) (0.634) 
    
Observations 483 483 483 
Number of parties 13 13 13 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A14: Replication of the models with clustered standard error for votes (footnote 91). 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
IV DV: Support DV: Support DV: Support 
    
Rile 0.347*** 0.583*** 0.349* 
 
(0.108) (0.164) (0.209) 
Rile x Rile -0.025* -0.060*** -0.053** 
 
(0.014) (0.018) (0.021) 
Gal/Tan 0.129*** 0.258*** 0.300*** 
 
(0.043) (0.072) (0.073) 
Gov 
 
2.319*** 1.586*** 
  
(0.324) (0.488) 
Gov x Rile 
  
0.416** 
   
(0.198) 
Decree 
 
0.798*** 0.239 
  
(0.228) (0.505) 
Decree x Rile 
  
0.142 
   
(0.114) 
Constant -0.830*** -2.772*** -2.160*** 
 
(0.251) (0.376) (0.518) 
    
Observations 483 483 483 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A15: replication of the Probit models with random effects for votes (footnote 91). 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
IV DV: Support DV: Support DV: Support 
    
Rile 0.452*** 0.788*** 0.553** 
 
(0.132) (0.191) (0.220) 
Rile x Rile -0.036** -0.081*** -0.079*** 
 
(0.014) (0.021) (0.024) 
Gal/Tan 0.147** 0.301*** 0.350*** 
 
(0.062) (0.093) (0.100) 
Gov 
 
2.827*** 2.006*** 
  
(0.372) (0.606) 
Gov x Rile 
  
0.448 
   
(0.326) 
Decree 
 
1.005*** 0.301 
  
(0.337) (0.528) 
Decree x Rile 
  
0.194* 
   
(0.100) 
Constant -1.016*** -3.503*** -2.840*** 
 
(0.262) (0.563) (0.632) 
    
Observations 483 483 483 
Number of votes  62 62 62 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A16: replication of the Probit models with the addition of the variable measuring for party 
extremism (Extreme) (footnote 91). 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
IV DV: Support DV: Support DV: Support 
    
Rile 0.093 -0.015 -0.180 
 (0.118) (0.120) (0.117) 
Extreme -0.025 -0.060*** -0.053** 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) 
Gal/Tan 0.129* 0.258*** 0.300*** 
 (0.075) (0.083) (0.091) 
Gov  2.319*** 1.586** 
  (0.276) (0.626) 
Gov x Rile   0.416* 
   (0.249) 
Decree  0.798*** 0.239* 
  (0.157) (0.133) 
Decree x Rile   0.000 
   (0.000) 
Decree x Rile   0.142*** 
   (0.048) 
Constant -0.194 -1.276*** -0.839* 
 (0.385) (0.424) (0.475) 
    
Observations 483 483 483 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Table A17: multinomial logit models with opposition votes as a base outcome (footnote 91). 
 
 Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 Model 3 Model 3 
IV Abstentions     Yes  Abstentions Yes Abstentions Yes  
       
Rile 0.239 0.585* 0.404 1.219*** 0.592 0.547* 
 (0.695) (0.333) (0.584) (0.405) (0.613) (0.310) 
Rile x Rile -0.007 -0.040 -0.035 
-
0.127*** -0.047 -0.105** 
 (0.061) (0.043) (0.048) (0.043) (0.055) (0.045) 
Gal/Tan 0.139 0.210 0.246 0.489** 0.237 0.576*** 
 (0.189) (0.156) (0.242) (0.230) (0.260) (0.218) 
Gov   1.465*** 4.663*** 2.129** 2.690*** 
   (0.504) (0.590) (0.859) (1.041) 
Decree   0.265 1.765*** 0.309 0.262 
   (0.376) (0.379) (0.949) (0.194) 
Gov x Rile     0.169 0.986** 
     (0.332) (0.429) 
Decree x Rile     -0.002 0.373*** 
     (0.140) (0.066) 
Constant -2.944*** 
-
1.519** -3.705*** 
-
5.962*** -4.267*** 
-
4.001*** 
 (1.075) (0.610) (0.929) (0.914) (1.077) (0.564) 
       
Observations 483 483 483 483 483 483 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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Chapter 4 
 
Table A18: Composition of D’Alema I cabinet at the beginning of the legislature (1998) (footnote 
103). 
 
 
Table A19: Composition of Berlusconi IV cabinet at the beginning of the legislature (2008) (footnote 
103). 
Party  Share of Total 
Seats 
(Chamber of 
Deputies) 
Share of Total 
Seats (Senate) 
Share of 
majority 
(Chamber of 
Deputies) 
Share of 
majority 
(Senate) 
Share of cabinet 
posts (ministers)  
PdL 43,65% (275) 45,34% (146)  80,17% (275) 83,91% (146) 80,95% (17) 
LN 9,52% (60) 8,07% (26) 17,49% (60) 14,94% (26) 19,05% (4) 
Others 1,27% (8) 0,62% (2) 2,33% (8) 1,15% (2) 0 
Total 54,44% (343) 54,03% (174) 100% (343) 100% (174) 100 % (21) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Party Share of Total 
Seats (Chamber 
of Deputies 
Share of Total 
Seats (Senate) 
Share of 
majority 
(Chamber of 
Deputies) 
Share of 
Majority 
(Senate)  
Share of Cabinet 
Posts (Ministers) 
DS 26,83% (169) 32,31% (105) 49,71% (169) 51,98% (105) 28,00% (7) 
PPI 10,63% (67) 9,54% (31) 19,71% (67) 15,35% (31) 20,00% (5) 
UDR 4,13% (26) 6,15% (20) 7,65% (26) 9,90% (20) 12,00% (3) 
PdCI 3,33% (21) 1,85% (6) 6,18% (21)  2,97% (6) 8,00% (2) 
FdV 2,38% (15) 4,31% (14) 4,41% (15) 6,93% (14) 8,00% (2) 
RI 3,65% (23) 2,15% (7) 6,76% (23) 3,47% (7) 8,00% (2)  
SDI 1,27% (8) 0,92% (3) 2,35% (8) 1,49% (3) 4,00% (1) 
Others 1,75% (11) 2,46% (8) 3,24% (11) 3,96% (8) 12,00% (3) 
Total 53,97% (340) 62,15% (202) 100% (340) 100% (202) 100% (25) 
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Table A20: Overview of the interviews (footnote 106) 
Interviewee Case Party Date 
1 Kosovo PdCI 27/02/19 
2 Kosovo PdCI 13/03/19 
3 Kosovo PdCI 12/04/19 
4 Kosovo FdV 07/05/19 
5 Kosovo FdV 16/04/19 
6 Kosovo FdV 07/05/19 
7 Kosovo DS 18/03/19 
8 Libya PdL 12/03/18 
9 Libya PdL 20/04/18 
10 Libya PdL 30/04/19 
11 Libya LN 29/03/18  
12 Libya LN 08/05/19 
13 Libya LN 28/05/19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
